Snider Int'l Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights, MD, No. 12-2490 (4th Cir. 2014)
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Plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of the issuance and form of automated speeding citations issued under Maryland's speed camera program. The court found that the notice and hearing afforded by Maryland's speed camera statute satisfied due process where notice sent by first-class mail was reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of the speeding violation and civil penalties; the availability of a trial in state court, upon plaintiffs' election, provided adequate opportunity to be heard on any objections prior to the imposition of the statutory penalties; and any flaws in the citation or enforcement process could have been challenged in the state courts and plaintiffs failed to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the towns.
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PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-2490 SNIDER INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, trading as Eastover Auto Supply; MARK CRANFORD; STAN DERWIN BROWN; AL GOYBURU, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS, MARYLAND; TOWN OF RIVERDALE PARK, MARYLAND, Defendants Appellees, and MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE TOWN OF RIVERDALE PARK, MARYLAND, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge. (8:12-cv-01248-JFM) Argued: October 29, 2013 Decided: January 7, 2014 Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Agee joined. ARGUED: James S. Liskow, DECARO, DORAN, SICILIANO, GALLAGHER & DEBLASIS, LLP, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellants. Kevin Bock Karpinski, KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen H. Ring, Gaithersburg, Maryland; Christopher R. Dunn, DECARO, DORAN, SICILIANO, GALLAGHER & DEBLASIS, LLP, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellants. Sandra D. Lee, KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. 2 GREGORY, Circuit Judge: Maryland permits localities to employ speed monitoring systems, better known as speed cameras, for enforcing traffic laws. Maryland s speed camera program imposes civil penalties for exceeding the speed limit by twelve miles per hour. several years, two electronically-signed Maryland speeding towns issued citations by a During number first-class of mail. The issues on appeal are whether the use of first-class mail or the use process. of the citations as evidence at trial violate due Finding that they do not, we affirm. I. Snider International Brown, and action challenging form of Al Goyburu automated the Corporation, ( Appellants ) Mark filed constitutionality speeding a of citations. 1 Cranford, Stan putative class the issuance Appellants and received citations from the Town of Forest Heights, Maryland and the Town of Riverdale Park, Maryland ( Appellees ). The citations were issued under Maryland s speed camera program. 1 The putative class action never constitutionality of the speed camera program. 3 challenged the A. Since 2006, the Maryland General Assembly has permitted the use of speed monitoring systems throughout designated areas within the state. pilot run expanded in See Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-809. Montgomery statewide the October in County, speed 2009. After a camera Under program Maryland Transportation Article § 21-809, speed cameras may be placed in school zones, in certain residential areas in Montgomery County, and near certain colleges in Prince George s County. 2 809(b)(1). § 21- Speed cameras produce electronically-recorded images of vehicles traveling in excess of the speed limit by at least twelve miles per hour. § 21-809(a)(5). The automated citations carry a civil penalty no greater than forty dollars. 809(c)(2). citation § 21- Nonpayment of the penalty and failure to contest the amounts to an admission of civil liability and may result in suspension or nonrenewal of the recorded vehicle s registration. The § 21-809(g). General Assembly further prescribed contents of these automated citations. mails the citation to the registered 2 the form and The appropriate agency owner of the recorded Speed cameras are also authorized in highway work zones, but a different statute governs such use. See, Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-810. All citations pertinent to this appeal issued from cameras authorized by Section 21-809. 4 vehicle. § 21-809(d)(1). An agency is either the local police force or, where a locality lacks its own police force, the entity charged with administering the automated citations. § 21-809(a)(2). owner s The information; citation the must time, contain the and location date, registered of the violation; the recorded image; the penalty amount; and a signed statement by a duly authorized law enforcement officer employed by or under contract with an agency that the vehicle was driven in an unlawful manner. A citation Court of recipient Maryland 809(d)(5). § 21-809(d)(1). The in may lieu recipient elect of a trial paying the present may for in the District penalty. § 21- consideration any defenses to liability that the district court deems pertinent. § 21-809(f)(1). The court determines preponderance of the evidence standard. liability using § 21-809(e)(3). a At trial, the agency may introduce the citation as evidence without any corroborating operator. evidence § 21-809(e)(1). certificate affirming or authentication by the systems To do so, the agency must submit a both a violation certain requirements under § 21-809(b). and satisfaction § 21-809(e)(1). of Under Subsection (b), the following documents must be kept on file and admitted into evidence at trial: the systems operator s certificate of training, a daily log showing that the systems operator successfully completed 5 a self-test prior to the recording of the image, and a signed certificate of calibration issued by an 809(b)(2)-(4). independent calibration laboratory. § 21- The citation recipient may request the presence and testimony of the systems operator at trial. § 21-809(e)(2). The speed camera statute references mail in two contexts. First, the statute requires all citations be mailed no later than two weeks after the alleged violation where the recipient is a Maryland resident. 