Cortes v. MTA New York City Transit, No. 14-713 (2d Cir. 2015)
Annotate this Case
Justia Opinion Summary
Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Second Circuit US Court of Appeals?
Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More ›
You already receive new opinion summaries from Second Circuit US Court of Appeals. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here.
Plaintiff filed suit against MTA, alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112-12117. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to MTA and its dismissal of plaintiff's claims. The district court, based on Collins v. New York City Transit Authority, gave almost preclusive weight to the NYSDHR's dismissal of this claim. The court vacated and remanded the dismissal of the disability discrimination claim because Collins addresses only the effect of arbitration awards under a collective bargaining agreement and does not apply to the decisions of state administrative agencies. The NYSDHR’s findings are admissible evidence, and the court held only that consideration of them on a motion for summary judgment, or, if appropriate, at a trial, is not governed by Collins. The court affirmed the dismissal of the retaliation claim.
Download PDF
14-713-cv Cortes v. MTA New York City Transit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 2014 (Submitted: - - - - - - February 19, 2015 Decided: September 4, 2015) Docket No. 14-713-cv - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JUAN E. CORTES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MTA NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT, Defendant-Appellee.* - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B e f o r e: WINTER, POOLER, and SACK, Circuit Judges. Appeal from a grant of summary judgment by the United States 24 District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Eric N. 25 Vitaliano, Judge) dismissing appellant’s claims under the 26 Americans with Disabilities Act. 27 administrative proceedings and arbitration awards in the dispute 28 leading to the litigation and affirm in part, vacate in part, and 29 remand. 30 31 32 33 34 We clarify the effect of prior Stewart Lee Karlin (Natalia Kapitonova on the brief), The Law Offices of Stewart Lee Karlin, P.C., New York, NY, for PlaintiffAppellant. * The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the case caption accordingly. 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Robert Kenneth Drinan (Lewis S. Finkleman and Kristen M. Nolan on the brief), New York City Transit Law Department, Brooklyn, NY, for Defendant-Appellee. WINTER, Circuit Judge: 8 Juan E. Cortes appeals from Judge Vitaliano’s grant of 9 summary judgment to MTA New York City Transit (“MTA”), dismissing 10 appellant’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act 11 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117. 12 action, appellant filed a substantially similar disability 13 discrimination claim with the New York State Division of Human 14 Rights (“NYSDHR”), which dismissed it. 15 York City Transit Authority, 305 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2002), the 16 district court gave almost preclusive weight to the NYSDHR’s 17 dismissal of this claim. 18 effect of arbitration awards under a collective bargaining 19 agreement and does not apply to the decisions of state 20 administrative agencies, we vacate and remand the dismissal of 21 appellant’s disability discrimination claim. 22 the dismissal of appellant’s retaliation claim. 23 24 Before bringing the present Based on Collins v. New Because Collins addresses only the However, we affirm BACKGROUND This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we 25 view the factual record in the light most favorable to appellant. 26 McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2001). 27 2 1 On July 11, 1994, MTA hired appellant as a train conductor. 2 He was promoted to passenger train operator in 1998. 3 2001, he became a work train (no passengers) operator. 4 October 15, 2006, appellant had a dispute with a supervisor. 5 that day or soon thereafter, he also injured his back. 6 subsequent MRI showed injury to four lumbar discs, and 7 appellant’s personal doctor ordered him not to work from November 8 3, 2006 until January 7, 2007. 9 In late On On A Appellant’s employment was governed by a collective 10 bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that required him, before returning 11 to work, to undergo a full physical evaluation at MTA’s Medical 12 Assessment Center (“MAC”) and to obtain a fit-for-duty 13 certificate. 14 evaluation, an EKG test revealed a potentially dangerous cardiac 15 abnormality. 16 until he had undergone complete cardiac testing. 17 appellant’s job was “safety sensitive,” the MTA determined that 18 there were no train-operator duties appellant could perform until 19 he was medically cleared. 20 On January 7, 2007, in the course of the physical MAC doctors barred appellant from operating trains Because Appellant’s doctor confirmed the abnormal EKG and referred 21 him to a cardiologist, Dr. Jane Levine. 