Joann Whiting v. The Johns Hopkins Hospital, No. 10-1158 (4th Cir. 2011)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1158 JOANN WHITING, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. THE JOHNS HOPKINS CORPORATION, HOSPITAL; JOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEM Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cv-01619-WDQ) Argued: January 26, 2011 Before TRAXLER, Judges. Chief Judge, Decided: and NIEMEYER and March 14, 2011 AGEE, Circuit Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ARGUED: Thomas Bernard Corbin, THOMAS B. CORBIN, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Jay Robert Fries, KRUCHKO & FRIES, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Kathleen A. Talty, KRUCHKO & FRIES, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Joann Whiting appeals a district court order granting judgment against her in her action against The Johns Hopkins Hospital and The Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation (together, Hopkins ) for violating the Family and Medical Leave Act ( FMLA ), 2010). see 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-54 (West 2009 & Supp. Finding no error, we affirm. I. Whiting worked for Hopkins from January 1998 to August 2007 as a patient financial service representative. She took medical leave pursuant to the FMLA from June 2007 to August 2007. approving Whiting s leave request, Hopkins stated that When her remaining FMLA leave would be exhausted on August 8, 2007, and that she would need a leave of absence for short-term disability if she needed to take any more time off from work. Hopkins initially approved such short-term disability through September 10, 2007, but it terminated Whiting on August 25, 2007, informing her she had been replaced. Whiting subsequently filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ), alleging that Hopkins had terminated her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). The charge alleged that she had been discharged 2 because of her disability inasmuch as she had been on leave because of her disability. EEOC-monitored agreements: After the parties participated in mediation, they reached two settlement the Mediation Settlement Agreement ( MSA ) and the Release and Settlement Agreement ( RSA ). The MSA, which the EEOC approved, provided that Whiting would not institute a lawsuit against Hopkins federal employment discrimination laws. under various The RSA, which was not approved by the EEOC, released Hopkins from any and all causes of action, relating known to or unknown, [Whiting s] arising out employment. of J.A. or in 28. any In way this agreement, Whiting also promised that she would neither file nor cause or lawsuits, permit claims, to be filed grievances, on her complaints behalf or . . any in charges . any forum, or any dispute arising out of her employment relationship with [Hopkins] exchange for through these December promises, 20, 2007. Whiting J.A. received, 28. among In other consideration, $4,500.00, less applicable taxes. More Whiting alleging than filed the Hopkins employment. for a summary year after present violated executing action her in FMLA these federal rights two releases, district during her court, 2007 Hopkins moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, judgment, on agreements barred the suit. the basis that the settlement Hopkins relied on a Department of 3 Labor ( DOL ) regulation stating that while [e]mployees cannot waive . . . their prospective rights under FMLA, this prohibition does not prevent the settlement or release of FMLA claims by employees based on past employer conduct without the approval of (2009). the This originally [DOL] or a regulation promulgated in court. was a 1995, 29 C.F.R. revision which of § 825.220(d) a provided regulation simply that [e]mployees cannot waive . . . their rights under the FMLA. 29 C.F.R. original § 825.220(d) version, not (2007). only We could had held employees that not under waive the their prospective rights, but they also could not waive their rights to proceed on FMLA claims for past employer conduct. See Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454, 457-63 (4th Cir. 2007). For her part, Whiting maintained that the revised regulation did not apply in her case since it was promulgated more than a year after the settlement agreements had been signed. She alternatively contended that the revised regulation was invalid because it was manifestly contrary to the FMLA. Rejecting both of Whiting s arguments, the district court granted judgment to Hopkins. 4 II. Whiting applying case. first revised argues 29 that C.F.R. the district § 825.220(d) court erred retroactively to in her We disagree. Although retroactive application of a statute or regulation is generally not favored, see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988), when an amendment clarifies the existing law rather than changing it, we give the clarification great weight in considering the meaning of the original law, Brown v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 253, 260 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether an amendment is clarifying, we consider the intent of the body that enacted the amendment. Here, See id. at 259. the DOL s intent to clarify original regulation is unmistakable. regulations notes that, prior to the meaning of the The preamble to the FMLA the amendment, a conflict existed between this circuit and the Fifth Circuit regarding the proper interpretation of § 825.220(d). (Nov. 17, 2008). See 73 Fed. Reg. 67987 Compare Taylor, 493 F.3d at 457-63 (holding that § 825.220(d) precluded both prospective and retrospective waivers of an employee s FMLA claims), with Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 320-22 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 825.220(d) claims). did The not prohibit preamble states 5 post-dispute that the settlement DOL revised of the regulation in the interest of clarity in order to make explicit the DOL s long-held view that employees and employers are permitted to agree voluntarily to the settlement of past claims without having first to obtain the permission or approval of the Department or a court. 