Sotina Cuffee v. John Newhart, No. 10-1494 (4th Cir. 2012)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1494 SOTINA LAVALE CUFFEE, deceased, Estate of, by and through her administrator, Bradley A. Cuffee, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOHN R. NEWHART, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the City of Chesapeake, Defendant Appellee, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INCORPORATED, Third Party Defendant Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge. (2:08-cv-00329-JBF-DEM) Argued: October 23, 2012 Decided: November 29, 2012 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ARGUED: Jeroyd Wiley Greene, III, ROBINSON & GREENE, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeff W. Rosen, PENDER & COWARD, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Lisa Ehrich, PENDER & COWARD, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee John R. Newhart. Andrew J. Terrell, Thomas C. Mugavero, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, LLP, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellee Wexford Health Sources, Incorporated. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: The Estate of Sotina LaVale Cuffee ("Cuffee's Estate" or "The Estate") judgment to appeals John R. the district Newhart, court's Sheriff the grant of of the summary City of Chesapeake, Virginia, on several claims arising from Cuffee's death while Jail"). incarcerated at the Chesapeake City Jail ("the For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court s judgment. I. The parties do not dispute the material underlying facts: The Jail Wexford contracted to inmates. provide with Wexford on-site Health medical and Sources, dental Inc., services for to The contract provided for inmates to submit health services request forms regarding any medical or dental issues. The contract required that within a set turnaround period, the forms would be reviewed, and, for medical issues, a registered nurse or physician would see the inmate. A similar provision required dentists to see patients for "acute" dental issues. Over Cuffee the filed course five of health approximately services two-and-a-half request forms, months, complaining first of a painful toothache and later of severe chest pains, tingling in her arms and back, and insomnia. nurses ("LPNs") examined Cuffee 3 and Licensed practical processed her services request forms on each occasion, and one of the LPNs assessed that Cuffee contravention had of "possible Wexford's indigestion." contract with In Jail, the apparent however, although Cuffee requested to be seen by a medical doctor for her medical complaints, she received no screening by an RN or physician. further treatment or Cuffee's last request for health services came the morning of July 17, 2006. An LPN gave Cuffee an antacid and told her to submit another request to be seen by a medical doctor. Cuffee was then returned to her "pod," where her condition worsened throughout the day. Fellow inmates informed corrections officers, who declared a medical emergency. Despite responding emergency consciousness and the efforts medical died. An of corrections technicians, autopsy officers Cuffee indicated that and lost Cuffee's death was caused by coronary artery atherosclerosis. Cuffee's Estate initially filed a complaint in the Eastern District known of and Virginia unknown alleging Wexford several medical officers, and Sheriff Newhart. claims staff, against Jail various corrections Decisions by the district court not at issue on appeal led to the operative pleading in this case the Second Amended Complaint 4 alleging claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, gross negligence, and breach of contract against Sheriff Newhart. 1 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court concluded that although the ultimate statutory responsibility for inmate medical care lies with Sheriff Newhart and . . . [Cuffee's Estate] appears to have identified certain omissions by Sheriff Newhart in connection with [overseeing] the City's contract with Wexford[,] there does not appear to be anything in the record of this case showing any causal connection between those apparent omissions by Sheriff Newhart and the alleged omissions by Wexford and/or its personnel that may have led to decedent's death. (J.A. 473.) The district court held that because causation was a element necessary Sheriff Newhart, the of each Estate of the could prevail on any of its claims. Estate's not, as a claims matter against of law, Accordingly, it granted Sheriff Newhart's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. 2 1 Cuffee's Estate sued Sheriff Newhart "individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the City of Chesapeake." (J.A. 28.) The district court held that the Estate's "claims against [Sheriff Newhart] in his official capacity are . . . precluded by the Eleventh Amendment" given that he is a state officer. (J.A. 474.) The Estate does not challenge that ruling on appeal, and the remaining analysis focuses solely on the claims against the Sheriff in his individual capacity. 2 The Estate's claims against Wexford and Wexford's medical personnel were barred by the statute of limitations. Sheriff Newhart had filed a third-party complaint against Wexford seeking indemnification under the contract for any recovery against him in this action. That claim had been severed, and as a result of the district court's disposition of the Estate's (Continued) 5 Cuffee's Estate noted a timely appeal, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. See Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civil Pro. 56(a). III. The whether failed central the to issue district establish Cuffee's court a erred proximate Estate in raises holding casual link on that appeal the between is record Sheriff Newhart's alleged omissions in overseeing the Jail's contract with Wexford and Wexford employees' conduct that led to Cuffee's death. 