US v. Anthony Coleman, No. 11-4989 (4th Cir. 2012)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-4989 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ANTHONY COLEMAN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10cr-00305-RWT-1) Submitted: April 25, 2012 Decided: May 9, 2012 Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan S. Skelton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Stacy Dawson Belf, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Anthony Coleman pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted § 922(g)(1) (2006), criminal the to and felon was mandatory in violation sentenced as sentence minimum of 18 U.S.C. an armed career of fifteen years prescribed by 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West Supp. 2011). Coleman appeals his sentence, arguing that imposition of the fifteenyear sentence conflict with was error because the mandate in 18 mandatory U.S.C. minimum § 3553(a) sentences (2006) to impose a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary. He further contends that a fifteen-year sentence is greater than necessary in § 3553(a). his case to achieve the sentencing goals of We affirm. The Sentencing Reform Act, of which § 3553(a) is part, dictates that a defendant should be sentenced in accordance with its provisions to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) [e]xcept as otherwise (2006). specifically Courts have provided. generally 18 held that U.S.C. § 3551(a) mandatory minimum sentences are otherwise specifically provided and thus do not conflict with § 3553(a) s necessary clause. sufficient but not greater than See United States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. defendant] 2004) was ( [T]he exposed to mandatory pursuant 2 minimum to sentences [statute] clearly [the fit within the except as otherwise specifically provided exclusion of § 3551(a). ). Courts have uniformly rejected the claim that § 3553(a) s no greater than necessary language authorizes a district court to sentence below the statutory minimum. United States v. Cirilo-MuÃ±oz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (listing cases); see also United States v. Franklin, 499 F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir. 2007) ( [Section] 3553(a) factors do not apply to congressionally mandated sentences ); United States v. Roberson, 474 acknowledging F.3d the 432, tension 436 between (7th Cir. § 3553(a) 2007) and (although statutorily- mandated sentences, holding that § 3553(a) as a very general statute cannot be understood to authorize courts to sentence below minimums specifically prescribed by Congress. ). In United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 2005), we held that, post-Booker, except in limited circumstances not present here, a district court still may not depart below a statutory minimum. Id. at 862. Coleman s reliance on United States v. Raby, 575 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2009), is misplaced, as that case provides no guidance on sentencing below a mandatory minimum. We therefore affirm the district court s judgment. dispense with oral argument because the facts and We legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3

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