US v. Charles Hall, No. 10-4995 (4th Cir. 2012)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4995 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHARLES ALLEN HALL, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (3:09-cr-00019-MR-1) Argued: September 19, 2012 Decided: October 15, 2012 Before TRAXLER, Chief Circuit Judge; DUNCAN and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Davis joined. ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Melissa Louise Rikard, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Angela Parrott, Assistant Federal Defender, Cecilia Oseguera, Assistant Federal Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, Matthew Segal, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 DUNCAN, Circuit Judge: Appellant and sentence on Charles one Allen count of Hall appeals possession of his a conviction firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on the ground that rights. state authorities violated his Fourth Amendment He further contends that the district court erroneously admitted unduly prejudicial evidence. In the alternative, Hall requests that we vacate the district court s order requiring him to reimburse court-appointed attorneys fees, as well as his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (the ACCA ). the reasons that follow, we affirm Hall s conviction. For However, we vacate the district court s reimbursement order and remand for resentencing as to that issue only. I. A. We briefly summarize the relevant facts. On April 8, 2008, Officer Calvin Helms of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department went with three other officers to Hall s Charlotte, North Carolina residence to arrest him for a misdemeanor charge arising from Officer Helms the was purported aware theft that Hall of catalytic had a converters. lengthy criminal history, including fifteen felony convictions and one hundred arrests. Upon arriving at Hall s 3 residence, the officers recognized his vehicle in the driveway, as some of the officers had seen Hall driving the vehicle in the past. After the officers knocked and announced their presence at both the front and back doors, a man who the officers knew was not Hall, and who was later identified as Thomas Phillips, opened the back door. An Phillips officer mumbled asked Phillips something whether Hall incomprehensible was in response-- possibly hold on or no --before shutting the door. The officers response. continued Officer knocking Helms then but received contacted apprised them of the situation. his there. J.A. 99. no further supervisors and In light of Hall s criminal history, the officers decided to request the assistance of a SWAT team to execute the arrest warrant. Over the next few hours, a SWAT team deployed to Hall s residence, set up a command post, and used loudspeakers to call for Hall to come out of the house. Hall did not come out, but four other occupants emerged: Hall s wife, Sheena Hall; her two children; and Phillips. her husband was not inside. Ms. Hall told the officers that According to the officers, Phillips told them that Hall was in the house. At the later suppression hearing, Phillips disputed that he told the officers Hall was inside; however, testimony. When the Hall district did court not credited respond or the emerge, officers SWAT team members entered the house and searched for Hall but did not find 4 him. During the search, the officers located two firearms, including a rifle that had been placed in an air duct large enough for a person to fit inside that ran underneath the house. An officer had opened the air duct to see if Hall was hiding in it. That officer immediately located a brown or tan rifle bag, about three feet long, six to eight inches high, and narrowed in a triangular manner on one end, laying lengthwise down the duct. J.A. 585-86. He pulled the bag out of the air duct and set it on the ground. At trial, the officer testified that he referred to it as a rifle bag because he owns several such bags himself. He further described it as just a large canvas or cloth like bag that s long enough for a rifle to fit into with a strap across the top, J.A. 185, and explained that [y]ou could feel the weight of it being heavier on one side versus the other when I lifted it out, typical of a rifle bag with a rifle inside of it. set up, J.A. 586. I have several at home, same exact Other officers later opened the bag and found a rifle. After interviewed the Phillips initial again, search, and adamant that Hall was inside. one reported of that the officers Phillips was The SWAT team then conducted a second search, and officers located Hall in a crevice inside the attic wall. An officer later testified at trial that he saw 5 Hall and said, Let me see your hands, whereupon Hall swore at him and spat at him and other officers. J.A. 151-52. B. On February 17, 2009, Hall was charged in the Western District of North Carolina with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hall filed a motion to suppress, arguing, inter alia, that (1) officers could not enter a house to arrest the subject of a misdemeanor warrant; (2) officers did not have adequate reason to believe Hall was inside; (3) officers exceeded the scope of a protective sweep; and (4) the duration of the search was constitutionally unreasonable. hearings, denied. after The magistrate judge conducted two suppression which he recommended that Hall s motion be Hall filed written objections to that recommendation. On September 29 and October 8, 2009, the district court entered orders overruling Hall s objections, adopting the magistrate judge s recommendation, and denying the motion to suppress. the first day of trial, the district court heard On additional testimony regarding the motion to suppress and reiterated its denial of that motion. Hall also filed a motion in limine to preclude the use of what he deemed inadmissible propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, he objected to testimony 6 from officers that Hall swore and spat at them when they found and arrested him. 1 The district court ruled that such evidence was not 404(b) evidence, as it was inextricably intertwined with the events in question and was relevant and admissible. Hall again objected to the admission of this evidence at trial, and his objection was overruled. After convicted Hall. sentenced Hall trial On as an on October August armed 25, 19 and 2010, career 20, the criminal 2009, a district to jury court 188 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The district court found that Hall lacked the ability to pay a fine or interest under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a), but it ordered Hall to reimburse the United States for court-appointed attorneys fees, installments in the amount of $50. in the form of monthly It made no specific findings of fact in support of the reimbursement order. The district court entered judgment against Hall on September 11, 2010. This appeal followed. 