Rosa v. Doe, No. 21-2628 (2d Cir. 2023)
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Plaintiff brought an action alleging that he received constitutionally inadequate medical care as an inmate in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction. But before the district court could proceed with his case, Plaintiff, like all civil litigants in federal court, was required to pay a filing fee of $402. Plaintiff believed he could not pay the fee while also paying for the necessities of life. So, he moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 23 U.S.C. Section 1915, which would allow Plaintiff to bring his suit without having to prepay the full filing fee. The Second Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding that the prison provided Plaintiff’s necessities of life. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, and the district court again denied his motion. On reconsideration, the district court found that Plaintiff had the resources to pay for both the necessities of life and the filing fee but had instead chosen to prioritize contributions to his family members for their necessities. Plaintiff argued that both conclusions are the result of legal error.
The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the rest of Section 1915’s requirements. The court concluded that Plaintiff demonstrated that he lacks the resources to pay the costs of the lawsuit and for his own necessities of life and those of his dependents. The court explained that Plaintiff would not be immediately destitute if required to pay the $402 filing fee; he has nonetheless established that he cannot pay the costs associated with this suit and still provide the necessities of life for himself and his dependents.
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21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 2 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 3 August Term, 2023 4 5 6 7 Argued: September 18, 2023 Decided: November 20, 2023 Docket No. 21-2628(L), 21-2851(Con) 8 ALEXANDER ROSA, 9 Plainti -Appellant, 10 v. 11 12 13 14 15 JOHN DOE, COMMISSIONER, JOHN DOE, WARDEN, VIKI S. BLUMBERG, MEDICAL DOCTOR, BARONE, WARDEN, VIKTORIA STORK, ROSE, NURSE, 16 Before: 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Alexander Rosa brought this action alleging that he received constitutionally inadequate medical care as an inmate in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction. But before the district court could proceed with his case, Rosa, like all civil litigants in federal court, was required to pay a ling fee of $402. Rosa believed he could not pay the fee while also paying for the necessities of life. So, he moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which would allow Rosa to bring his suit without having to prepay the full ling fee. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied Rosa’s motion, nding that the prison provided Rosa’s necessities of life. Rosa moved for reconsideration, and the district court again denied his motion. On reconsideration, the district court found that Rosa had the resources to pay for both the necessities of life and the ling fee but had instead chosen to prioritize 1 Defendants-Appellees. _____________________________________ CALABRESI, LEE, and PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. 1 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 contributions to his family members for their necessities. Rosa argues that both conclusions are the result of legal error. We agree and conclude that Rosa has demonstrated that he lacks the resources to pay the costs of the lawsuit and for his own necessities of life and those of his dependents. We therefore REVERSE, nding that Rosa’s motion meets the standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and remand for consideration of the rest of § 1915’s requirements. 18 Plainti -Appellant Alexander Rosa appeals from a judgment of the United 19 States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Merriam, J.). Rosa believed 20 that the Connecticut Department of Correction violated his Eighth Amendment 21 rights by providing him with insu cient medical care. So, Rosa, acting pro se, 22 sought relief in federal court by ling this suit. _____________________________________ RACHEL ZHU, Rule 46.1(e) Law Student (Michael W. Martin, Ian Weinstein, Lincoln Sq. Legal Serv., Inc., on the brief), New York, NY, for Plainti -Appellant Alexander Rosa. _____________________________________ CALABRESI, Circuit Judge: 23 Like all civil litigants, however, Rosa had to pay a ling fee before the court 24 could proceed with his case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914. Believing that payment of the 25 $402 ling fee would render him unable to pay for essentials, Rosa moved for leave 26 to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In forma pauperis status allows 2 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 prisoners like Rosa to