Douglas Brown v. Rectors and Visitors of the Un, No. 08-1637 (4th Cir. 2010)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-1637 DOUGLAS P. BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. RECTORS AND VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA; JAMES A. MARSHALL, Defendants Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, District Judge. (3:07-cv-00030-nkm-bwc) Submitted: August 26, 2009 Decided: January 19, 2010 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Paul Erik Wilke, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard C. Kast, Special Assistant Attorney General, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Douglas Brown appeals the district court s order granting the Defendants motion to dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Brown raised claims of violation of due process and breach of contract arising from his removal from a graduate program in chemistry at the University of Virginia. The district court found that Brown failed to plead a violation of his due process rights or a breach of contract claim, and that Defendant James Marshall is entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. I Due Process Brown first argues that the district court erroneously found that he was entitled to only minimal process because he was removed from the program for academic reasons, rather than disciplinary reasons. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, ยง 1. Generally, a due process claim requires a two-part analysis: whether [the claimant] was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was his due. Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). Logan v. Zimmerman Brush In the context of claims against institutions of higher learning, the Supreme Court has assumed 2 without deciding that students have a protected property right in continued enrollment. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1985) (assuming the existence of a protected property interest in student s continued enrollment); Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1978) (assuming existence of dismissed student s liberty or property interests); see also Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 627 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting assumption). When are required what type of procedural disciplinary in the educational setting, drawn consistently school determining a distinction between dismissals. takes serious 435 Horowitz, disciplinary courts have academic U.S. action safeguards and at against 87. a When a student, generally the student must be offered notice and an opportunity to be heard. Procedural Goss v. requirements Lopez, are 419 greatly U.S. 565, reduced, 579 however, (1975). when a student is dismissed for academic, as opposed to disciplinary, reasons. proceedings academic 435 Horowitz, require more evaluations, U.S. at stringent even though 87-88. procedural the decision on the student may be the same. effects protection of an than adverse Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983). 3 [D]isciplinary The district court did not err in finding that Brown was dismissed reasons. for academic Although removed for his reasons, Brown s rather complaint failure to than suggests abide by disciplinary that the he was Defendants interpretation of the graduate program s rules and regulations, rather than as a direct result of his failing the Ph.D. candidacy exam, the complaint also indicates that the decision to remove him was based upon his failure to complete his M.S. degree thesis within the required failure on the candidacy exam. time limits following his The Graduate Studies Committee, which Marshall heads, interpreted its rules governing academic standards for timely completion of the graduate program s requirements, rather than disciplinary rules governing student conduct, to find that Brown was no longer eligible to remain in the program. Because Brown was removed for academic reasons, rather than disciplinary reasons, the district court properly found that deference the and removal subject decision to was entitled greatly to reduced heightened procedural requirements. II Qualified Immunity Brown next contends that the district court engaged in improper fact-finding that contradicted the allegations in his complaint when it found that the notice and hearing process he 4 received in January 2004 was relevant to his ultimate removal from the program in 2006, resulting in an improper finding that Marshall was entitled to qualified immunity. We review de novo a district court s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, focus[ing] complaint. 2008). judge only on the legal sufficiency of the Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. [W]hen ruling on a defendant s motion to dismiss, a must accept as true all contained in the complaint. of the factual allegations Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). However, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, and the pleading must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 [T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions or [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a conclusory statements. 1949 (2009). cause of action, supported by mere Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if it states a plausible claim for relief that permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct based upon its judicial experience and common sense. 1950. 5 Id. at Qualified performing damages immunity discretionary insofar established as functions their statutory protects or from conduct does not plaintiff has officials liability constitutional reasonable person would have known. U.S. 800, 818 (1982). government for violate rights of civil clearly which a Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 The court must determine whether the alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and, if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). For a right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official doing violates that right. would understand that what he is Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (internal quotation omitted). The district court did not engage in improper factfinding in determining that Marshall was entitled to qualified immunity. The allegations in Brown s complaint describe the hearing process that was afforded him in January 2004, after he was first informed that he was not in compliance requirements for remaining in the graduate program. with the Although the complaint states in a conclusory fashion that Brown was not afforded notice or a hearing prior to his removal from the program in 2006, the district court was not required to accept as true this statement that merely described a legal element of 6 the cause of action. Because Brown s complaint did not state any purported reason for his removal from the program that did not relate to his failure to complete his M.S. thesis in a timely fashion, process Brown the was removal in 2006. court afforded did not in err 2004 in finding related to his that the ultimate Accordingly, the court did not err in finding that any minimal violation of his due process rights that might have occurred established, did and not that violate Marshall a was right that entitled was to clearly qualified immunity. III Breach of Contract Brown also argues that the district court erred in finding that the Graduate Student Handbook referenced in the complaint did not constitute a contract between himself and UVA as a matter of law. The district court did not err because Brown s complaint contained only conclusory allegations that the Graduate Student Handbook constituted a contract between himself and UVA, and that assertion was unsupported by the terms of the Handbook and expressly contradicted by the Graduate we affirm Record incorporated therein. For court s order. the foregoing reasons, the district We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 7 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 8
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