22 appellant submitted documentation to MAC showing that Dr. Levine 23 confirmed the coronary artery disease diagnosis and, as a result, 24 he could not perform train-operator duties. 3 On March 5, 2007, Dr. Levine 1 recommended additional diagnostic procedures including a nuclear 2 stress test and a cardiac catheterization or, alternatively, a 3 cardiac CT angiogram. 4 On March 20, 2007, appellant met with MAC doctors again. 5 The stress test revealed coronary artery disease, but appellant 6 refused to undergo a catheterization. 7 refused catheterization only because was waiting for his 8 insurer’s approval of an angiogram. 9 provided the requisite documentation, MAC doctors left the work 10 restrictions in place and gave him until May 15, 2007 to submit 11 the results of an angiogram. 12 results by the deadline. 13 were changed from temporary to permanent, which allowed him to be 14 reclassified to a position encompassing duties he was physically 15 fit to perform. 16 Appellant claimed that he Because appellant had not Appellant failed to submit the Consequently, his work restrictions In late August 2007, appellant received the results of the 17 angiogram, which revealed no heart or artery disease. 18 however, did not give these results to the MTA and missed a 19 September 25, 2007 appointment with MAC for a reclassification 20 evaluation. 21 appellant produced the August diagnostic results. 22 2008, based on the new information, the MTA doctors altered 23 appellant’s work restrictions to allow him to operate work (non- 24 passenger) trains, as he had done since 2001. Appellant, At a rescheduled appointment on November 28, 4 On March 31, 1 On April 16, 2007, during the various medical examinations, 2 appellant’s counsel filed a complaint with the NYSDHR, claiming 3 the MTA had illegally discriminated against him under state and 4 federal law by failing to accommodate his disability, i.e., his 5 cardiac problem and neck injury. 6 issued a decision holding that appellant had not met his burden 7 of proof on the discrimination claim. 8 relevant part, the following facts. 9 with the CBA requirement that he obtain a fit-for-duty On January 23, 2009, the NYSDHR The NYSDHR found, in Appellant had not complied 10 certificate from MAC to return to work. 11 ready to consider lifting appellant’s job restriction if further 12 testing ruled out a heart condition serious enough to endanger 13 passengers, appellant failed to submit the diagnostic results in 14 a timely manner. 15 the further cardiac testing, the MTA modified his work 16 restrictions and allowed him to return to operating work trains. 17 Because appellant could not fulfill the essential duties of his 18 safety-sensitive position as passenger train operator without 19 medical clearance, the NYSDHR concluded that no reasonable 20 accommodation would have been possible. 21 that appellant never requested an accommodation for his 22 disability. 23 The EEOC adopted its findings on June 10, 2012. 24 2000e-5(b) (“[T]he Commission shall accord substantial weight to Although the MTA was As soon as appellant submitted the results of The NYSDHR further noted The NYSDHR opinion became final on January 25, 2010. 5 42 U.S.C. § 1 the final findings and orders made by state or local authorities 2 . . . .”). 3 administratively or in state court. 4 Appellant did not challenge the NYSDHR’s decision On September 10, 2010, appellant commenced the present 5 action by filing a pro se complaint against the MTA in the 6 Eastern District of New York. 7 under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.1 8 2000e-17, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117. 9 only facts alleged in the complaint were that “[I] have never had The complaint asserted claims 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to The 10 a medical appeal of my case according to our collective 11 bargaining agreement” and “I had a neck injury 12-26-1996 and 12 believe the Transit Authority is retaliating against me because 13 of this.” 14 discrimination because of appellant’s back or cardiac conditions 15 or retaliation because of his NYSDHR complaint. 16 J. App’x at 13. The complaint did not assert The MTA moved for summary judgment, submitting, inter alia, 17 a copy of the NYSDHR/EEOC order. 18 56.1 statement of material facts, appellant admitted that he had 19 filed an NYSDHR complaint alleging that the MTA discriminated 20 against him on the basis of his initial injury and his cardiac 21 condition. In response to the MTA’s Rule He also conceded that the NYSDHR had held a hearing 1 Cortes withdrew his ADEA and Title VII claims and proceeded only on his ADA claim. The district court nevertheless addressed and granted summary judgment to the defendants on Cortes’s Title VII claims. We therefore have addressed neither those portions of the district court’s opinion nor Cortes’s Title VII claims on appeal. 6 1 at which he was represented by counsel and gave sworn testimony. 