Spencer Jones, III v. Sternheimer Brothers, Inc., No. 09-2375 (4th Cir. 2010)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-2375 SPENCER E. JONES, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. STERNHEIMER BROTHERS, INC., Defendant Appellee, and ROSS STERNHEIMER, CEO, Everything Casual, incorporated f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; PAT MONEY, Assistant CEO, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; ADDRIANE LATHAN, Head of Human Resources, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; JAMES BAILEY, Warehouse Manager, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; ANGELA CRAWLEY, Dock Supervisor, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; HAROLD ELLIOTT, Dock Manager; GLORIA CRAWLEY, Clothes Supervisor; MARK STERNHEIMER, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:08-cv-00187-REP) Submitted: March 30, 2010 Decided: Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. April 22, 2010 Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Spencer E. Jones, III, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher E. Gatewood, HIRSCHLER FLEISCHER, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: Spencer E. Jones, III appeals the district court s order granting summary judgment as to Jones s action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) in favor of Everything Casual, Inc., and several employees of the corporation. Everything Casual, Inc., a corporation formerly known as Sternheimer Bros, Inc., operated the now-defunct A & N stores in Virginia. Jones contended that during his In his complaint, employment, he was denied training due to his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( ADEA ). 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants. appeal, Jones reasserts the merits of his claims, The On and additionally contends that Defendants Angela Crawley and James Bailey perjured themselves in their dates Jones was offered training. affidavits regarding the We affirm. We review a district court s order granting summary judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008). See Nader v. Blair, 549 Summary judgment may be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). allegations do not However, [c]onclusory or speculative suffice, nor evidence in support of his case. 3 does a mere scintilla of Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). unless a reasonable nonmoving party on jury the Summary judgment will be granted could return evidence a verdict presented. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). a district court s judgment on any ground for the Anderson v. We may affirm supported by the Suter v. United States, 441 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. record. 2006). Under the ADEA, it is illegal for an employer discriminate against an employee due to the employee s age. U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). action for employees to 29 The ADEA provides a civil cause of who are discriminated employers because of their age. against by their See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2006). An employee may establish an ADEA discrimination claim through two alternative methods of proof: requiring evidence employer s that adverse (1) a mixed-motive framework, the employee s decision, or (2) a age motivated pretext the framework identical to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis used in Title VII cases. E.E.O.C. v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co., Inc., 364 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2004); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In his pleadings below, Jones asserted that the Defendants refused to offer adequate training due to his age. However, Jones entirely failed 4 to provide any evidence of conduct or statements that reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision. Id. Therefore, he failed to establish age discrimination under the mixed-motive framework. In McDonnell order Douglas to establish framework, an Jones ADEA must claim first under the demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2004). In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of discriminatory denial of training, Jones must show: protected class; (2) the (1) [he] is a member of a defendant[s] provided training to [their] employees; (3) [Jones] was eligible for the training; and (4) [Jones] was not provided training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. F.3d at 649-50 (setting McDonnell out Douglas Thompson, 312 framework discriminatory denial of training based on race). for If Jones is successful in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden legitimate, then shifts the non-discriminatory adequately train Jones. then to prove that pretextual. Id. the defendants reason for to articulate a failure to their Mereish, 359 F.3d at 334. defendants proffered Jones must justification was This final burden . . . merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [Jones] ha[s] been the victim[] of intentional discrimination. 5 Id. After reviewing the record, we find that Jones failed to meet his burden in establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. dispense with oral argument because the facts and We legal contentions are adequately expressed in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6

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