US v. Jude Eligwe, No. 08-4984 (4th Cir. 2011)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. JUDE ELIGWE, Defendant Appellant. No. 08-4986 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. GIOVANNI BELL, Defendant Appellant. No. 08-4992 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. RICHOL GRINER, Defendant Appellant. No. 10-4860 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. GIOVANNI BELL, Defendant Appellant. No. 10-4863 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. RICHOL GRINER, Defendant Appellant. No. 10-4864 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. 2 JUDE ELIGWE, Defendant Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District Judge. (8:07-cr-00160-PJM-2; 8:07-cr-00160-PJM-1; 8:07-cr00160-PJM-3) Argued: October 27, 2011 Decided: December 1, 2011 Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Agee joined. ARGUED: Gary Allen Ticknor, Elkridge, Maryland, for Appellants. Emily Noel Glatfelter, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Arthur S. Cheslock, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Jude Eligwe; Mary E. Davis, DAVIS & DAVIS, Washington, D.C., for Appellant Richol Griner. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 3 SHEDD, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Jude Eligwe, Giovanni Bell, and Richol Griner of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The jury also convicted Bell and Griner of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) and of brandishing violence a in firearm during violation of and 18 in relation U.S.C. § to a crime 924(c). In of this consolidated appeal, the defendants raise a total of thirteen issues. We address only one: the admissibility of Eligwe s post-arrest statements. 1 I. Prior statements. to trial, The Eligwe district moved court to suppress denied his his custodial motion, and the following facts are relevant to our review of the district court order. We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the prevailing party below. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 548 (4th Cir. 1998). After arresting Eligwe in connection with the bank robbery, the Montgomery County Police transported him to police headquarters, where Detective Mason interviewed him in a room 1 We have reviewed the remaining issues and find them to be without merit. 4 equipped with video recording. Before asking questions related to the charges, Mason reviewed the Police Department s advice of rights form with Eligwe. Eligwe then executed the form, indicating that he understood his rights and wanted to speak with Mason. At one point during this initial interview and after some discussion of the bank robbery, Eligwe said, I want a lawyer, and I need a lawyer for that. J.A. 589. quickly and excitedly with a heavy Because Eligwe spoke accent, clarification, you don t wanna talk to me[?] Mason asked for Eligwe replied, I wanna talk to you sir but you gotta understand something. J.A. 589. Moments later, Eligwe said, I ll get a lawyer. J.A. 590. Mason testified that because Eligwe used the word lawyer, tried he to ask clarifying questions of Eligwe, but Eligwe indicated that he wanted to keep talking with Mason and actually continued speaking over Mason. After this initial interview, the police put Eligwe in a holding cell. with Mason. room. While in the cell, Eligwe asked to again speak Eligwe was then brought back into the interview Mason asked Eligwe, You say you wanted to talk to me[?] Eligwe responded, Yeah, it s very important I talk to you. J.A. 712. At this point, Eligwe told Mason that he had provided information to a bank customer, including information about the bank s procedures, the times he worked, the vault timers, and 5 where money was stored. Eligwe also admitted that he had accessed a co-conspirator s bank account after the robbery to see whether there was any money. J.A. 1133. Prior to trial, Eligwe moved to suppress these custodial statements. The district court denied his motion, finding that Eligwe s references to wanting a lawyer were not unambiguous or unequivocal requests for a lawyer and, therefore, his statements were not barred by the Fifth Amendment. II. Eligwe argues that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment evidence. 2 rights by admitting his custodial statements into We review a district court s legal conclusions made pursuant to a suppression determination de novo and its factual findings for clear error. harmless error review. 187, 193 (4th Cir. Further, such rulings are subject to See United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 2005)( We first determine whether the district court should have suppressed . . . [the defendant s] 2 Although Eligwe alleges a violation of both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, his Sixth Amendment rights had not yet attached. See United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991))( A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, which at least includes the point of formal charge, indictment, information, preliminary hearing, or arraignment. ). 6 statements, and, then, if so, we ask whether the failure to do so was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ). In order to find a district court's error harmless, we need only be able to say with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. United States v. 1997)(internal citation marks omitted). Although a suspect can waive his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and agree to an interview with the police, if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to available further or the questioning suspect until himself a lawyer reinitiates has been made conversation. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 485 (1981)). request must be unambiguous. to an attorney reasonable that officer in is [I]f a suspect makes a reference ambiguous light However, such a of or the equivocal in circumstances that would a have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our questioning. precedents do not require the cessation of Id. We find that Eligwe did not make an unambiguous request for an attorney. When read out of context, Eligwe s statements could perhaps be read as such a request. 7 isolated However, after reviewing the video-taped interview, we conclude that no reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood those statements to be an unequivocal request for a lawyer. Eligwe spoke quickly and with a heavy accent, and when Mason attempted to ask Eligwe clarifying questions, Eligwe spoke over Mason and continued talking about the case. Furthermore, even if Eligwe had invoked his right to counsel, the district court did not err in introducing the custodial statements because Eligwe made the statements at issue after he reinitiated communication with Mason. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (invocation of counsel can be waived if the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police ). Alternatively, we conclude that, even assuming the district court erred in admitting error was harmless. evidence of guilt Eligwe s custodial statements, any In light of the Government s overwhelming presented throughout the trial, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury s verdict even without this challenged evidence. that error in admitting See Johnson, 400 F.3d at 197 (finding custodial statements made after defendant invoked his right to counsel was harmless, especially as his statements did not amount to a full confession). 8 III. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences of Jude Eligwe, Giovanni Bell, and Richol Griner. AFFIRMED 9

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