2 He did not contest any of the NYSDHR’s findings of fact. 3 Appellant’s response to the MTA’s Rule 56.1 statement 4 further stated, for the first time, that the alleged 5 discrimination stemmed not only from an injury sustained at home 6 and a verbal confrontation with a superior, but also from his 7 cardiac condition and a neck injury suffered in 1996. 8 injury pre-dated by many years his promotion from conductor to 9 train operator. The neck He alleged that he was facing disciplinary 10 charges “for being injured.” 11 parties’ summary judgment briefing discussed additional acts of 12 alleged disability discrimination during the period after Cortes 13 returned to work, including restricted work assignments and 14 overtime. 15 J. App’x at 86. In addition, the The district court granted summary judgment to the MTA. The 16 court held that appellant’s claims were not precluded by virtue 17 of the NYSDHR’s prior administrative ruling based on the same 18 facts. 19 claim, the court assigned substantial weight to the NYSDHR’s 20 findings of fact because they were the product of an “independent 21 and unbiased” hearing. 22 F.3d at 115). 23 F.3d at 115, the court held that appellant “utterly fail[ed] to 24 confront much less carry” the burden of showing that the NYSDHR’s With regard to appellant’s disability discrimination J. App’x at 121 (quoting Collins, 305 Relying on this court’s opinion in Collins, 305 7 1 decision was wrong as a matter of fact or that its impartiality 2 was tainted. 3 evidence related to his 2007-2008 claims that was not already 4 presented,” appellant “rehash[ed]” the same facts and arguments 5 he provided to the NYSDHR. 6 summary judgment on the ADA discrimination claims. Instead of presenting the district court with “any Therefore, the court granted the MTA 7 Appellant’s briefing in the district court also claimed that 8 he was retaliated against for filing a complaint with the NYSDHR. 9 This claim “appear[ed] nowhere in his complaint.” J. App’x at 10 122. 11 and the court would have granted permission to amend it to add a 12 retaliation claim, the court deemed the retaliation claim as 13 properly before it. 14 Nonetheless, because appellant filed the complaint pro se However, the district court held that appellant failed to 15 make out a prima facie retaliation case. 16 an NYSDHR complaint, a protected activity of which the MTA had 17 knowledge, and he was put under work restrictions, an adverse 18 employment action, the district court held that appellant had not 19 shown a causal connection between the NYSDHR complaint and the 20 adverse employment action. 21 complaint was filed in April 2007 and the claimed retaliation 22 took place 14 months later, there was not even a “tenuous 23 temporal connection” to suggest retaliatory intent. 24 124. Although he had filed It concluded that, because the NYSDHR J. App’x at The court moreover found that even assuming appellant could 8 1 show causation, the medical evidence clearly established that the 2 MTA had a non-retaliatory basis to place appellant on work 3 restrictions. 4 retaliation claims as well. 5 Therefore, the MTA was granted judgment on the DISCUSSION 6 We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de 7 novo. 8 2014). 9 genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is See Jackson v. Fed. Express, 766 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. Summary judgment is not appropriate unless there is “no 10 entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 11 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 12 judgment, the nonmovant must merely show that “reasonable minds 13 could differ as to the import of the evidence . . . in the 14 record.” 15 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 a) ADA Claim 17 Anderson v. Liberty To survive summary R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. Appellant argues that the district court misapplied Collins 18 and our caselaw regarding the weight to be given the NYSDHR 19 ruling. 20 pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement to which the 21 employer was a party on a Title VII claim.2 Collins concerns the effect of binding arbitration 2 The district court We treat Collins and the other Title VII cases cited in this opinion as applicable to Cortes’s ADA claim because “the ADA explicitly incorporates all of the enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures of Title VII.” Smith v. Perkins Bd. Of Educ., 708 F.3d 821, 827-28 (6th Cir. 2013); cf. Joseph V. Athanasopoulos, 9 1 appears to have equated such binding arbitration to a decision of 2 a state administrative agency. 3 write to clarify the difference. 4 We agree that this was error and “ADA employment discrimination claims are subject to the 5 familiar burden-shifting analysis established by the Supreme 6 Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): 7 A plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; the employer must 8 offer through the introduction of admissible evidence a 9 legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the discharge; and the 10 plaintiff must then produce evidence and carry the burden of 11 persuasion that the proffered reason is a pretext.” 12 Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 13 Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. 