bring suits without the obligation to prepay certain fees, 2 including the $402 ling fee, and allows non-incarcerated litigants to proceed 3 entirely without paying such fees. 4 reasoning that the prison provided for Rosa’s necessities of life and that Rosa’s 5 account contained more than the $402 required to pay the ling fee. 6 reconsideration, the district court again ruled against Rosa, further reasoning that 7 funds Rosa chose to give his mother and son, even if for their essentials, could 8 have instead been used to pay the ling fee in his suit. On appeal, Rosa argues 9 that the district court erred in two ways: rst, by considering only Rosa’s 10 necessities of life and not the necessities of life of Rosa’s dependents, and second, 11 in concluding that the prison provided all of Rosa’s necessities. We agree with 12 Rosa as to both mistakes and therefore reverse. 13 The district court denied Rosa’s motion, On BACKGROUND 14 Alexander Rosa is an inmate in the custody of the State of Connecticut at 15 Osborn Correctional Institution. In January 2019, Rosa entered Connecticut State 16 custody at Bridgeport Correctional Center. Shortly thereafter, Rosa reported to 17 prison medical sta that he had recently su ered a broken collarbone in a car 18 accident. He also noti ed medical sta that he had long-running pain in both 3 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 shoulders and his right knee, and that he had been injured in two shootings years 2 prior. Over the ensuing months, Rosa asserts that he repeatedly sought medical 3 care to little e ect. Eventually, Rosa received some medical care, including the 4 removal of bullet fragments from his shoulder. 5 persisted, and a bullet lodged near Rosa’s lower femur brought him signi cant 6 discomfort. Still, allegedly, Rosa’s pain 7 On April 5, 2021, Rosa led a pro se complaint in the United States District 8 Court for the District of Connecticut. The complaint charged that Rosa received 9 insu cient medical care in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 10 rights and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint also sought 11 injunctive relief requiring further medical treatment and an order “to be cu ed in 12 front and a permanent bottom bunk pass.” App’x 12. 13 But ling a lawsuit in federal court is an expensive process. For his 14 complaint to be deemed received, a civil claimant like Rosa must pay the court 15 $402 in fees. 1 Unfortunately, 63% of adults in the United States report not having The civil filing fee is $350. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The Schedule of Fees set out following the statute also requires an additional administrative fee of $52 for filing any civil case. District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. Courts, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/districtcourt-miscellaneous-fee-schedule (last visited Nov. 16, 2023). 1 4 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 the savings to cover that unexpected expense. 2 Report on the Economic Well-Being 2 of U.S. Households in 2022, Bd. Governors Fed. Res. Sys. (May 2023), 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2023-economic-well-being-of-us- 4 households-in-2022-executive-summary.htm. To remedy the risk that litigants 5 with meritorious claims but without nancial resources might be denied their day 6 in court, American law has a well-established tradition of allowing impoverished 7 litigants to proceed in forma pauperis and bring their suit without prepayment of 8 court fees. Accordingly, Rosa submitted a motion for leave to proceed in forma 9 pauperis along with his complaint, requesting that the court allow him to proceed 10 without prepayment of the $402 ling fee. 11 The in forma pauperis tradition in the United States builds on a long English 12 tradition of fee waivers for impoverished litigants, codi ed by statute in England 13 in 1495. See An Acte to Admytt Such P[er]sons as Are Poore to Sue In Forma 14 Paup[er]is, 11 Hen. 7 c. 12 (1495). The 1495 statute was preceded by a common- Incarcerated people like Rosa may well face even greater obstacles to securing the finances necessary to bring a claim in federal court. On average, incarcerated people earn between $0.86 and $3.45 per day working prison jobs. Wendy Sawyer, How much do incarcerated people earn in each state?, Prison Policy Initiative (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/. Imprisoned in Connecticut, Rosa might expect to earn between $0.75 and $1.75 per day. Conn. Gen. Assemb. Off. Legis. Rsch., Inmate Wages, 2018-R-0179, at 1 (2018); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-85 (2023) (capping inmate pay at $10 per week). 2 5 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 law right to proceed in forma pauperis. See Brunt v. Wardle (1841) 133 Eng. Rep. 2 1254, 1257; 3 Man. & G. 534, 542 (Chief Justice Tindal: “[A]fter all, is the 11 H[en]. 