3 It specifically contends that the record contains facts claims against Sheriff Newhart, the district dismissed the third-party complaint as being moot. 3 court also Cuffee's Estate also challenges the district court's exclusion of evidence the Estate claims supports a finding of Sheriff Newhart's deliberate indifference, and its conclusion (Continued) 6 on which a connection. evidence jury could have found the requisite causal To support this argument, the Estate points to showing that Wexford alerted Sheriff Newhart's designated officer of an immediate need for additional nursing staff at the recognized Jail; medical Sheriff staffing Newhart's shortages internal at the 2005 Jail; audit and the testimony of the Estate's expert witness, Dr. David Walthall Richardson, opining that Cuffee's death could have been avoided had she received earlier proper care each of the times she submitted a health services request form in the weeks prior to her death. Although Cuffee's Estate brought three separate causes of action against Sheriff element of causation. (4th Cir. 1994) Newhart, the claims share the common See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798-99 (observing that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim premised on a supervisor's deliberate indifference exists where a supervisor's subordinates' "indifference misconduct or [is] a tacit causative authorization factor" in of the that Sheriff Newhart was entitled to qualified immunity against a claim of ordinary negligence. We need not address either argument given our agreement with the district court that all of the Estate's claims fail due to an absence of evidence of causation. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) ( [A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. ). 7 plaintiff's injury); Stone v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 629, 631 (Va. 1986) (stating that breach of contract requires, inter alia, "harm or damage to the plaintiff as a proximate consequence of the violation or breach") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Smith v. Prater, 146 S.E.2d 179, 182-83 (Va. 1966) (stating causation). that gross negligence requires proof of We have previously recognized that [a]lthough issues of causation are to be decided by the jury, whether the evidence is sufficient to create a jury issue is solely a question of law to be determined by the court. In diversity cases in which the sufficiency of the evidence to create a jury question is presented, this court resolves the issue based on the federal rule. That rule presents the question whether there is evidence on which a jury properly can base a verdict. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, Inc., 6 citations omitted). F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal "Fair and proper adjudication of disputes . . . precludes jury consideration of a party's claim unless the party produces evidence demonstrating that claim to be at least a reasonable probability rather equally surmisable possibilities." than merely one of several Id.; see also Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (discussing an "affirmative causal link" necessary to survive summary judgment in the context of a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim). Here, Cuffee's Estate relies on evidence it proffered that may have proven that Sheriff Newhart knew there were medical 8 staffing shortages at the Jail. But that evidence is not sufficient to survive summary judgment as it is not proof of the critical element of causation. evidence was sufficient to Even prove assuming Sheriff the Newhart's Estate's alleged omissions in overseeing the Jail's medical staffing, the Estate also had to provide evidence that Sheriff Newhart's acts led to Cuffee's death. The record lacks any evidence to show that the staffing shortages caused or otherwise contributed to Cuffee's death. A jury verdict that the two were related would be based on pure speculation rather than a legally sufficient showing of proximate cause, i.e., a supportable finding that Cuffee's death was a natural and foreseeable consequence of any omissions on Sheriff Newhart's part shortages at the Jail. 247-48 (discussing with respect to medical staffing Cf. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 6 F.3d at speculative conclusions of causation as the as opposed to actual evidence thereof). Having reviewed the evidence as well parties' arguments, we agree with the district court's conclusion that "there is nothing in the record to suggest that [Cuffee] was not correctly assessed or seen by a medical doctor because of the apparent allegedly staffing shortages deliberately of which indifferent. Sheriff Newhart Consequently, in was the absence of any such affirmative causal link, [the Estate's]" claims against Sheriff Newhart must fail. 9 (J.A. 485.) Indeed, as the district court aptly observed, the Estate's own expert witness, Dr. Richardson, testified as to the lack of any evidence making the requisite causal link: Q Do you have any facts that the reason that the [LPN] didn't provide [sic] Ms. Cuffee to a doctor or an RN was caused by nursing shortages? A No, I don't have any facts of that. My opinion is that the nurse should have done better, that nurse. . . . . Q . . . The nurse could have made the decision not to present, say that she is not sick enough for an EKG and not told the doctor. To the best of your knowledge, you don't know why the nurse did what she did? A That's true. Q And it has no basis on whether there's a nursing shortage or not? A That is true. (J.A. 485.) Cuffee's Estate cannot rise above its own evidence. See Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th motion Cir. for 2003) summary ( A party judgment opposing may not a properly rest upon supported the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. [N]either unsupported speculation, nor evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative will suffice . . . . ) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 10 Even the Estate s own expert witness could not identify any reason to attribute Wexford's medical personnel's decisions regarding Cuffee's treatment to a medical staffing shortage at the Jail. None of the probability" Estate's that other such a evidence causal provides link a exists "reasonable either. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 6 F.3d at 247. Cf. Because the record does not contain any evidence of causation, the Estate's claims each fail as a matter of law. U.S. at against 322 a (stating party who that fails See Celotex Corp., 477 summary judgment to a make showing is appropriate sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. ). IV. For the reasons set forth above and in the district court's opinion, we find no error in the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to Sheriff Newhart and dismiss this case. Accordingly, that judgment is AFFIRMED. 11
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