3 §§ 21-809(d)(4), (f)(4). In this context, the statute does not specify the use of any particular mail service or delivery method. arises when describing The second reference to mail procedures for a defense that the registered owner was not driving the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation. The citation recipient must send a sworn statement of such facts by certified mail. § 21-809(f)(3). B. Between May 2010 and January 2012, Appellees issued fiftyfive citations via first-class mail to Appellants. 4 paid some Appellants of these defaulted citations by neither immediately. paying the Appellants Other times, citations nor 3 Citations to nonresidents must issue within thirty days of the alleged violation. § 21-809(4). Appellants are Maryland residents. 4 The parties agree that first-class mail was the form of service authorized by ordinances enacted pursuant to § 21-809. 6 electing trial. In yet other instances, Appellants elected trial in the District Court of Maryland, received an adverse verdict, and still refused to pay. As to all fifty-five citations, the record lacks any indication that Appellants never received any of the mailed citations. Appellants filed a putative class action in the States District Court for the District of Maryland. United Appellants identified four classes of individuals: (1) anyone who received and immediately by paid citations issued the Town of Forest Heights, (2) anyone who received and immediately paid citations issued by the Town of Riverdale Park, (3) anyone issued citations by the Town of Forest Heights and suffered a default due to nonpayment, and (4) anyone suffering nonpayment of the Riverdale Park citations. relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging default due to Appellants sought violations of the Fourteenth Amendment s Due Process Clause and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Without ruling on the class certification motion, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the towns. 5 5 Appellees filed a motion for dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and the district court considered the motion as one for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). The district court noted that the plaintiffs Rule 12(c) motion was premature due to the fact that the pleadings had yet to close. The district court later (Continued) 7 After rejecting Appellees jurisdictional and waiver arguments, 6 the district court constitutional laws held that through it § 1983 could not enforce actions, and state that res judicata precluded claims by recipients who suffered default due to nonpayment. 7 Turning to the merits as to those who paid the citations, the district court held that the citations issuance and contents process. did not Appellants violate timely substantive appealed, or procedural challenging only due the district court s ruling on the merits as to the paid classes. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. We review a district court s grant of summary judgment de novo. Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013). explained why, untimeliness merits was appropriate. notwithstanding, denial on the 6 Appellees unsuccessfully argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine required abstention by the district court. The district court also rejected Appellees argument that those plaintiffs who paid the citations waived their right to pursue relief under § 1983. 7 The district court held that res judicata did not apply to the two paid classes because those plaintiffs never received a final judgment on the merits. 8 III. Appellants maintain that the automated citations violated both procedural and substantive due process in three ways. First, Appellants argue that first-class mail fails to satisfy due process, certified and that mail. Appellees Second, must Appellants use, at contend a minimum, that citations signed electronically cannot serve as sworn testimony admissible at trial. noncompliance Third, with Appellants § 21-809(b) claim violated that the citations the process required under Maryland law. A basic requirement of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation is the depriv[ation] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Mantavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)). Conduct violating state law without violating federal law will not give rise to a § 1983 claim. United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 1998). We find Appellants third challenge, which concerns whether the citations comply with the Maryland statute, misplaced in a § 1983 claim. Even if the citations violated Maryland law, the noncompliance would not violate federal law and thus cannot give rise to § 1983 relief. Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 163 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371 (4th Cir. 1974) (officer cannot be liable under § 1983 for violating 9 a Maryland arrest constitutional law law unless governing he . . . also violated the The arrests ). federal alleged noncompliance with the state law is not, as Appellants argue, so extreme as to result in denial of a constitutionally fair proceeding. (4th Cir. See, e.g., Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 186 2000). The district court properly found that Appellants cannot pursue § 1983 relief for acts that allegedly violate only Maryland law. We similarly limit our consideration to Appellants first two arguments, which allege violations of the United States Constitution. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. contains both substantive and procedural components. due process prevents mistaken or unjust Due process Procedural deprivation, while substantive due process prohibits certain actions regardless of procedural fairness. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). We consider each challenge as they relate to procedural due process before addressing substantive due process. 10 A. At bottom, procedural due process requires fair notice of impending state action and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950). Notice and the hearing are two distinct features of due process, and are thus governed by different standards. 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002). Dusenbery v. United States, Proper notice is an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process, and must be reasonably calculated Mullane, to 339 convey U.S. information at 314; concerning see also a deprivation. Presley v. Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 490 (4th Cir. 2006). forth the familiar three-step inquiry for adequacy of the opportunity to be heard: City of Mathews set determining the a balancing of the private interest and the public interest, along with the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 424 U.S. at 335. 1. Appellants challenge first-class mail as a constitutionally insufficient means of providing notice. Mullane is the appropriate Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 168. but rather an effort guidepost As noted in Dusenbery, for this question. Notice must not be a mere gesture, reasonably 11 calculated to effect actual notice. Mullane, necessary. satisfies U.S. Dusenbery, due reasonably 339 534 process certain at U.S. where to 315. at it inform Actual notice 170-71. either those is not Instead, notice is in itself or 2) where 1) affected conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, . . . the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes. 339 U.S. at 315 (citations omitted). Mullane, The use of first-class mail at issue satisfies this inquiry. The Supreme Court has routinely recognized that the use of mail satisfies the notice element of due process. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006); Tulsa Prof l Jones v. Collection Servs., Inc v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at recognized 319 as (recognizing an efficient that the mails today are and inexpensive means of communication that would ordinarily satisfy a prudent man of business ); cf. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982) (finding that [n]otice by mail . . . would surely go a long way toward providing proper notice the under constitutionally due process). required Where the assurance of identities of interested parties are known, a serious effort [must be made] to inform them personally of the [action], at least by ordinary mail to the record addresses. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added); see also Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 12 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) ( Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party . . . if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable. ). First-class mail was reasonably calculated to confer actual notice upon Appellants. Appellees mailed connection with Through summonses the to recorded their the designated addresses vehicles. It agencies, registered in difficult to is imagine a more reasonable attempt at effectuating actual notice of a driving infraction than the use of registration information collected Motor by Transp. Vehicle the state s transportation Administration §§ 13-402, 13-403 vehicles with the MVA). ( MVA ). (requiring agency, See Md. residents the Maryland Code to Ann., register By using these records, the citations were sent to what was likely to be the most current address for the registered owner. (requiring owners address changes). to See Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 13-414(a) notify the MVA within thirty days of So long as the agency did not have reason to believe that the citation recipient could not be reached at that address, the mailed notice would be sufficient. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 39-40 (1972) (notice sent to an address listed with the secretary of state was insufficient because the 13 appellant s incarceration provided the state knowledge that he would not receive mail at his residence). Repeated success of first-class mail delivery suggests the reasonableness of this method for two reasons. First, an individual that receives timely actual notice, and thus suffers no harm from the method of notice, constitutionality of said method. cannot challenge the See, e.g., Lind v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., 688 F.3d 402, 406 (8th Cir. 2012). Second, due to successful delivery, Appellees lacked any indication, e.g. envelopes returned as undeliverable, that first-class mail could not reasonably provide actual notice. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 229-30 (notice insufficient where the government proceeded with a taking after learning the notice was not delivered); cf. Linn Farms & Timber Ltd. P ship v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 661 F.3d 354, 358 (8th Cir. 2011) (additional steps beyond the initial notice attempt were necessary where notice letters were returned as undeliverable). Appellants offer no facts that would have suggested to Appellees that sending mail to the addresses of record would not accomplish actual notice. Appellants payment of the mailed citations plainly suggests both actual notice and the reasonableness in continuing to use the same notice procedure. Appellants spend significant time attacking first-class mail, arguing it is sufficient only for in rem proceedings where 14 publication already occurred. procedures do not displace They contend that these in rem the requirements for in personam actions, which Appellants read as requiring the use of certified mail or other efforts above and beyond first-class mail. position is incorrect. This Sufficiency of notice does not turn upon the sometimes malleable and elusive distinctions of in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem, thus we employ the reasonably calculated to effect actual notice inquiry regardless of the nature of the action. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312-13. As to their certified mail proposal, Appellants cite Miserandino v. Resort Properties, Inc., 691 A.2d 208 (Md. 1997), for the position that first-class mail is insufficient for providing action for a money judgment in Maryland. 8 notice in an However, Miserandino did not broadly declare first-class mail insufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 See Griffin v. Bierman, 941 A.2d 475, 485-86 (Md. 2008). 8 In Miserandino, the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether certain factors permitted the use of the significantly less certain procedure of first-class mail instead of ordinary and available methods such as personal service by officials or service by restricted delivery or certified mail. 691 A.2d at 219. In finding first-class mail impermissible, the court based its conclusion on the fact that a money judgment was at issue and also the Virginia long-arm service statute relevant to those proceedings. Id. 9 Even if it meant what Appellants suggest, Misernadino s persuasiveness is severely undercut by subsequent explanations in Jones and Dusenbery that offered further guidance as to what (Continued) 15 Furthermore, and contrary to Appellants position, certified mail does not necessarily enhance the likelihood of actual notice; even if it did, such enhancement would not necessarily compel us to make certified mail the constitutional threshold. never See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 172 ( [O]ur cases have held that improvements in the reliability of new procedures necessarily demonstrate the infirmity of those that were replaced. ); cf. Akey v. Clinton Cnty., N.Y., 375 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) ( As notice by mail is deemed to be reasonably calculated to reach property owners, the state is not required to go further, despite the slight risk that notice sent by ordinary mail might not be received. ). fails to recipient s demonstrate a correlation signature upon delivery enhancement of delivery procedures. 172. The record before us between and an requiring improvement a or See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at Put another way, nothing presented to us indicates that the United States Postal Service delivers certified mail at a rate so superior to that of first-class mail that we should declare first-class mail not reasonably calculated to provide actual notice. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234-35 (recognizing that certified mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary notice efforts are reasonable under procedural due process. Griffin, 941 A.2d at 482-83, 486. 16 See mail, thus certified mail only increases chance of actual notice so long as someone is present to sign for the letter (citations omitted)). First-class mail may actually increase the likelihood of actual notice, as the signature requirement limits when certified mail may be delivered. Id. at 234. We also decline Appellants invitation to read Jones as permitting the use of first-class mail only in conjunction with publication after certified mail has proved unfruitful. Courts have upheld the sufficiency of dual mailing schemes, involving the contemporaneous use of first-class and certified mails to send identical notice, returned unclaimed. even where the certified notices are See Griffin, 941 A.2d at 483; Crum v. Mo. Dir. of Revenue, 455 F. Supp. 2d 978, 989 (W.D. Mo. 2006), aff d sub nom. Crum v. Vincent, 493 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 2007). follows that an to prerequisite Griffin, scheme d[id] 941 was not the A.2d not of sufficiency of 484 an the to certified requiring indication that infirm certified mail first-class (explaining constitutionally prior Without failure at require undeliverable mail ). initial merely mail [the that the is not mail. dual mailing because [it] be returned use of] first first-class a Cf. to the It as class mailing attempt could not notify the intended recipient, it is difficult to see how first-class mail, on its own, is insufficient. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 227, 234 (requiring the government to take 17 additional, reasonable steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do so, where it received new information suggesting that its attempt at notice has failed ); cf. Griffin, 941 A.2d at 484 n.11 ( Our holding would be different, however, had the firstclass mail notices been returned undelivered or the certified mail had been returned unclaimed. ). as something more revealing than Accordingly, we find that notice via first- class mail comports with due process. 