3 7, c. 12, any thing more than con rmatory of the common law?”). Indeed, even 4 earlier, by 1295 the English ecclesiastical courts had statutorily codi ed an 5 expansive in forma pauperis procedure. Statuta Rob. Cantuar. Archiep. De Consistorio 6 (1295), in 2 CONCILIA MAGNAE BRITANNIAE ET HIBERNIAE, A SYNODO 7 VEROLAMIENSI A.D. CCCXLVI AD LONDINENSEM A.D., MCCCXLIX 206 (David 8 Wilkins ed., 1737). 9 Our own in forma pauperis tradition is similarly well-established. In 1892, 10 Congress codi ed the ability of federal courts to allow litigants to proceed in forma 11 pauperis. The language regarding eligibility for in forma pauperis status enacted by 12 this statute remains essentially the same today: litigants can proceed “without 13 being required to prepay fees or costs, or give security therefor” if the litigant 14 submitted an a davit representing that “because of his poverty, he is unable to 15 pay.” 3 Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252, 252. Moreover, before this 16 federal codi cation, many states had either passed in forma pauperis statutes or had By its terms, the 1892 statute extended in forma pauperis status for “plaintiffs” and “United States citizens” only, but the statute has been amended several times since 1892. The statute was amended to include appellants, Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 435, § 1, 36 Stat. 866, 866, and noncitizens, Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-320, 73 Stat. 590. 3 6 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 held that they had inherited in forma pauperis as part of their adoption of the 2 English common law. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 3 HARV. L. REV. 361, 381-90 (1923). 4 The federal in forma pauperis statute represents a signi cant e ort to ensure 5 the ability of impoverished litigants to prosecute meritorious claims or defenses 6 without disadvantage. The Supreme Court has described the 1892 statute as 7 aiming “to lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 8 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). The House Report accompanying the statute labels it as 9 confronting the problem that “persons with honest claims may be defeated, and 10 doubtless often are, by wealthy adversaries.” H.R. Rep. No. 52-1079, at 1 (1892). 11 The House Report suggests that without this statute, “the Government allow[s] its 12 courts to be practically closed to its own citizens, who are conceded to have valid 13 and just rights, because they happen to be without the money to advance pay to 14 the tribunals of justice.” Id. at 2. 15 Rosa’s motion was submitted under the current in forma pauperis statute, 28 16 U.S.C. § 1915. This statute allows litigants to bring a suit “without prepayment of 17 fees or security therefor” so long as the litigant submits an a davit “that includes 18 a statement of all assets” that the litigant possesses. § 1915(a)(1). The statute has 7 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 somewhat di erent requirements for prisoners, re ecting amendments made to it 2 as part of the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). As a result of these 3 amendments, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 now requires prisoner-litigants to “submit a 4 certi ed copy of the trust fund account statement . . . for the 6-month period” 5 before the commencement of the suit. § 1915(a)(2). Additionally, prisoners are 6 eligible only for a payment plan for court costs rather than a full waiver. § 1915(b). 7 Nonetheless, the statute relieves prisoners, if otherwise eligible, of their obligation 8 to prepay court fees before the court can consider the complaint received. 9 Though the PLRA instituted substantial changes to Section 1915, it did not 10 change the substantive Section 1915(a) standard that movants must meet in order 11 to qualify for in forma pauperis status. The Supreme Court, interpreting the same 12 “unable to pay” language still found in Section 1915(a), laid out that eligibility 13 standard in Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948): A litigant 14 need not be “absolutely destitute” to qualify for in forma pauperis status but need 15 demonstrate only that they “cannot because of [their] poverty pay or give security 16 for the costs and still be able to provide [themselves] and dependents with the 17 necessities of life.” Id. at 339 (internal quotations omitted); see also Potnick v. E. State 18 Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (applying the Adkins standard 8 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 to hold that the nancial condition of a plainti whose income was less than the 2 federal poverty level warranted leave to proceed in forma pauperis). 3 The PLRA did, however, require that an incarcerated movant for in forma 4 pauperis status demonstrate that their complaint does not present an obviously 5 fatal defect. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (providing that “the court shall dismiss” a 6 case in which “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or the action or appeal “is 7 frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 8 “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief”). 9 Thus, a determination of whether an incarcerated movant quali es for in forma 10 pauperis status now requires district courts to engage in two distinct tasks: rst, 11 they must evaluate whether the movant has met Section 1915’s substantive 12 standard, § 1915(a), and second, they must review the merits of the movant’s 13 complaint, § 1915(e)(2). 14 Rosa moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis by submitting the form 15 provided by the District of Connecticut Clerk’s O ce for prisoners seeking to 16 proceed in forma pauperis in a civil action. The form asked, inter alia, for Rosa’s 17 income and any other sources of money, the current balance of his inmate account, 18 the total value of property that he owned, and his approximate monthly 9 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 contributions to support family members. App’x 100-02. Rosa’s answers 2 indicated that he had no income, supported his mother and son with monthly 3 payments totaling $86.66, and had an account balance of $576.98 at the time of 4 ling. Rosa attached a certi cation from a prison o cial indicating that, over the 5 last six months, Rosa’s inmate account had an average balance of $601.64 and 6 average monthly deposits of $74.41. Rosa also attached screenshots showing his 7 inmate account transactions over a period of about ten months. These screenshots 8 show frequent debits for commissary purchases and postage and credits for 9 inmate pay (usually between $5 and $25). The screenshots also show three much 10 larger credits for stimulus payments and several debits coded by the account 11 system as “special requests,” ranging from less than $100 to as much as $600. 12 Alongside his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Rosa moved for 13 the appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). As with Rosa’s in forma 14 pauperis motion, Rosa’s motion for appointment of counsel was submitted using a 15 form provided by the District of Connecticut. Both motion forms ask for detailed 16 nancial information. Rosa’s motion for appointment of counsel rea rmed that 17 his income was limited, that his prison account had a balance of $576.98 at the time 18 of ling, and that his mother and his son were his “dependents.” Additionally, 10 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 the motion form for appointment of counsel asked for an itemized list of debts. 2 Rosa listed more than $1,500 in debts, the vast majority of which were fees for 3 ambulance services. 4 The district court denied Rosa’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on the 5 basis of the information submitted in his motion form. The district court noted 6 that Rosa reported receiving $1,200 in income from federal COVID stimulus funds 7 and had an average balance of about $600 over the last six months in his prison 8 account. The district court further noted that “[a]s a prisoner, Rosa does not pay 9 for room or board.” App’x 123-24. Following previous decisions of the District of 10 Connecticut, the district court evidently concluded that the prison provided Rosa’s 11 necessities of life. Accordingly, because Rosa’s inmate account contained more 12 than the $402 required to pay the ling fee, and because Rosa’s room and board 13 were provided by the prison, the district court held that it could “discern no reason 14 why requiring Rosa to pay the ling fee of $402 would force him to forego the 15 necessities of life or abandon this action.” App’x 124. 16 Rosa led several additional documents with the district court contesting 17 this ruling. In these lings, Rosa provided further details of his nancial situation. 18 He responded to the district court’s analysis of his receipt of stimulus funds by 11 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 explaining that he sent those funds to his mother and son to pay for their housing 2 and other necessities. The district court construed Rosa’s additional lings as a 3 motion for reconsideration and denied the motion. 4 On reconsideration, the 4 district court noted that the federal stimulus funds Rosa received were “more than 5 enough to pay the ling fee” and concluded that “[w]hile the desire to help his 6 family is admirable, plainti still made a choice to do so rather than paying the 7 ling fee.” App’x 148. 8 Rosa timely appealed to this Court. 