1 The government also referred to Hall s conduct in this regard during its opening and closing statements. 7 II. Hall makes the following arguments on appeal: that state authorities violated the Fourth Amendment by entering his residence without searching the bag reason in to which believe the he rifle was was inside found; and that by the district court erred in admitting evidence that Hall swore and spat at officers when they found him; that the district court violated the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, by ordering Hall to repay his court-appointed attorneys fees; and that the district court erred in sentencing him as an armed career criminal under the ACCA. We consider each contention in turn. A. We violated first the Fourth address Hall s Amendment by reason to believe he was inside. 2 contention entering his that police home without On appeal from a district court s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the court s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de 2 Although Hall also contends in general terms that SWAT teams present acute Fourth Amendment concerns, Appellant s Br. at 19, he frames the argument in the context of the broader challenge to the officers reason to believe he was home when they entered his residence. He cites no authority, nor have we found any, for the proposition that a SWAT team may not be used to execute a misdemeanor warrant. To the contrary, given Hall s criminal history, of which the officers were aware, the exercise of their discretion to call in a SWAT team seems appropriate. 8 novo. United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). [A]n implicitly arrest carries warrant with it the founded limited on probable authority to cause enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. 573, 603 (1980). Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. It is well established that Payton requires that officers have a reasonable belief that the arrestee (1) lives in the residence, and (2) is within the residence at the time of entry. United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995). Assuming the equivalence of the probable cause and reason to believe standards, 3 the officers were required to have been aware of facts and circumstances sufficient to justify a reasonably cautious person in believing that Hall was in the home. Vasquez v. Snow, 616 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1980). 3 To We note that the parties disagree about whether reasonable belief requires probable cause, or something less. We have previously acknowledged the diverse views taken by our sister circuits, and declined to reach a conclusion as to whether reason to believe is as stringent as probable cause. Hill, 649 F.3d at 263. Here, too, we decline to resolve that issue, because we hold that the officers had probable cause to enter Hall s home. 9 determine whether probable cause existed, we look to the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the arrest. United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 931 (4th Cir. 1995). And as to the second Payton prong, courts must be sensitive resident s to presence, common including sense the factors indicating possibility that a the resident may be aware that police are attempting to ascertain whether or not the resident is at home. United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995); cf. 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.1 (4th ed. 2004) ( [T]he police need not possess special knowledge that the defendant is at home in order to meet the probable cause test, for in the absence of facts tending to show that the defendant is not at home, it is reasonable to infer that he would be there. ). On these facts, we hold that the officers had reason to believe that Hall was inside the house at the time of entry. 4 4 Hall argues that, for purposes of determining whether officers had reason to believe he was inside, officers constructively entered the residence and arrested him when SWAT team members began using loudspeakers, but before they physically entered the home. In so arguing, Hall relies on several out-of-circuit cases involving the use of forceful SWAT methods designed to lure a potential arrestee out of his home so police could arrest him in public without a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1451 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that Payton is violated when there is such a show of force that a defendant comes out of a home under coercion and submits to being taken in custody ). We decline to adopt the constructive entry analysis where, as here, officers (Continued) 10 Officers knew the house was Hall s residence and possessed several pieces of information suggesting he was at home. officers recognized Hall s vehicle in the driveway. First, Second, officers knew someone was in the house and not responding to their knocks. Further, Hall s wife and two of her children ultimately emerged, as did Phillips, who reported, as credited by the district court, the fact of Hall s presence inside. Therefore, officers had reason to believe Hall was inside the residence at the time of entry under Payton. B. Hall next contends that officers violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a search of the bag that was ultimately found to contain a rifle. The government contends that the seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine. Whether the plain view exception to the warrant requirement supports an officer s search of a container is a question Williams, of 41 law that F.3d we 192, review 196 (4th de novo. Cir. United 1994). 5 States Officers v. may had an arrest warrant for Hall and did not use the SWAT team to lure Hall outside to make a warrantless arrest. 