Perez v. AC Roosevelt Food Corp., No. 13-497 (2d Cir. 2013)
Annotate this CaseThis opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on November 6, 2013.
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13-497-cv Perez v. AC Roosevelt Food Corp. 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT _______________ 5 August Term, 2013 6 7 8 9 (Submitted: Oct. 17, 2013; Decided: Nov. 6, 2013; Amended: December 10, 2013) 10 _______________ 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MIGUEL G. PEREZ, individually and on behalf of other persons similarly situated who were employed by AC Roosevelt Food Corp., d/b/a/ Champion Food Supermarket or any other entities affiliated with or controlled by AC Roosevelt Food Corp. and Antonio Collado, 26 27 Before: WINTER, JACOBS, STRAUB, Circuit Judges. _____________ Docket No. 13-497 Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AC ROOSEVELT FOOD CORPORATION, or any other entities affiliated with or controlled by AC Roosevelt Food Corp. doing business as Champion Food Supermarket, and ANTONIO COLLADO, Defendants-Appellants. _______________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (John Gleeson, Judge), granting a motion for attorneys fees. We hold that the appeal is not timely. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 ANDREW SQUIRE, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellants. 15 16 Judge JACOBS dissents in a separate opinion. _______________ LADONNA M. LUSHER, Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee. _______________ STRAUB, Circuit Judge: AC Roosevelt Food Corporation and Antonio Collado appeal from an 17 August 13, 2012 order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 18 of New York (John Gleeson, Judge), as memorialized in a January 7, 2013 19 judgment, granting Miguel Perez s motion for attorneys fees. We hold that (1) a 20 final order solely on the issue of attorneys fees is appealable without entry of a 21 separate document; and (2) a subsequent, identical judgment does not re-start the 22 time to appeal. Because the entry of judgment did not restart the time to appeal, 23 we DISMISS the appeal as untimely. 2 1 The facts of this case as relevant to this appeal are as follows. Perez 2 commenced this action for overtime wages on October 20, 2010. Defendants 3 initially failed to appear and default was entered on January 18, 2011. Perez 4 sought certification as a class on February 22, 2011, which was granted on May 3, 5 2011, and notice published. Defendants appeared on October 31, 2011, and 6 default was vacated. The class was voluntarily de-certified on February 9, 2012, 7 and a settlement reached by June 1, 2012. On August 13, 2012, the District Court 8 approved the settlement and resolved the only outstanding issue by granting 9 Perez s motion for attorneys fees in an order that stated, [t]he Clerk of the 10 Court is respectfully directed to close the case. The August 13 order, therefore, 11 was the final order of the District Court, resolving all pending issues and ending 12 the case. Defendants, however, failed to pay, and on November 8, 2012, Perez 13 filed to reopen the case and have judgment entered. This motion was granted on 14 November 19, 2012, and judgment entered on January 7, 2013. Defendants 15 notice of appeal was filed on February 6, 2013. In their appeal, Defendants 16 challenge only the District Court s decision on Perez s motion for attorneys fees. 17 18 Perez argues that Defendants appeal is untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. The time limit provided for by Rule 4 is jurisdictional in 3 1 civil cases. M.E.S., Inc. v. Snell, 712 F.3d 666, 668 (2d Cir. 2013); see Napoli v. 2 Town of New Windsor, 600 F.3d 168, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) ( The timely filing of a 3 notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement. (internal quotation 4 marks and brackets omitted)). It is common ground that jurisdiction is a 5 threshold matter that must exist before a court may decide the merits of an 6 appeal. Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2013). 7 [W]e have consistently held that an order awarding attorneys fees and 8 costs is not an appealable final order until the amount of fees and costs has been 9 set by the district court. Honeywell Int l, Inc. v. Purolator Prods. Co., 468 F.3d 162, 10 164 (2d Cir. 2006); see O & G Indus., Inc. v. Nat l R.R. Passenger Corp., 537 F.3d 153, 11 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying the same rule). In this case, the amount of fees and 12 costs was set by the District Court s order of August 13, 2012. 13 Rule 4(a)(1)(A) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed . . . within 30 14 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Entry of a judgment 15 or order, for purposes of this Rule 4(a), depends upon whether Federal Rule of 16 Civil Procedure 58(a) requires a separate document. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7). 17 Where a separate document is required, entry occurs when the judgment or 18 order is entered in the civil docket and either 150 days have passed or the 4 1 judgment or order is set forth on a separate document. Fed R. App. P. 2 4(a)(7)(ii). Where a separate document is not required, the judgment or order is 3 considered to have been entered when the judgment or order is entered in the 4 civil docket. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(i). A separate document is not required for an order disposing of a motion 5 6 . . . for attorney s fees under Rule 54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)(3); see Feldman v. Olin 7 Corp., 673 F.3d 515, 516-17 (7th Cir. 2012) ( Rule 58(a)(3) has provided that no 8 separate document is required for an order disposing of a motion for attorney s 9 fees under Rule 54, and [a]ll that the reference to Rule 54 can sensibly be 10 understood to mean is that Rule 54, the rule on judgments, makes awards of 11 attorneys fees one type of judgment and Rule 58 designates it as a type of 12 judgment for which a separate judgment document is not required. (internal 13 quotation marks omitted)).1 It follows that the order setting the amount of 14 attorneys fees was entered for the purposes of Rule 4 when it was entered in 15 the civil docket, i.e., on August 13, 2012. The thirty days provided for by Rule This rule serves to distinguish Bogaerts v. Shapiro (In re Litas International, Inc.), 316 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), which, as the dissent concedes, concerned satisfaction of Rule 58 under circumstances that did not implicate an exception to that rule. Nor do we believe that this is a case in which confusion was likely, as the District Court s August 13 order closed the case. 1 5 1 4(a)(1)(A), therefore, had long since run when Defendants filed their notice of 2 appeal on February 6, 2013. Defendants argue that the thirty-day period should be measured from the 3 4 January 7, 2013 judgment rather than the August 13, 2012 order. However, a 5 new or amended judgment may only renew the thirty-day limit if the later 6 judgment changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity, in a 7 judgment previously rendered. Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 502 8 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); see FTC v. 9 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 211-12 (1952) ( Only when the 10 lower court changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity, in a 11 judgment previously rendered should the period within which an appeal must 12 be taken or a petition for certiorari filed begin to run anew. (internal footnotes 13 omitted)).2 Indeed, even where a judgment has been vacated and a second entered, it 14 15 is the substance of the new judgment rather than the procedure that is The fact that the August 13 order was an order and not a judgment does not alter the application of this rule because a judgment is defined as any order from which 2 an appeal lies. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). Put simply, the August 13 order was the final judgment of the District Court and the time to appeal from a final judgment does not restart because a defendant refuses to pay the judgment and forces the plaintiff to seek additional judicial intervention. 6 1 determinative of whether the appeal clock begins anew. See Cody, Inc. v. Town of 2 Woodbury, 179 F.3d 52, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that where the 3 two judgments are identical with respect to all questions of substantive rights 4 appeal could not lie from the second judgment even where the district court 5 vacated its original judgment ). 6 There can be no argument in this case that the January 7, 2013 judgment 7 and the August 13, 2012 order are not identical in every way. No issue of 8 substance indeed, no issue of triviality differs between the two orders. It 9 follows that the entry of judgment did not reset Defendants time to appeal, that 10 the appeal was untimely, and that we lack jurisdiction. The appeal, therefore, is 11 DISMISSED. 7 1 2 JACOBS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: This appeal challenges the reasonableness of an 3 attorney s fee award, and presents an issue as to 4 timeliness: the appeal is timely if calculated from the 5 entry of final judgment but untimely if calculated from the 6 earlier order to pay the fees. 7 Roosevelt had until 30 days after entry of final judgment to 8 file notice of appeal, I respectfully dissent from the 9 majority s dismissal and would affirm the district court s 10 Because I believe AC judgment on the merits. 11 12 13 I The August 13, 2012 order, which approved the 14 settlement agreement, granted Perez s motion for attorney s 15 fees, and directed the clerk to close the case, did not meet 16 the separate document requirement of Federal Rule of Civil 17 Procedure 58 and was not labeled a judgment. 18 Civ. P. 58(a). 19 order can, without the subsequent entry of a Rule 58 final 20 judgment, and by the passage of time alone, deprive a would- 21 be appellant of its opportunity to seek review. 22 Supreme Court made clear, . . . it cannot. See Fed. R. The question is whether a self-executing 1 As the In re Litas 1 Int l, Inc., 316 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2003). 2 requirement has not been waived. 3 Hampton, 83 F.3d 31, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1996). 4 The Rule 58 See Cooper v. Town of East The separate-document formality sought to relieve the 5 kind of uncertainty (raised in this case) where the opinion 6 or memorandum has not contained all the elements of a 7 judgment, or where the judge has later signed a formal 8 judgment, and it has become a matter of doubt whether the 9 purported entry of a judgment was effective, starting the 10 time running for post-verdict motions and for the purpose of 11 appeal. 12 (1978) (citation omitted). 13 formalism of the separate document requirement is to avoid 14 confusion as to when the clock starts for the purpose of an 15 appeal. 