5 On appeal, Rosa argues that the district 9 court erred in requiring Rosa to choose between spending his funds on his family’s 10 necessities of life and using that money to le this suit. Rosa further argues that 11 the district court erred in concluding that the prison provided his necessities of 12 life. On these facts, Rosa contends that the record demonstrates that his nancial 13 condition meets Section 1915(a)’s standard. We agree with Rosa, reverse the 14 district court’s order and remand for further proceedings. Until this point in the litigation, the case had been before Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer, who issued the initial ruling on Rosa’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The case was then transferred to Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam, who ruled on the motion for reconsideration. 5 We appointed counsel for purposes of this appeal. 4 12 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 DISCUSSION 2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal because a district court order denying 3 an application to proceed in forma pauperis is immediately appealable. See Fischer 4 v. N.Y. State Dep’t of L., 812 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Dist. 5 Ct., 339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950)). Additionally, Rosa’s motion for reconsideration was 6 led within twenty-eight days of the underlying nal judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 7 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). As a result, on appeal, we review both the district court’s ruling on 8 reconsideration and the underlying nal judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(5)(B); cf. 9 Bailey v. Interbay Funding, LLC, No. 21-146, 2022 WL 852851 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2022) 10 (reviewing only the ruling on reconsideration where a movant’s reconsideration 11 motion was led more than three months after the underlying nal judgment). 12 We review the denial of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis for abuse of 13 discretion. See Potnick, 701 F.2d at 244. “An abuse of discretion exists if the district 14 court (1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) made a clearly 15 erroneous assessment of the evidence, or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be 16 located within the range of permissible decisions.” City of New York v. Golden 17 Feather Smoke Shop, Inc., 597 F.3d 115, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and 18 citations omitted). 13 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 I 2 As a preliminary matter, the State of Connecticut argues for a rmance of 3 the district court’s orders on the ground that, for procedural reasons, we cannot 4 consider Rosa’s argument that he spent funds to support his family members. 6 5 Connecticut presents two arguments: (1) that Rosa improperly “attempt[s] to 6 present new facts” in his motion for reconsideration in describing that he sent the 7 stimulus funds he received to his dependents, Conn. Br. 16, and (2) that this Court 8 can only consider facts, and arguments reliant on facts, listed in the a davit 9 required by Section 1915(a), Conn. Br. 20-22. 10 We disagree. The in forma pauperis law is not meant to be a series of traps 11 and travails for pro se litigants, nor does it aim to dismiss potentially meritorious 12 arguments because of the particularities of federal practice. And “[i]t is well 13 established that a court is ordinarily obligated to a ord a special solicitude to pro 14 se litigants.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Estelle v. 15 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). This special solicitude “most often consists of 16 liberal construction of pleadings, motion papers, and appellate briefs,” id. at 101 The State of Connecticut would have represented the various defendants had process been served in this case. Because process has not been served, Connecticut appeared at this stage only as an amicus. Brief Amicus Curiae State of Connecticut in Support of Affirmance at 1 (hereinafter “Conn. Br.”). 6 14 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)), and includes leniency 2 in the application of procedural rules, LeSane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 3 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001). 7 See generally Tracy, 623 F.3d at 101-02 (collecting cases 4 a ording procedural leniency to pro se litigants). 5 Here, “construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments 6 that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 7 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted), Rosa’s submissions certainly 8 present the claim that Rosa needed funds to support his family and had a history 9 of supporting his family. Rosa listed his mother and son as dependents on his 10 motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and again on his motion for 11 appointment of counsel. Rosa’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis listed 12 monthly payments he made to support his mother and son. And the screenshots 13 of his inmate account show withdrawals in amounts similar to those that Rosa 14 claimed as the monthly support he provided his mother and son. Liberally 15 construing the pattern of debits to Rosa’s inmate account from funds sent to his We are especially