US v. Eddie Snead, No. 11-5100 (4th Cir. 2012)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-5100 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. EDDIE WAYNE SNEAD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:09-cr-00281-H-1) Submitted: October 31, 2012 Decided: November 7, 2012 Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion. Noah A. Clements, THE CLEMENTS FIRM, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Eddie Wayne Snead appeals his conviction and 228-month sentence following his guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement to distribution 21 U.S.C.A. of § a quantity 841(a)(1) of cocaine, (West 2006 in & violation Supp. of 2012). The Government argues that Snead s appeal of his sentence is foreclosed by the waiver of appeal rights in his plea agreement and that the remainder of the appeal is without merit. We dismiss in part and affirm in part. A criminal defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver is knowing and intelligent. United Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). States v. Generally, if the district court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during a plea colloquy performed in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005). Whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a question of law this court reviews de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). Where the Government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and there is no claim that it breached its obligations under the plea agreement, we will enforce the waiver if the record establishes that (1) the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to 2 waive the right to appeal; and (2) the issue being appealed is within the scope of the waiver. Id. at 168 & n.5. Upon review of the record and the parties briefs, we conclude that Snead knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his 228-month sentence. Accordingly, we dismiss the portion of Snead s appeal challenging his sentence under United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 241-47 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), and Congress sentencing policies. Next, challenge to we the decline hearing to on reach his the motion merits to of suppress Snead s evidence because the claimed error was waived by virtue of his guilty plea. When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to entry of the plea. (4th Cir. 2004). United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 644 A criminal defendant s guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. (1973). Thus, non-jurisdictional Tollett the v. Henderson, defendant ground 411 U.S. 258, who pled guilty which upon has to attack that has 267 no judgment except the inadequacy of the plea or the government s power to bring any indictment at all. F.3d 263, 279 (4th citation omitted). Cir. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 2010) (internal quotation marks and Snead s valid guilty plea thus waives his argument challenging the judgment of conviction on the basis of 3 a claimed constitutional error at the pre-guilty-plea hearing on his motion to suppress evidence. Snead also challenges the district court s failure to order a competency hearing sua sponte. A district court is required to order a competency hearing sua sponte if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. In determining whether there is 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006). reasonable cause to order a competency hearing, a district court must consider all evidence before it, including evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant s demeanor . . . , and medical opinions concerning the defendant s competence. 1290 (4th Cir. 1995). court erred in United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, To prevail on a claim that the district failing to order a competency hearing, the defendant must establish that the court ignored facts raising a bona fide doubt regarding his competency. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 291 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). After review of the record and the parties briefs, we conclude that Snead fails to establish that the district court abused its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing sua sponte. See United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 742 4 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating the standard of review). Snead s two indicators for of his alleged need to be evaluated mental competence letters he supposedly wrote to the district court prior to the sentencing hearing and the nature of his allocution at that hearing do not establish a bona fide doubt as to his competency. Snead fails to identify the letters at issue, expound on their contents, or explain how the letters in any way bear on the issue of whether he was suffering at the sentencing hearing from a mental disease or defect that prevented him from understanding the nature and consequences of the hearing or in assisting in his defense. Further, Snead also fails to connect his allocution with any reasonable basis for believing he lacked understanding of the sentencing proceeding or lacked the ability to assist in his defense. Accordingly, the district court did not in abuse its discretion failing to order a competency hearing sua sponte. Snead also argues that he was constructively denied counsel at the portion of the sentencing hearing dedicated to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. counsel results from counsel is so counsel is provided circumstances inadequate at that, all. in Constructive denial of where the effect, Moussaoui, performance of assistance of no 591 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). F.3d at 289 After review of the record, we reject Snead s argument, premised on United 5 States v. Joslin, 434 F.2d 526, 528-31 (D.C. Cir. 1970), that he was constructively denied counsel because trial counsel failed to deliver arguments in support of the motion and told district court that he recommended against granting it. the Unlike in Joslin, which, in any event, does not bind this court, Snead did not plausibly assert his innocence of the offense to which he had pled guilty. Further, Snead in no way suggests that his trial counsel plausibly could have argued that he had shown a fair and United just reason States v. for Moore, withdrawing 931 F.2d his 245, guilty 248 (4th plea. Cf. Cir. 1991) (listing six factors this court is to consider in determining whether defendant has carried his burden in showing a fair and just reason suggestion to withdraw that he was his guilty plea). constructively Further, counsel denied Snead s because there may have been a breakdown of communication with trial counsel is wholly unexplained and lacks record support. Accordingly, Snead s claim of the constructive denial of counsel is without merit. Finally, Snead claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in connection with the competency hearing conducted by the magistrate judge. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable on direct appeal. 1997). United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. Rather, to allow for adequate development of the record, 6 a defendant must bring his claims in a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2012) motion. the record Id. conclusively An exception exists, however, where establishes ineffective assistance. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). After review of the record, we find no conclusive evidence that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and we therefore decline to consider this claim on direct appeal. In view of the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the district court s judgment in part. Snead s motion brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal before seeking contentions the court leave to are adequately and argument file a pro presented would not se We deny in aid supplemental the the materials decisional process. DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART 7
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