Ruston v. The Town Board for the Town of Skaneateles et al., No. 09-4480 (2d Cir. 2010)

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09-4480-cv Ruston v. The Town Board for the Town of Skaneateles et al. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 2009 (Argued: April 15, 2010 Decided: July 8, 2010) Docket No. 09-4480-cv - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x LAWRENCE RUSTON, JANET RUSTON, Plaintiffs-Appellants , - v.THE TOWN BOARD FOR THE TOWN OF SKANEATELES, PAUL BILL PAVLUS, THADDEUS ASTEMBORSKI, BARBARA SPAIN, DAVID G. LAXTON, THEODORE MURDICK, THE PLANNING BOARD FOR THE TOWN OF SKANEATELES, MARK TUCKER, JOSEPH SOUTHERN, KENNETH JONES, ALAN BRIGGS, LEWIS WELLINGTON, DESSA BERGEN, ROBERT LOTKOWICTZ, THE VILLAGE OF SKANEATELES, Defendants-Appellees, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE 1-20, Defendants . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, McLAUGHLIN and SACK, Circuit Judges. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.), 1 dismissing on the pleadings a class of one equal 2 protection claim by property owners, who were denied sewer 3 hookups for their proposed subdivision, against the Village 4 of Skaneateles , the Town Board, and the Town Planning Board 5 (and individual members of the Boards) . 6 on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) and Bell 7 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) to supersede 8 DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2003). 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 We affirm, relying J. DAVID MacCARTNEY, JR., Esq. (Dennis E.A. Lynch, Esq., on the brief), Feerick Lynch MacCartney PLLC, South Nyack, NY for Plaintiffs-Appellants . Terry Rice, Rice & Amon, Suffern, NY for DefendantAppellee Village of Skaneateles; FRANK W. MILLER, Esq., Law Firm of Frank Miller, East Syracuse, NY for Defendants-Appellees Town Board for the Town of Skaneateles, Town Planning Board, and individual Town Defendants . DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge: Plaintiffs-appellants Lawrence and Janet Ruston ( the 29 Rustons ) allege a class of one equal protection claim 30 against local authorities that denied applications for a 31 subdivision and additional sewer hookups for plaintiffs lot 32 fronting Lake Skaneateles. 2 1 2 3 I The Rustons own a 27-acre lakefront lot within the Town 4 of Skaneateles ( Town ), but outside of the Village of 5 Skaneateles ( Village ). 6 house, in which the Rustons lived, and three other 7 structures, all connected to the Village s sewer system. 8 They plead that the Town and the Village unconstitutionally 9 frustrated their development plans. 1 10 In 1990, the property had a single In 1990, the Rustons presented to the Town a plan to 11 subdivide their lot and build a new housing development. 12 The Town required the Rustons first to get permission from 13 the Village to connect the proposed new homes to the Village 14 sewer system. 15 request. 16 In 1991, the Village denied the Rustons The Rustons, for a time, abandoned their efforts. In 2000, the Rustons sought permission from the Town to 17 subdivide their property and build a development containing 18 14 residential units, each to be serviced by its own septic 19 system in a new sewer district. The Rustons allege that the 1 This account of the dispute is derived from the Rustons January 12, 2009 amended complaint, the factual allegations of which are accepted as true to the extent they are non-conclusory for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009). 3 1 Town delayed and raised a series of obstacles to their 2 application. 3 the Rustons twice sought permission to connect their 4 proposed new units to the Village sewer system. 5 requests were denied. 6 rejection in November 2004, the Rustons renewed the pending 7 application to the Town to create the new sewer district for 8 the development and to approve the new development as a 9 whole. While the application to the Town was stalled, Both After the Village issued its final The Town delayed consideration until December 2005, 10 by which time a new zoning law had been put into place. 11 is alleged that this law was designed to block the Rustons 12 proposed development, and did so: 13 Rustons development application in December 2005 and, 14 citing the new zoning law, denied it. 15 It The Town considered the In July 2006, the Rustons filed a complaint under 42 16 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 in the United States District Court 17 for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.) against 18 the Village of Skaneateles and the Town Board of 19 Skaneateles, the Town Planning Board, as well as several 20 individual members of the Town Board and the Town Planning 21 Board (collectively, the Town defendants ). 22 complaint alleged: (1) conspiracy to violate the Rustons 4 This (first) 1 civil rights; (2) violation of their substantive due process 2 rights; and (3) violation of their equal protection rights. 3 Additionally, the Rustons brought claims against the Town 4 defendants claiming that the Town s new zoning law was 5 unconstitutionally vague, and violated their substantive due 6 process rights and their right to equal protection. 7 Rustons also asserted a state law claim against the Town 8 defendants to enforce vested property rights. 9 The The Village moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 10 joined by the Town defendants (as relevant to them). 11 December 24, 2008, the district court dismissed: (1) with 12 prejudice as to the § 1985 conspiracy claims against all 13 defendants; (2) with prejudice as to the substantive due 14 process claim against the Village; but (3) without prejudice 15 as to the equal protection claim against the Village. 16 Ruston v. Town Bd. for Skaneateles, No. 5:06-CV-927, 2008 17 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104129 (N.D.N.Y Dec. 24, 2008). On See 18 On January 12, 2009, the Rustons filed an amended 19 complaint, renewing all claims against the Town defendants 20 (except the § 1985 conspiracy claims), and re-casting the 21 equal protection claim against the Village. 22 defendants and the Village again moved to dismiss, and the 5 The Town 1 district court dismissed with prejudice all federal claims 2 against the Town defendants and the Village; and, having 3 dismissed all federal law claims, the court declined to 4 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Rustons state 5 law claim, and dismissed it without prejudice. 6 v. Town Bd. for Skaneateles, No. 5:06-CV-927, 2009 U.S. 7 Dist. LEXIS 90964 (N.D.N.Y Sept. 30, 2009). 8 9 See Ruston The Rustons appeal, inter alia, the dismissal of their equal protection claim. 2 We affirm, holding that the 10 complaint failed to state an equal protection claim on which 11 relief could be granted. 2 The Rustons assert two additional grounds for appeal, both meritless. As to their substantive due process claim, they had no federally protected property right to approval of the sewer hookups or the development itself (as approval of either required a favorable exercise of discretion), see Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2006); RRI Realty Corp. v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir. 1989), and they did not allege governmental behavior that may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience, see Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 93 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). As to the facial constitutionality of the new zoning law, the Rustons failed to allege that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid. See Kittay v. Giuliani, 252 F.3d 645, 647 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)) . 