loathe to construe strictly procedural rules against a pro se litigant where the motion in question was submitted according to a form provided by the court. If, as here, the form fails to ask for potentially relevant information, it would be perverse to hold that failure against the litigant. As the author of the form, the court can easily add additional instructions or questions ensuring that necessary information is submitted. A litigant who earnestly responds to the questions that the court asks should not be penalized by the court’s failure to ask for basic information the court in fact requires.s 7 15 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 mother and son, we hold that Rosa’s assertion that he utilized his inmate account 2 funds to support his dependents was su ciently presented in Rosa’s original 3 motion. 8 4 II 5 We turn next to the issue of whether the district court properly analyzed 6 Rosa’s motion under Section 1915(a)’s standard. Rosa rst argues that the district 7 court erred in limiting its analysis to his own necessities of life and failing to 8 consider his dependents’ necessities of life in its Section 1915(a) determination. On 9 reconsideration, the district court recognized that Rosa’s choice to send funds to 10 his family members was “admirable,” but noted that those funds could have 11 instead been used to pay the costs of his suit. App’x 148. Rosa contends that this 12 was error because Section 1915(a)’s substantive standard contemplates that the 13 necessities of life of the movant and those of his dependents are to be considered 14 in determining in forma pauperis eligibility. 15 We agree with Rosa. An in forma pauperis motion meets Section 1915(a)’s 16 standard when it demonstrates that the applicant cannot “pay or give security for Because we find that Rosa’s original motion and accompanying affidavit sufficiently raised the arguments in question, we need not consider whether a court can consider information submitted outside the affidavit required by Section 1915(a). 8 16 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 the costs and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of 2 life.” Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). To 3 require in forma pauperis applicants to “have sworn to contribute to payment of 4 costs[] the last dollar they have . . . and thus make themselves and their 5 dependents wholly destitute[] would be to construe the statute in a way that 6 would throw its bene ciaries into the category of public charges.” Id. Adkins 7 explicitly acknowledges that others might nancially depend on litigants and thus 8 incorporates support of dependents into the Section 1915(a) standard. The district 9 court thus erred in denying Rosa in forma pauperis status without considering his 10 dependents’ necessities of life. 11 Connecticut argues that Rosa’s claims that his mother is a dependent and 12 that he sent her funds to help her pay rent are implausible because she is non- 13 elderly and because there was a federal eviction moratorium in place at the time. 14 Conn. Br. 33-34. Connecticut’s argument would have us apply a level of factual 15 skepticism to Rosa’s a davit that the Supreme Court disfavors in Section 1915(a) 16 analyses. 17 satisfaction of Section 1915’s procedural requirements “should ordinarily be 18 accepted . . . particularly where unquestioned and where the judge does not See Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339 (providing that allegations made in 17 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 perceive a agrant misrepresentation”). Here, Connecticut's challenges are based 2 on unsupported speculation that we nd unpersuasive. Thus, we accept Rosa’s 3 claims for purposes of the Section 1915(a) evaluation. 4 Connecticut further notes that no prior court has addressed whether a 5 movant’s parents may qualify as Adkins dependents. Conn. Br. 33-34. It is 6 unnecessary for us to determine the outer bounds of who may be considered a 7 dependent to resolve this case. Because of the unrestricted usage of the word 8 “dependent” in Adkins and Congress’s broad intent to enable poor litigants to 9 access the courts in enacting this statute, at a minimum, immediate family 10 members such as parents must be understood to qualify. Moreover, any 11 reasonable de nition of dependent includes the potential for dependent parents. 12 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 152 (de ning the word “dependent” for tax code purposes as 13 “(1) a qualifying child, or (2) a qualifying relative” who meets certain statutory 14 criteria); Dependent, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 604 (1966) 15 (de ning “dependent” as “one relying on another for support”). 