16 Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384-85 The reason for adhering to the Cooper, 83 F.3d at 33. As the majority explains, a grant of attorney s fees is 17 an exception to the separate-document requirement. See Fed. 18 R. Civ. P. 58(a)(3). 19 collateral order does not render an appeal untimely if 20 appeal awaits entry of final judgment. 21 appeals, including this one, have held explicitly . . . 22 that failure to take an available collateral order appeal But the availability of appeal from a 2 [S]everal courts of 1 does not forfeit the right to review the order on appeal 2 from a [procedurally proper] final judgment on the merits. 3 15A Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3911 (2d 4 ed.) (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 5 381, 818 F.2d 179, 181 (2d Cir. 1987) ( Even if the 6 [collateral] order was appealable under Cohen, there is 7 still no reason to bar an appeal from the [later] order, 8 which was clearly intended by the district court to be 9 final. )). 10 My view is confirmed by the grouping of the orders 11 specified in Rule 58(a). 12 often made after entry of judgment on the merits, and in 13 that respect is like other exceptions to the separate- 14 document rule, which are invariably made afterward. 15 case such as this, in which the attorney s fee award 16 precedes entry of the final judgment, an immediate appeal of 17 the attorney s fee would raise an issue as to prematurity: 18 how can the fee award be reviewed before the outcome on the 19 merits has been ascertained? 20 An award of attorney s fees is In a Accordingly, AC Roosevelt had until 30 days after the 21 January 7, 2013 entry of final judgment to file notice of 22 appeal. 23 2013. AC Roosevelt filed timely notice on February 6, 3 1 II 2 Because I consider AC Roosevelt s appeal timely, I 3 would reach the merits and affirm the district court s award 4 of attorney s fees. 5 The Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ) directs courts 6 to award prevailing plaintiffs reasonable attorney s fees 7 and costs. 8 537 F.3d 132, 151 (2d Cir. 2008); see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 9 ( The court in such action shall, in addition to any Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 10 judgment awarded to . . . plaintiffs, allow a reasonable 11 attorney s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the 12 action. ). 13 § 663(4) (McKinney 2011) ( In any civil action by an 14 employee . . ., the employee . . . shall have the right to 15 collect attorneys fees and costs incurred in enforcing any 16 court judgment. ). 17 New York Labor Law is the same. N.Y. Labor Law A party prevails in a FLSA suit if [it] succeed[s] on 18 any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of 19 the benefit . . . sought in bringing suit. 20 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (citation omitted). 21 plaintiff involved in litigation ultimately resolved by 22 settlement may still be entitled to an award of attorneys 4 Hensley v. A 1 fees as a prevailing party. 2 F.2d 101, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1991). 3 Lyte v. Sara Lee Corp., 950 The settlement agreement required payments totaling 4 $8,000 to Perez and another former employee, and explicitly 5 contemplated the pending motion for attorney s fees and 6 costs. 7 statutory framework. 8 9 Perez was therefore a prevailing party under the See Lyte, 950 F.2d at 104. We review attorneys fee awards for abuse of discretion. A district court abuses its discretion if it 10 (1) bases its decision on an error of law or uses the wrong 11 legal standard; (2) bases its decision on a clearly 12 erroneous factual finding; or (3) reaches a conclusion that, 13 though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a 14 clearly erroneous factual finding, cannot be located within 15 the range of permissible decisions. 16 R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal 17 quotation marks and citations omitted). 18 discretion--already one of the most deferential standards of 19 review--takes on special significance when reviewing fee 20 decisions because the district court, which is intimately 21 familiar with the nuances of the case, is in a far better 22 position to make such decisions than is an appellate court, 5 Millea v. Metro-N. Abuse of 1 which must work from a cold record. 2 Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal 3 quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). 4 McDaniel v. Cnty. of Both this Court and the Supreme Court have held that 5 the lodestar--the product of a reasonable hourly rate and 6 the reasonable number of hours required by the case--creates 7 a presumptively reasonable fee. 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 that the percentage of the fund method is more Millea, 658 F.3d at 166-67 AC Roosevelt argues 10 appropriate; but here there is no common fund because the 11 class was decertified prior to settlement negotiations. 12 The district court reviewed the parties submissions 13 and contemporaneous lawyer time records; acknowledged the 14 work involved in litigating what was originally a class 15 action, notifying class members, and engaging with a 16 defendant who did not appear in the case for almost a year; 17 and concluded that the request for attorney s fees was 18 reasonable in all respects. 19 discretion. 20 This was no abuse of Accordingly, I would affirm. 6
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