US v. Jonathan Logan, No. 12-4235 (4th Cir. 2012)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4235 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JONATHAN CLINGMAN LOGAN, Defendant Appellant. No. 12-4236 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JONATHAN CLINGMAN LOGAN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (1:11-cr-00001-MR-DLH-1; 1:10-cr-00089-MR-DLH1) Submitted: November 29, 2012 Decided: Before MOTZ, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. December 13, 2012 Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Henderson Hill, Executive Director, Ann L. Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Melissa L. Rikard, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: In No. 12-4235, Jonathan Logan appeals the eighteenmonth sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. In No. 12-4236, he appeals the consecutive eighteen-month sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to four counts of bank fraud. We affirm. I Logan s Guidelines range convictions was 12-18 months. for the bank fraud During argument at sentencing, defense counsel discussed Logan s medical problems and urged the court to consider splitting the sentence between a period of incarceration and one of community placement. The district court sentenced Logan to eighteen months on each count, to run concurrently. In imposing the sentence, the court took into consideration the 18 U.S.C. ยง 3553(a) (2006) sentencing factors. The court expressed its concern that the offenses had occurred relatively soon after Logan s release from prison on other charges. The court also noted that defrauding banks was the equivalent of stealing from the banks customers. Logan claims that the sentence is unreasonable because, when imposing the sentence, the court did not mention either his medical condition or his request that the sentence be split between incarceration and community placement. 3 We review the reasonableness United States v. of the sentence Diosdado-Star, for 630 abuse of discretion. F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. court did not abuse its 2011). We discretion. find that the district The district court s explanation of the selected sentence was adequate under established circuit law. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). II In 2009, Logan was sentenced to forty-six months for wire fraud, appealed, bank and fraud, the and parties aggravated jointly identity moved theft. remand to He for resentencing in light of Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009). prison. Logan was resentenced to twenty-five months in He had already served approximately thirty months in prison by the time of his resentencing. incarceration and placed on Logan was released from supervised release. He then admitted to violating certain terms of his release, which was revoked. Logan was sentenced for both the release violation and bank fraud at the same proceeding. With respect to the release violation, defense counsel asked the court to take into account Logan s over-service of his original sentence. 4 The district court replied that it could not consider such over-service when fashioning an appropriate revocation sentence. Logan claims unreasonable because over-service of revocation sentences within the the sentence. imposed the upon prescribed unreasonable. that his district sentence previous This court sentence Court revocation statutory range procedurally refused when reviews of is consider selecting whether supervised and to are the or not release are not plainly United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that Logan has not established that his sentence is plainly unreasonable. Counsel has not identified, and we have not located, any case law holding that over-service of a sentence may be taken into consideration when imposing a revocation sentence, and there is reason to be wary of allowing over-service to establish[] . . . a line of credit to be used against future violations of the law. F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1971) See Miller v. Cox, 443 (internal quotation marks omitted). III We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 5 in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6

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