US v. Mohammed Marga, No. 10-4000 (4th Cir. 2011)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4000 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MOHAMMED MARGA, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (1:09-cr-00166-RDB-2) Submitted: February 17, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gary E. Proctor, LAW OFFICES OF GARY E. PROCTOR, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Rachel M. Yasser, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Following a jury trial, Mohammed Marga was convicted of conspiracy to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2010). The district court sentenced Marga to concurrent seventy-eight-month terms of imprisonment. Marga timely appealed, challenging a supplemental jury instruction given by the district court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Marga s co-conspirator, Edward Aboagye, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and subsequently agreed to testify against Marga. The Government introduced agreement into evidence without objection. Aboagye s plea This plea agreement contained stipulations of fact concerning the events that led to Aboagye s and Marga s arrests. After the jury began deliberations, it sent the court a note asking how Aboagye s plea agreement applied to Marga s case and whether the stipulations in Aboagye s plea agreement applied to Marga. The court answered: [W]ith respect to the statement of facts in the plea agreement, the plea agreement having been introduced into evidence, that is just as to Mr. Aboagye s agreement of facts with the government. It is not in any way binding upon the defendant, Mr. Marga. It is what Mr. Aboagye says occurred and you can compare that with whatever you recall his testimony to be as 2 well. It is what he agrees are the facts of the matter with the government. It is not binding upon Mr. Marga and it is not a stipulation as to Mr. Marga . . . . This is strictly just the agreement that Aboagye reached with the government and what he agreed with the government were the facts as far as he was concerned and just as you judge his credibility in terms of his testimony, you judge this for whatever you desire it s [sic] worth. But these facts here in this plea agreement letter are not binding upon Mr. Marga and are not agreed to by Mr. Marga. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in giving this instruction. Because Marga did not object to this instruction in the district court, it is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 953 (4th Cir. 2010). To establish plain error, Marga must show that an error occurred, the error rights. was plain, and the error affected his substantial United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). The necessity, extent, and character of supplemental jury instructions district court. Cir. 1990). we inquiry prejudice. matters within the discretion of the United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 547 (4th When evaluating the adequacy of supplemental jury instructions, jury s are consider fairly whether and the court accurately addressed without the creating United States v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 977 (4th Cir. 1998). Marga highlights the court s statement that the stipulations were facts as far as [Aboagye] was concerned and 3 just as you judge his credibility in terms of his testimony, you judge this contends for that whatever it you erroneously desire it s invited [sic] the jury worth, to inference from the stipulations that Marga was guilty. jury instructions may not be draw and an However, [l]anguage in viewed in isolation. United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 677 (4th Cir. 1996); Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1294 (4th Cir. 1995). At the close of evidence at the trial, the court instructed the jury about Aboagye s guilty plea, admonishing the jurors not to draw conclusions or inferences about Marga s guilt from the fact that his co-defendant pled guilty. Additionally, the court cautioned the jury that Aboagye s agreement to testify in exchange for favorable treatment from the Government might impact his credibility, because such agreements give witnesses a motive to testify falsely. During deliberations, when the jury asked the court how Aboagye s plea agreement and the stipulations contained therein applied to Marga s case, the court explained that the stipulations were Aboagye s version of the events and emphasized three times that they were not binding upon or agreed to by Marga. In explaining this to the jury, the court said that the stipulation was merely Aboagye s version of the facts and just as you judge [Aboagye s] credibility in terms of his testimony, 4 you judge this [stipulation of facts] for whatever you desire it s [sic] worth. We conclude that the district court s initial and supplemental instructions, read as a whole, properly informed the jury that the plea agreement and stipulations were relevant to the jury s determination of Aboagye s credibility; the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
