US v. Michael Fuller, No. 10-4880 (4th Cir. 2011)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4880 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MICHAEL GLENN FULLER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:08-cr-00599-CCB-1) Submitted: June 17, 2011 Decided: June 28, 2011 Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gary E. Proctor, LAW OFFICES OF GARY E. PROCTOR, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Clinton J. Fuchs, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Michael Glenn Fuller appeals his conviction for possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On appeal, Fuller argues that the district court erred by excluding as irrelevant evidence of his intoxication and by instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a § 922(g)(1) offense. He also asserts that the firearm s manufacture in another state did not establish a sufficient interstate commerce nexus. We affirm. Fuller first asserts that the district court erred by excluding as irrelevant expert testimony regarding intoxication because such testimony would have rebutted the knowing element of the offense. of a firearm crime. Federal courts have recognized that possession after a felony conviction is a general intent See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1144 n.6 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Brown, 367 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir. 2004). Because voluntary intoxication is a defense only to specific intent crimes, courts agree that the defense does not apply to the general intent crime in § 922(g)(1). United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing cases). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the proposed testimony from the defense expert regarding the effect of intoxication on a defendant s mental state was not relevant 2 to whether Fuller knowingly possessed the firearm. 1 Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence). Thus, See Fed. R. the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding that testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 ( Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. ); United States v. Myers, 589 F.3d 117, 123 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating standard of review). Next, instruction Fuller regarding claims the that the unavailability district of a court s voluntary intoxication defense to a § 922(g)(1) offense was not a correct statement of the law. 2 A refusal to give a requested theory of defense instructions is reversible error only if the instruction (1) was correct, (2) was not substantially covered by the court s charge to the jury, and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important that the failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant s ability to conduct his defense. 1 Although Fuller claims that his extreme intoxication could render physical possession unknowing so that a defense could exist if the defendant were comatose and the evidence indicated someone dropped the gun in his lap, United States v. Reed, 991 F.2d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 1993), the facts of his case do not fall within that limited exception. 2 Fuller notes that one circuit court has held that proof of constructive possession requires specific intent. See United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 606 (6th Cir. 2006). However, no other circuit has adopted that approach. United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646, 654 n.7 (10th Cir. 2011); see United States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that there is no distinction between actual and constructive possession insofar as the intent requirement is concerned ). 3 United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 378 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 omitted). knowing S. Ct. Because possession 271 (2010) voluntary of a (internal intoxication firearm, Fuller s is quotation no marks defense proposed to voluntary intoxication instruction was not a correct statement of the law. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the requested instruction. See id. at 377 (stating standard of review). Finally, Fuller asserts that, absent additional evidence, the fact that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce at some point did not establish a sufficient nexus, rendering the offense. Fuller s counsel admits, however, that this claim is foreclosed by evidence circuit insufficient precedent. on that See element United of States the v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we affirm the district court s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