14 Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)). 15 Sista v. CDC A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination 16 by demonstrating that he “suffered an adverse employment action 17 under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory 18 intent.” 19 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and ellipses 20 omitted). 21 the employer to articulate “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 22 reason for the adverse employment action.” 23 quotation marks omitted). Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep’t, 709 F.3d Once the plaintiff shows this, the burden shifts to Id. (internal 648 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e are aware of no distinction between the [ADA and Title VII] that would require affording a state court judgment a different preclusive effect.”). 10 1 We will assume, without deciding, that appellant established 2 a prima facie case by alleging that he was not allowed to return 3 to work after being injured as well as alleging discriminatory 4 treatment upon his initial return to work.3 5 first issue, the MTA countered with the NYSDHR’s findings of fact 6 as evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for barring 7 appellant from working. 8 produce evidence showing that the various reasons relied upon by 9 the NYSDHR were a pretext. With respect to the The burden then shifted to appellant to In response, appellant made arguments 10 substantially similar to those he made in proceedings before the 11 NYSDHR. 12 A claimant may bring federal ADA and Title VII claims even 13 if they have been rejected in a state administrative proceeding. 14 See Joseph v. Athanasopoulos, 648 F.3d 58, 62, 64 n.6 (2d Cir. 15 2011); see also Staats v. Cty. of Sawyer, 220 F.3d 511, 514 (7th 16 Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 150 F.3d 31, 17 39 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998) (The ADA incorporates Title VII deferral 18 procedures; therefore, Title VII precedents “apply with equal 19 force in the ADA context”). 3 Despite the parties’ briefing on this issue, the district court did not consider Cortes’s allegations of disability discrimination upon his return to work in the form of restricted work assignments and overtime, instead apparently considering these contentions relevant only to appellant’s retaliation claim. Although we take no position on the merits of these post-return allegations or whether they are properly exhausted, the district court is instructed to consider them on remand as part of its consideration of appellant’s disability discrimination claim. 11 1 Because we do not give preclusive effect to state agency 2 decisions unless they have been reviewed in a state court 3 proceeding, see Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 73 (2d 4 Cir. 2006) (citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 5 (1986)), an unreviewed NYSDHR decision is not binding on a trier 6 of fact in an ADA action. 7 are, however, admissible as evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 8 803(8)(A)(iii) as “factual findings from a legally authorized 9 investigation” by a public office. The unreviewed findings of an agency See also Arroyo v. WestLB 10 Admin., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 224, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 213 11 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2000); Henry v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 42 F.3d 89, 12 96 (2d Cir. 1994). 13 Discrimination claims are also often brought in federal 14 court after being submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to a 15 collective bargaining agreement. 16 that “a decision of an independent and unbiased arbitrator based 17 on substantial evidence after a fair hearing . . . has probative 18 weight regarding the requisite causal link between an employee’s 19 termination and the employer’s illegal motive.” 20 F.3d at 115. 21 treatment to arbitration, “a decision by an independent tribunal 22 that is not itself subject to a claim of bias will attenuate a 23 plaintiff’s proof of the requisite causal link.” 24 Therefore, when an arbitrator’s “decision follows an evidentiary In that context, we have held Collins, 305 When an employee submits his claim of unlawful 12 Id. at 119. 1 hearing and is based on substantial evidence, the Title VII 2 plaintiff, to survive a motion for summary judgment, must present 3 strong evidence that the decision was wrong as a matter of fact 4 –- e.g. new evidence not before the tribunal –- or that the 5 impartiality of the proceeding was somehow compromised.” 6 Id. The district court appears to have equated binding 7 arbitration and judicially unreviewed agency findings. 8 that, based upon Collins, appellant “utterly fail[ed] to confront 9 much less carry” the burden of showing that the NYSDHR’s decision It held 10 was factually wrong or biased. 11 not clear that application of the distinction between binding 12 arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement and an agency 13 decision would alter the outcome in this particular case, we 14 expressly reject the view that Collins applies to agency 15 decisions. 