Richard Sampson v. Hospira, Incorporated, No. 12-2247 (4th Cir. 2013)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-2247 RICHARD SAMPSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. HOSPIRA, INCORPORATED Defendant Appellee, and MIKE LEONARD; BRAD BAZEMORE; LEI ZHENG Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville. James C. Dever, III, Chief District Judge. (4:10-cv-00121-D) Submitted: June 6, 2013 Decided: July 3, 2013 Before AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Teresa DeLoatch Bryant, THE BRYANT, PLLC, Greenville, Phillip J. Strach, OGLETREE, P.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, LAW OFFICES OF TERESA DELOATCH North Carolina, for Appellant. DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: Richard Sampson appeals the district court s entry of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Hospira, Inc. (Hospira), on Sampson s claim that Hospira unlawfully terminated Sampson s employment as a laboratory technician in a chemical plant. Sampson, who is Native American, alleged that Hospira terminated his employment in violation of North Carolina law based on his interracial relationship with an African American co-worker, who pregnant After relationship. 1 became reviewing during the the course record, we of their affirm the district court s judgment. We review an award of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Sampson, the non-moving party. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119-20 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record fails to disclose a genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under (EEPA), the N.C. North Gen. Carolina Stat. § Equal Employment 143-422.2, 1 an Practices employer may Act not The district court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 3 discriminate against an employee on the basis religion, color, national origin, sex or handicap. of race, We analyze a wrongful discharge claim under the EEPA pursuant to the same burden-shifting requirements discrimination statutes. applicable to federal anti- N.C. Dep t of Corr. v. Gibson, 301 S.E.2d 78, 82-84 (N.C. 1983). In the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of discrimination must demonstrate (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he suffered from an adverse employment action; (3) that at the time the employer performing at expectations; similarly took the a level and (4) qualified adverse that that applicant met the employment his employer s position outside action was the he was legitimate filled protected by a class. King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003). When a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer nondiscriminatory reason to for articulate the adverse a legitimate, employment action. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). If the employer satisfies this evidentiary standard, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons for termination offered by the employer were not its true reasons, but were a pretext 4 for discrimination. Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)). For purposes deciding that of our Sampson analysis, established discrimination under the EEPA. 2 argument that the we district a will prima assume facie without case of We therefore address Sampson s court erred in concluding that Hospira established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Sampson s employment, namely, that Sampson entered false data tolerance contends into a policy that he log book requiring provided in violation accurate sufficient of Hospira s documentation. evidence that no- Sampson Hospira s explanation for terminating his employment was pretextual. We disagree with Sampson s argument. The record demonstrates that on June 26, 2007, Sampson was asked to repair equipment used to perform testing on chemical solutions. In order to make the repair, Sampson needed determine a working standard for an identified solution. to To determine the working standard, Sampson was required to weigh 2 Because we assume without deciding that Sampson established a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of North Carolina law, we do not address whether an individual is a member of a protected class under the EEPA based on a sexual relationship with an individual of another race. We observe that the district court also assumed without deciding that Sampson qualified as a member of a protected class under the EEPA. 5 the solution, manually record that weight amount in a log book and note the date of entry, confirm the weight amount with another employee, and record that weight amount in a computer software file. 408.15 Sampson manually recorded a weight amount of mg in the log book, documented in the computer but a software weight of file. 396.67 Two days mg was later, Sampson struck through the original weight amount of 408.15 mg that he had written in the log book, and entered a different weight amount of 396.67 mg. When Sampson s supervisors were informed about the altered log book, they questioned Sampson. had made a Sampson s transcription supervisors, error Sampson contended that he that however, he later determined had that corrected. Sampson had failed to perform the required initial weighing procedure to obtain the weight of the working standard. The supervisors reached this conclusion based on the fact that they were unable to find a volumetric container bearing the weight of 408.15 mg, that no other employee had confirmed a working standard of 408.15 mg, and that the weight standard entered into the computer software file was 396.67 mg, rather than 408.15 mg. In support of his position that Hospira s explanation was pretextual, Sampson relies on statements in the district court record from Sampson s two conduct former of Hospira entering supervisors, an 6 improper who opined working that standard into a log book did not constitute a falsification of data. That evidence, however, is not germane to the issue whether Hospira relied on a pretextual reason for terminating Sampson s employment. In conducting our review, we consider the opinion of the Hospira supervisors who actually made the decision to discharge Sampson, not the opinions of former Hospira personnel. See DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) (it is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant in determining whether an employer s reasons for terminating an employee are pretextual) (citation and internal quotation court marks showed omitted). that the The evidence Hospira before supervisors who the district decided to terminate Sampson s employment considered his contention that he merely made support that a transcription contention error and, but found ultimately, no did evidence not to believe Sampson s explanation. Sampson contends, nevertheless, that the record contained evidence of pretext based on his supervisors comments about his relationship with his coworker, which his supervisors made about one week before Sampson entered the false data in the log book. We find no merit in this argument. that the supervisors expressed Although the evidence showed disapproval that Sampson had impregnated a co-worker, the supervisors comments did not refer to the race of either employee or to the fact that Sampson had 7 been involved in an interracial relationship. Moreover, the allegedly suspicious timing of events, namely, that Sampson s supervisors learned about his relationship one week before the data-recordation incident, is insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Hospira s stated reason for terminating Sampson s employment was pretextual. We likewise find no merit in Sampson s additional argument that evidence of information he stated she that discriminatory received was from animus personally demonstrated Hospira another was employee, who joking the familiar with in by laboratory regarding [Sampson] and his relationship with his co-worker. part of This general statement did not exhibit animus on the the Hospira supervisors Sampson s employment or Sampson s involvement in who constitute a decided a relationship to terminate statement regarding with a person of a different race. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Hospira, because Sampson failed to present a disputed issue of material fact that would permit a jury to conclude that Sampson was discharged from his employment based on his race or on his involvement in an interracial sexual relationship. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 8 presented adequately in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. AFFIRMED 9
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