73 Fed. Reg. 67987 (Nov. 17, 2008); see id. (stating that the DOL intends, as it has always intended, for the waiver prohibition prospective FMLA rights ). to apply only to Thus, the district court properly concluded that the amended regulation was clarifying. * Whiting alternatively maintains that to the extent § 825.220(d) allows settlement of past FMLA claims without court or DOL approval, the regulation must be struck down for being inconsistent with the FMLA. We disagree. We judge the regulation s validity by applying the two-step analysis provided in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, analysis, we Inc., first 467 consider U.S. 837 whether (1984). Congress spoken to the precise question at issue. Congress s intent is clear, then * our Under has that directly Id. at 842-43. analysis ends If since Whiting contends that the DOL is being disingenuous when it asserts that its revision was intended merely as a clarification rather than a change in the law. However, the circuit split regarding the meaning of the original regulation lends strong support to the DOL s representation. See Brown, 374 F.3d at 260. 6 agencies must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 843. On the other hand, if the statute in question is silent or ambiguous regarding the issue in dispute, then we must determine whether the agency s interpretation is reasonable, and if it is, we must defer to the agency. See id.; Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011). Thus, the challenged regulation is controlling unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 844; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). For that reason, we must uphold the regulation so long as the See Motor agency articulates a rational basis for its action. Vehicle Mfrs. Ass n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Whiting correctly concedes regarding the waiver of claims. second Chevron step, that FMLA is silent We therefore proceed to the determining interpretation is permissible. the whether the agency s We conclude that it is. The DOL explains in the preamble to the regulations its reasons for permitting unsupervised settlements of past FMLA claims, reasons that closely track those offered by the Fifth Circuit in Faris. The DOL notes that allowing such settlements promotes the efficient resolution of FMLA claims and recognizes the common practice of including a release of a broad array of 7 employment claims in severance agreements. (Nov. 17, 2008). The DOL also explains 73 Fed. Reg. 67988 that waivers is consistent with the FMLA s language. allowing such In this regard, the DOL contrasts the FMLA with the Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ), see 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1998 & Supp. 2010), which contains a provision authorizing the settlement of FLSA claims when the settlement is supervised by the DOL or a court. See 73 Fed. Reg. 67987 (Nov. 17, 2008); 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(c). The DOL reasons that this distinction between the FMLA and the FLSA is justified by the difference in subject matter of the two statutes: The FLSA is a remedial statute setting the floor for minimum wage and overtime pay. It was intended to protect the most vulnerable workers, who lacked the bargaining power to negotiate a fair wage or reasonable work hours with their employers. . . . Like the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( ADEA ), see 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010)], the FMLA is not primarily focused on pay, and protects all segments of the workforce, from low wage workers to highly paid professionals. 73 Fed. Reg. 67987 (Nov. 17, 2008). construed the ADEA as not The DOL adds that we have requiring that settlements be supervised, see O Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 361-62 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying ordinary contract principles to ADEA waivers). Whiting contends that the revised regulation is impermissible because it conflicts with the view of the FMLA we 8 expressed in Taylor. In Taylor, we rejected the DOL s argument that the original § 825.220(d) allowed waivers of claims based on past FMLA violations. doing, we concluded See Taylor, 493 F.3d at 457-62. that the DOL s interpretation In so of its original regulation was at odds with the regulation s language. See id. at 457-59. We also reasoned that the DOL s construction would thwart the legislative policy that the FLSA was designed to effectuate, and that it was inconsistent with the meaning the DOL embraced at the time of promulgation. See id. at 459-62. Whiting now argues that, in light of our conclusion in Taylor that allowing unsupervised waivers of claims based on past FMLA violations would thwart the legislative policy behind the FLSA, the revised regulation s allowing such permissible interpretation of the statute. waivers cannot be a We disagree. Simply put, the DOL is not bound by the observations we made in Taylor concerning our view of the legislative policy supporting the FMLA. that is charged After all, it is the DOL, not this court, with the authority to promulgate FMLA regulations. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2654 (authorizing the Secretary of prescribe Labor to carry out the FMLA). such regulations as are necessary to Thus, regardless of whether we disagree with the DOL s interpretation of the FMLA, we must uphold its regulations so long as they are reasonable. See National Cable & Telecomms. Ass n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 9 (2005) ( A trumps an deference court s agency only if prior judicial construction the prior construction otherwise court of entitled decision a statute to Chevron holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion. ). The district court correctly determined that the revised regulation satisfies that standard. III. In sum, because we hold that the district court properly upheld the regulation at issue and applied it in this case, we affirm. AFFIRMED 10
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