16 Second, Rosa argues that the district court erred by failing to consider that 17 Rosa, while incarcerated, might nonetheless require funds for his own necessities 18 of life. Appellant’s Br. 20-23. Connecticut instead contends that it provides 18 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 prisoners like Rosa with all the necessities of life. Conn. Br. 23-27. And it was on 2 this basis that the district court denied in forma pauperis status. The court found 3 that the prison provided for Rosa’s room and board and considered no other 4 necessities that Rosa might require. On reconsideration, the district court likewise 5 failed to discuss any necessities that might require Rosa’s funds. In view of this 6 holding, the court concluded that any funds in Rosa’s inmate account were not 7 required for Rosa’s necessities of life. 8 This was error. Despite their incarceration, prisoners maintain their own, 9 often complex, economic lives. Adkins explains that the aim of in forma pauperis 10 status is to prevent individuals from becoming “public charges” because of the 11 costs of a suit. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339. It made clear that it would be anathema to 12 the statute’s purpose of “lower[ing] judicial access barriers to the indigent,” 13 Denton, 504 U.S. at 31, to require litigants to choose between bringing a suit and 14 meeting their familial support or loan payment obligations. But, in addition—and 15 implicit in what the reasoning of Adkins asks courts to recognize—prisoners may 16 well have nancial obligations that warrant consideration in a Section 1915(a) 17 evaluation: medical debts, court nes, student loans, support orders, among other 18 examples. Moreover, prisons all too frequently fail to provide necessary hygiene 19 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 essentials and often charge substantial rates for postage and phone calls that 2 prisoners need to maintain relationships with family and friends. 9 3 It follows that an inquiry into whether a movant meets Section 1915(a)’s 4 standard may not simply presume that, because incarceration provides food and 5 lodging, the movant does not need any nancial resources to secure necessities. 6 And a court may not simply assume that an incarcerated movant with more than 7 $402 in their inmate account requires no resources for their own necessities of life 8 and hence is ineligible for in forma pauperis status. Courts must instead carefully 9 consider whether the motion and the attached inmate account details demonstrate 10 a need for the applicant to maintain some of their own funds for necessities. 11 III 12 Having found that the district court erred because prisoners like Rosa may 13 still have economic needs and because Adkins understands Section 1915(a)’s 14 standard to consider support for dependents, we turn to Rosa’s contention that his 15 motion in fact meets Section 1915(a)’s standard. We hold that it does and, in See Tiana Herring, For the poorest people in prison, it’s a struggle to access even basic necessities, Prison Policy Initiative (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/11/18/indigence/; Timothy Williams, The High Cost of Calling the Imprisoned, New York Times (Mar. 30, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/us/steep-costs-of-inmate-phone-calls-are-underscrutiny.html. 9 20 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 particular, that Rosa demonstrated that his nancial condition precludes him from 2 prepaying the costs of this suit while still providing the necessities of life for 3 himself and his dependents. 4 Rosa’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis demonstrated that he supported 5 his family members with monthly payments of $86.66. At the time the motion was 6 led, Rosa’s inmate account had a balance of $576.98. Though the in forma pauperis 7 form that the court provided failed to inquire into Rosa’s debts, his motion for the 8 appointment of counsel lists more than $1,500 in debt. If denied in forma pauperis 9 status, Rosa would be left with less than $200 in his inmate account to pay for 10 service of process and any other future costs associated with this suit, as well as 11 his debts and support of his dependents. As this court has held, “Section 1915(a) 12 does not require a litigant to demonstrate absolute destitution; no party must be 13 made to choose between abandoning a potentially meritorious claim or foregoing 14 the necessities of life.” Potnick, 701 F.2d at 244 (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339). 15 Though Rosa would not be immediately destitute if required to pay the $402 16 ling fee, he has nonetheless established that he cannot pay the costs associated 17 with this suit and still provide the necessities of life for himself and his 18 dependents. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and direct the court to 21 21-2628 (L) Rosa v. Doe 1 consider whether Rosa, having met the standard of Section 1915(a), meets Section 2 1915’s other requirements and is thus deserving of in forma pauperis status. 3 4 5 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 22
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