Betty Hart v. Hanover County School Board, No. 11-1619 (4th Cir. 2012)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-1619 BETTY W. HART, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. HANOVER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; MICHAEL R. ASHBY, SR., Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (3:10-cv-00794-JRS) Submitted: January 27, 2012 Before KING and Circuit Judge. DAVIS, Circuit Decided: Judges, and October 12, 2012 HAMILTON, Senior Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. David R. Yvonne S. Virginia, Virginia, Simonsen, Jr., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Wellford, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Hanover, Bradford A. King, THOMPSONMCMULLAN, P.C., Richmond, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Betty W. Hart, who was previously employed by the Hanover County School Board ( the Board ), filed a complaint against the Board and its Director of Pupil Transportation, Michael Ashby, asserting that her employment was terminated in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201219 (West 1998 & Supp. 2011). Hart asserts that the district court erred when it granted Defendants Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim. Hart also asserts that the district court erred when it refused to reconsider its dismissal order, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and dismissed her Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) motion to amend the complaint as moot. Although we discern no error in the district court s order granting Defendants motion to dismiss, we conclude that the district court erred when it denied her motions to amend and for reconsideration. This court reviews de novo a district court s order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, assuming that all well-pleaded nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint are true. v. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Aziz Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2011). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief 2 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.] Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations marks, alterations and citations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.] Id. Given the allegations in Hart s original complaint, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting Defendants motion to dismiss. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (holding that adverse action taken twenty months after protected activity suggests, by itself, no causality at all ); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir. 1998) ( A thirteen month interval between the charge and termination is too long to establish causation absent other evidence of retaliation. ). We denying nonetheless Hart s complaint. motions vacate for the district reconsideration and court s to order amend her Rule 15(a) requires that leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile. Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986) (construing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Delay alone, however, is an insufficient reason to deny the plaintiff s motion to amend. 3 Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). For this reason, a district court may not deny such a motion simply because it has entered judgment against the plaintiff be it a judgment of dismissal, a summary judgment, or a judgment after a trial on the merits. evaluated Id. under Instead, a post-judgment motion to amend is the same legal standard as a similar motion filed before judgment was entered for prejudice, bad faith, or futility. Id. As this court recognized in Laber and recently reiterated in Katyle v. Penn Nat l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470-71 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 115 (2011), the only difference between a pre- and a post-judgment motion to amend is that the district court may not grant the post-judgment motion unless the judgment is vacated pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 427. See Katyle, 637 F.3d at 470; Laber, 438 F.3d at To determine whether vacatur is warranted, however, the court need not concern itself with either of those rules legal standards. Katyle, 637 F.3d at 471. Rather, [t]he court need only ask whether the amendment should be granted, just as it would on 15(a). whether a prejudgment motion to amend pursuant to [Rule] Id.; see also Laber, 438 F.3d at 426-29 (analyzing the district court erred in denying a post-judgment motion to amend under the more liberal motion to amend standard, rather than the more stringent 4 Rule 59(e) standard, and concluding that the district court erred in denying the Rule 59(e) motion because the plaintiff did not act in bad faith, the amendment was not prejudiced). We futile, review and for the abuse defendant of would discretion a not be district court s denial of a motion to amend a complaint, regardless of whether that motion is filed pre- or post-judgment. Laber, 438 F.3d at 427-28. The only reason the district court gave for denying Hart s motion to amend was that the motion was moot because Hart could not establish she was entitled to have the district court s final judgment vacated under Rule 59(e); the district court did not consider whether Hart s amended complaint would be See Johnson, 785 prejudicial, futile, or was made in bad faith. F.2d at 509. properly We conclude that the district court s failure to analyze discretion. Hart s motion to amend was an abuse of See Murrow Furn. Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furn. Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 524, 526 n.3, 529-30 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that district court s denial of Rule 59(e) motion effectively denied the Rule 15(a) motion, but ultimately vacating because district the court s district court denial failed of the to give Rule a 15(a) reason motion for the denial using the standards for granting a Rule 15(a) motion). Accordingly, there are sufficient grounds to vacate the district court s order to the extent it denied Hart s Rule 59(e) motion. 5 See Laber, 438 F.3d at 428; see also Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) ( A conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to amend . . . is sufficient grounds on which to reverse the district court s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion. ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although we affirm the district court s order granting Defendants motion to dismiss Hart s original complaint, we vacate the district court s order denying Hart s Rule 59(e) and Rule 15(a) motions. district court so it may We remand this matter to the determine, in the first instance, whether Hart is entitled to amend her complaint under Rule 15(a) (i.e., whether the amendment would prejudice Defendants, whether the amendment was made in bad faith, and whether the amendment would be futile). * facts and materials legal before We dispense with oral argument because the contentions are adequately the and argument court presented would not in the aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED * By this disposition, we indicate ultimate resolution of Hart s motions. 6 no view as to the

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