5 When a defendant fails to raise an issue before the district court with sufficient specificity, our review of the claim is for plain error only. United States v. Baptiste, 596 (Continued) 11 conduct a warrantless search of a container seized in plain view only when its contents are a foregone conclusion. (citation omitted). In Williams, we held Id. at 197 that when a container s distinctive configuration proclaims its contents, the container supports no reasonable expectation of privacy and the contents can be said to be in plain view. omitted). are a Id. (citation In determining whether the contents of a container foregone conclusion, the circumstances under which an officer finds the container may add to the apparent nature of its contents. Id. For example, in Williams, we upheld a warrantless search where compelling circumstances existed that [led] us to conclude that cellophane wrapped packages found in Williams suitcase spoke volumes as to [their] particularly to the trained eye of the officer. contents-- For instance, from the appearance and size of the packages, . . . it was reasonable to assume that they contained contraband. 197-98 (citation omitted). belief, based on his ten Id. at We further noted the officer s firm years experience, that appearing in this manner always contained narcotics. packages Id. at F.3d 214, 220 (4th Cir. 2010). The government contends that we should review for plain error only because Hall did not challenge the officer s testimony that he knew the rifle bag found in the air duct contained a rifle. Because we hold that, even reviewed de novo, the warrantless search of the bag was lawful, we need not resolve this issue. 12 198. Significantly for our analysis, the Supreme Court has specifically cited a gun case as an example of a container that may be seized under the plain view Arkansas exception. v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979) ( [S]ome containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot because their support contents any reasonable can be appearance. ) (emphasis added). expectation inferred privacy their from of outward Although we have not previously applied the plain view exception to a gun case, other circuits have done so. (8th Cir. See United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 775 2008) (holding that because gun cases vary in characteristics, [and] each case must be evaluated on its own facts, the test is whether the container at issue is readily identifiable as a gun case by its distinctive configuration ); United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding search of clearly labeled gun case when the case reasonably appeared to contain a gun, and when as a convicted felon, [the defendant] was prohibited from possessing one ); cf. United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954, 956-57 (10th Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply the exception to the search of a hard plastic case which did not reveal its contents to the trial court, but withholding judgment as to the well-known soft, zippered gun cases because soft-sided gun cases could 13 self-reveal the presence of a weapon inside ). Similarly, we find it plain that the soft bag found in the air duct contained a rifle for the following reasons: (1) the officer immediately recognized it as a rifle bag because of its specific dimensions, shape, and weight distribution; (2) the officer had prior experience with rifle bags, and had several such bags at home; and (3) the rifle bag was secreted in an air duct. We therefore hold that the search of the rifle bag was justified and a search warrant unnecessary. C. We next consider Hall s argument that the district court erred in admitting evidence that Hall spat and swore at police officers when they found him. We review a district court s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and subject such rulings to harmless error United review. States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 2009). Under the harmless error standard, we will not reverse if we can say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the error. judgment was not substantially Kotteakos v. United States, 328 swayed U.S. by the 750, 765 (1946); see United States v. Mouzone, 687 F.3d 207, 213 (4th Cir. 2012). 14 Hall argues that evidence of his behavior at the time of arrest was both extrinsic 922(g)(1) charge and knowledge of firearms the to the ultimate to prove irrelevant in his correct and that the district U.S.C. Hall s house. testimony was extremely prejudicial. 18 He § guilty contends the Even assuming that Hall is court erred in admitting the evidence, we conclude that any resulting error was harmless. In this case, there was overwhelming evidence that Hall was guilty of the charged offense: the jury heard evidence of where the two guns were found and also heard phone calls in which Hall referenced owning other firearms that the police did not find. Moreover, Hall does not contend that evidence that he was hiding in the attic admitted. wall Thus, when we can officers say found with fair him was assurance improperly that the testimony that Hall swore and spat at officers when they found him, and the prosecution s references to that conduct during opening and closing statements, did not substantially sway the judgment in this case. D. We next address Hall s challenge to the district court s order requiring him to repay his attorneys fees. A district court s authority to order reimbursement of attorneys 15 fees presents a question of statutory interpretation which we normally review de novo. 356 (4th Cir. 2011). United States v. Weaver, 659 F.3d 353, Because Hall did not raise this challenge below, however, our review is for plain error. 52(b). Fed. R. Crim. P. To establish plain error, Hall must show that an error occurred, that it was plain, that it affected his substantial rights, and that this court should exercise its discretion to correct the error. (1993). United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 We have held that an error is clear or equivalently obvious if the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit establishes that an error has occurred. United States v. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Notably, the error need not be plain at the time the district court erred as long as the Id. appellate consideration. substantial rights sentence imposed. if error it is plain at the time of An error affects the defendant s has a prejudicial effect on the United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir. 2010). The Criminal Justice Act requires the government to provide unable charged adequate to pay with 3006A(a)(1)(A). legal for a representation such federal services felony for when, criminal like offense. defendants Hall, they 18 U.S.C. are § That statute also provides that [i]f at any time after the appointment of counsel . . . the court finds that 16 the person is financially able to obtain counsel or to make partial payment for the representation, it may . . . authorize payment as provided justice may dictate. in subsection (f), as the 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c). interests of Subsection (f) authorizes a court to order repayment of attorneys fees under certain circumstances: Whenever . . . the court finds that funds are available for payment from or on behalf of a person furnished representation, it may authorize or direct that such funds be paid to the appointed attorney . . . or to the court for deposit in the Treasury as a reimbursement to the appropriation, current at the time of payment, to carry out the provisions of this section. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f). We recently held that a district court must base a reimbursement order under § 3006A(f) on a finding that there are specific funds, assets, or asset streams (or the fixed right to those funds, assets, or asset streams) that are (1) identified by the court and (2) available to the defendant for the repayment of the court-appointed attorneys fees. States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 322 (4th Cir. 2012). United In Moore, we vacated the reimbursement order because the district court failed to make findings that defendant Moore was financially able . . . to make partial payment for the representation. at 323 (citation omitted). Id. The district court in Moore simply adopted the probation officer s standing $50 a month repayment 17 plan even though it specifically found that Moore, who was clearly eligible for a court-appointed attorney, did not have the ability to pay a fine or interest. Id. (citation omitted). We hold that Moore controls our disposition of Hall s challenge to the district court s reimbursement order. This case is factually similar to Moore: the district court made no findings regarding probation officer s Hall s ability standard to monthly pay, relied the plan, installment upon and specifically found that Hall did not have the ability to pay a fine or interest. As such, the district court did not comply with the statutory mandate here. 6 For those reasons, we exercise our discretion to hold that the district court s judgment at sentencing, insofar as it required a reimbursement of attorneys fees, was in error, and that the error was plain. We vacate that portion of the district court s judgment requiring Hall to repay his resentencing court-appointed consistent attorneys with this fees, opinion, and as remand to that for issue only. E. Finally, we address 6 Hall s challenge to his It bears noting that the district court did not have the benefit of our decision in Moore when it entered the reimbursement order. 18 classification as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). We review legal issues such as whether a defendant s previous conviction counted as an ACCA predicate de United novo, and we review factual findings for clear error. States v. Washington, 629 F.3d 403, 411 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Hall submitted his own, supplemental brief to contest his sentence convicted of under the ACCA. three prior He violent contends he has felonies, as 18 not been U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) requires, and therefore should not have been sentenced as an armed career criminal. He first argues that his South Carolina third-degree burglary conviction is not a violent felony. The Supreme Court has defined burglary as a violent felony under the ACCA only if the breaking and entering was what it terms generic burglary: any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a See United States v. Foster, 662 F.3d 291, 292 (4th crime. Cir. 2011) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990)). Although conviction does Hall s not charging specify the document statute from under the which burglary he was charged, we nevertheless conclude that his third-degree burglary 19 conviction qualifies as a violent prior felony for ACCA purposes. There was no evidence of there being more than one third-degree burglary statute in South Carolina (§ 16-11-313) and the language of the indictment tracked this statute, which met the basic requirement for classifying a burglary as a qualifying violent felony for ACCA purposes: unlawful entry into a physical crime. structure with the intent See Foster, 662 F.3d at 292. to commit a Therefore, the court properly classified the burglary as a predicate ACCA felony. Hall also contends that two of his predicate offenses are actually one crime. The ACCA requires that the three predicate offenses take place on occasions different from one another. United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). factors a court should In Letterlough, we laid out the consider to determine whether the predicate offenses took place on different occasions, including whether the offenses arose in different geographic locations; whether the nature of the offenses was substantively different; and whether the offenses involved multiple victims or multiple criminal objectives. Id. at 335-36. We have previously found that criminals who commit separate crimes against different individuals while on a spree, within a short period of time, provided that the perpetrator had the opportunity to cease and desist from his criminal actions at any time commit crimes on 20 different occasions. United States v. Leeson, 453 F.3d 631, 642-43 (4th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). The district court walked through each factor during Hall s sentencing hearing, explaining its reasoning for finding that the two felonies Hall now challenges--a charge for breaking and entering and larceny, and a charge for aiding and abetting an assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer--constituted two separate felony offenses, arose entering. when S.J.A. Hall 1072 even though fled the the scene (pre-sentence aiding of and the abetting breaking investigation and report); 1003-05. A consideration of the Letterlough factors leads us to conclude that our holding in Leeson applies here. Hall s breaking and entering and his assault on a police officer were committed in somewhat different geographic locations, the nature of the two offenses was substantially different, the victims of the crimes were distinct, objectives to each crime. breaking and entering, and there were different criminal Further, there was a point after the albeit brief, where Hall had the opportunity to cease and desist from his criminal actions, meaning the crimes occurred on different occasions. F.3d at 643 (citations omitted). Leeson, 453 Therefore, the district court did not err in classifying Hall as an armed career criminal and so sentencing him under the ACCA. 21 III. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 22

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