16 J. App’x at 121. Although it is In Collins, the appellant had challenged his termination by 17 his employer through his collective bargaining agreement’s multi- 18 step grievance procedure ending in binding arbitration. 19 at 115-16. 20 retaliation. 21 Id. at 117. 22 make out a prima facie case under Title VII because he did not 23 show a causal link between the employer’s alleged bias and his 24 termination. 305 F.3d His grievance claimed racial discrimination and Id. The arbitration board upheld the termination. In Collins, we held that the appellant failed to Id. at 119. 13 1 Collins had “challenged the Transit Authority's decision to 2 fire him and was finally discharged only after the arbitration 3 board made an independent inquiry, including the taking of 4 evidence.” 5 independent and unbiased decisionmaker.” 6 noted that “the CBA established [the arbitration] process both to 7 deprive the Transit Authority of the power to terminate an 8 employee unilaterally and to ensure fair and probatively sound 9 decisions for aggrieved employees.” Id. at 118. The arbitration board was a “fully Id. Id. at 119. We further “Appellant's 10 termination occurred, therefore, only after a decision, based on 11 substantial evidence, of an undisputedly independent, neutral, 12 and unbiased adjudicator that had the power to prevent the 13 termination. 14 discriminatory intent in that termination.” 15 This fact is highly probative of the absence of Id. In Collins, therefore, we held only that while “a negative 16 arbitration decision rendered under a CBA does not preclude a 17 Title VII action by a discharged employee[,] . . . a decision by 18 an independent tribunal that is not itself subject to a claim of 19 bias will attenuate a plaintiff's proof of the requisite causal 20 link.” 21 circumstances, when an arbitral decision “follows an evidentiary 22 hearing and is based on substantial evidence, the Title VII 23 plaintiff, to survive a motion for summary judgment, must present 24 strong evidence that the decision was wrong as a matter of fact Id. (internal citation omitted). 14 Under such 1 -- e.g. new evidence not before the tribunal -- or that the 2 impartiality of the proceeding was somehow compromised.” Id. 3 We note here that Collins is applicable only to decisions of 4 a tribunal to which an employer has contractually surrendered the 5 final power to discipline or discharge employees. 6 Collins requires is the same as that required in all Title VII or 7 ADA cases regarding a causal connection between the prohibited 8 motive and the adverse employment action. 9 President for sales is discharged, the bias of a janitorial The analysis If a company’s Vice- 10 foreman will be irrelevant because the foreman is not the 11 decision-maker regarding the Vice-President’s employment. 12 Similarly, when the final decision on discipline or discharge is 13 made by an arbitrator whose lack of bias is conceded, enough 14 evidence linking the employer’s motive and the arbitration 15 decision must be proffered to allow a reasonable trier of fact to 16 find that the decision was affected by acts resulting from that 17 motive. 18 arbitration under his CBA. 19 to meet the burden established by Collins for Title VII 20 plaintiffs to survive a motion for summary judgment or at trial. 21 In this case, appellant did not submit to binding Therefore, appellant was not required Again, the NYSDHR’s findings are admissible evidence, and we 22 hold only that consideration of them on a motion for summary 23 judgment, or, if appropriate, at a trial, is not governed by 15 1 Collins. 2 proceedings on summary judgment. 3 b) Retaliation Claim 4 We of course intimate no view on the outcome of further On the retaliation claim, appellant did not make out a prima 5 facie case. 6 to the MTA and suffered an adverse employment action, we agree 7 with the district court that he failed to proffer enough evidence 8 to support a finding of a causal connection between the protected 9 activity and the adverse employment action. While he participated in a protected activity known See Gorman-Bakos v. 10 Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 11 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). 12 complaint in April 2007 is too remote from the alleged adverse 13 employment action in June 2008 to support by itself an inference 14 of retaliation. 15 behavior. 16 he produced the appropriate diagnostic results.4 17 the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s retaliation claim. The filing of the NYSDHR The record indicates no other retaliatory Indeed, appellant was allowed to return to work after Thus, we affirm 18 CONCLUSION 19 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 20 court is affirmed as to appellant’s retaliation claims, but the 21 dismissal of the ADA discrimination claims is vacated and 22 remanded. 4 Appellant does not argue that those results entitled him to return to passenger-train operation. 16
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