2. Appellants second argument challenges the validity of electronic signatures on citations and the admissibility of the citations as sworn testimony in trial. Appellants contend that the electronic signatures fail to state whether the testimony is sworn based on personal knowledge or information and belief, as required by Maryland law, and thus cannot form testimony under oath. Without reaching the substance of the state law, we find no procedural due process violation. A procedural occurrence of a due process deprivation violation but arises rather the process in connection with the deprivation. at 125. Therefore, to determine whether not failure upon the of due Zinermon, 494 U.S. a constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate. Id. Rather than a meticulous examination of the minutiae of the 18 state s procedural rubric, procedural due process is simply a guarantee that there is notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, Md., 519 F.3d 216, 230 (4th Cir. 2008). Having found notice sufficient, only an evaluation of the opportunity to be heard remains. We now consider 1) the private risk interest involved, 2) the of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable procedural value, if safeguards, any, and of the 3) additional state or substitute interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens imposed by additional process. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. More than evaluating the twenty MVA s years ago, deprivation we applied procedures with Mathews in respect to driver s license suspensions, which are analogous to the hearing procedure under the speed camera program. Plumer v. State of Md., 915 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1990). Plumer required hearing, setting notice to forth the the licensee basis for of the The procedure in a pre-deprivation suspension, and an opportunity at the hearing to inspect evidence, call witnesses, and present rebuttal evidence. Id. at 932. We found the MVA s procedures not only constitutionally adequate but possibly even more than due process requires. Id. We find no reason to reach a different conclusion here. Appellants received constitutionally 19 sufficient notice of the citation and potential penalty, and they could elect a trial prior to being assessed the penalty. basis for the adverse action. The notice set forth the The trial, like the hearing in Plumer, permitted Appellants to call witnesses and rebut the state s evidence with their own. Appellants interest is arguably less than that at stake in Plumer--driving privileges cannot be affected under the speed camera program and the $40 civil penalty is not subject to additional monetary penalties for nonpayment. 10 It is difficult to see how additional process could significantly reduce the chance of erroneous deprivation, especially given the trial mechanism already in place. The state s interest in efficiently enforcing traffic laws would be greatly burdened safeguards, resources, were exhausting that we to require significant would provide additional fiscal little, and if procedural administrative any, additional protection above and beyond that afforded by a trial in the state courts. In present fact, their Notwithstanding the mere availability of grievances undermines the that fact 10 a trial in Appellants Appellants which to argument. predicate their At oral argument, counsel for Appellees explained that failure to pay the speeding citations at issue would not impact an individual s driving record or driving privileges in general. Counsel further noted that no late fees are imposed for failure to pay by the deadline indicated on the citation. 20 challenge on a violation of state law rather than federal law, the availability of state procedures [to address Appellants arguments] is fatal to their procedural due process claims. Mora, 519 F.3d at 230. Appellants had adequate opportunity in the state courts to argue the sufficiency of electronicallysigned citations evidence. as an affidavit or otherwise admissible Having forgone the opportunity to object to the use of electronically-signed citations as evidence, Appellants may not first cry foul in a federal court on this issue. See Mora, 519 F.3d at 230 ( [Mora] cannot plausibly claim that Maryland s procedures are unfair when he has not tried to avail himself of them. ). B. We also find that the automated citation procedures do not violate substantive due process. The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government. (1998). County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 Only the most egregious official conduct qualifies as constitutionally arbitrary. Huggins v. Prince George s Cnty., Md., 683 F.3d 525, 535 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). To give rise to a substantive due process violation, the arbitrary action must be unjustified by any circumstance or governmental interest, as to be literally incapable of avoidance by any pre-deprivation procedural 21 protections or of adequate rectification by any post-deprivation state remedies. Rucker v. Harford Cnty., 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991). Appellants fail to identify any element of the disputed procedures that equate to egregious official conduct unjustified by the state interest in traffic enforcement. Furthermore, assessment of the $40 civil penalty was subject to correction through trial, presentation of witnesses, and rebuttal evidence. Thus, Maryland s treatment of [Appellants] is hardly arbitrary when the state has [alleged] errors. given [them] the means to correct the Mora, 519 F.3d at 231. V. We find that the notice and hearing afforded by Maryland s speed camera statute satisfy due process. Notice sent by first- class mail was reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of the speeding violation and civil penalties. The availability of a election, trial adequate in state court, opportunity imposition of the to upon be Appellants heard statutory on any penalties. objections Any flaws provided prior to in the citation or enforcement process could have been challenged in the state courts, and Appellants failed to do so. Accordingly, the district court s judgment is AFFIRMED. 22
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