6 1 2 II 3 We review a district court s grant of a motion to 4 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. 5 Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 115 6 (2d. Cir 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Vietnam Ass n for The Rustons argue that they sufficiently alleged a 8 class of one equal protection claim against the Town 9 defendants and the Village. See generally, Engquist v. Or. 10 Dep t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008). 11 recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 12 class of one, where the plaintiff alleges that she has 13 been intentionally treated differently from others similarly 14 situated and that there is no rational basis for the 15 difference in treatment. 3 16 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). 17 18 The Supreme Court has Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, The Supreme Court has recently clarified the pleading standard required to withstand a motion to dismiss. 3 [O]nly The Supreme Court arguably added a third requirement to class of one claims in Engquist v. Or. Dep t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008): that the offending governmental action at issue be non-discretionary. As we hold that the Rustons have failed to adequately allege a class of one claim regardless of whether the governmental action at issue was non-discretionary we have no need to explore Engquist. 7 1 a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief 2 survives a motion to dismiss. 3 complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be 4 a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 5 draw on its judicial experience and common sense. 6 v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (internal citation 7 omitted). 8 framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 9 allegations. Determining whether a Ashcroft While legal conclusions can provide the When there are well-pleaded factual 10 allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 11 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 12 to relief. 13 U.S. 544, 565-66 (2007). 14 differ as to the impact of this pleading standard on a 15 class of one equal protection claim.4 16 attributable to the tension between [i] this Court s 17 decision in DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 18 2003), which held under a now-obsolete pleading standard 19 that a class of one claim is adequately pled ( albeit Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 District courts in our Circuit 4 This uncertainty is Compare Toussie v. Town Bd. of E. Hampton, No. 08-CV1922, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13435, at *16-17 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2010) with Crippen v. Town of Hempstead, No. 07-CV-3478, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24820, at *33 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009) (decided before Iqbal but after Twombly). 8 1 barely so) even without specification of others similarly 2 situated, and [ii] the Supreme Court s recent 3 clarifications, which require that a complaint allege facts 4 sufficient to establish a plausible claim for relief, 5 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 ; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 6 566. 7 We hold that the pleading standard set out in Iqbal 8 supersedes the general allegation deemed sufficient in 9 DeMuria, 328 F.3d at 707. Under Iqbal, factual allegations 10 must be sufficient to support necessary legal conclusions. 11 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51. 12 begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no 13 more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of 14 truth. 15 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). 16 consider the factual allegations in [the] complaint to 17 determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to 18 relief. 19 Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). 20 A court can choose to Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. We next Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951; see also Harris v. The Rustons complaint fails to allege facts that 21 plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. 22 Town defendants, the Rustons argument appears to be that 9 As to the 1 the Town refused to consider their application while 2 considering applications submitted by those similarly 3 situated. 4 examples of the Town s proceedings, let alone applications 5 that were made by persons similarly situated. 6 protection claim as to the Town defendants therefore fails 7 for lack of factual allegations to support the legal 8 conclusion. 9 However, the Rustons do not allege specific The equal As to the Village, the Rustons argue that other, 10 similarly situated properties were allowed to connect to the 11 Village s sewer system. 12 properties that allegedly were allowed to connect to the 13 Village s sewer system, all of them individual homes or 14 businesses that (like the Rustons land) were outside the 15 Village but within the Town. 16 factual allegations that these other properties received 17 sewer access while the Rustons property did not. 18 Nevertheless the complaint fails to state a claim that would 19 support relief. 20 The Rustons do identify several We credit, as we must, the [C]lass-of-one plaintiffs must show an extremely high 21 degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to 22 whom they compare themselves. 10 Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 1 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006) . 2 on a class-of-one claim, a plaintiff must establish that (i) 3 no rational person could regard the circumstances of the 4 plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree 5 that would justify the differential treatment on the basis 6 of a legitimate government policy; and (ii) the similarity 7 in circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient 8 to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted on the 9 basis of a mistake. 10 11 Accordingly, to succeed Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, none of the properties cited by 12 the Rustons suffice: a house built in 1987; a country club 13 that was renovated in the early 1990 s ; two neighboring 14 properties-- connected to the Village sewer system for 15 decades --that are not further described; a house built in 16 or around 2004 ; a luxury spa built in the late 1990 s ; 17 and a large commercial building. 18 is similar to the Rustons proposed 14-home development, let 19 alone so similar that no rational person could see them as 20 different: some are commercial properties versus the 21 residential properties at issue, see Campbell v. Rainbow 22 City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2006) (properties 11 None of these properties 1 that differed in land use were not prima facie similarly 2 situated) ; see also Clubside, Inc., 468 F.3d at 159, and the 3 residential connections were single homes, not a new 4 development as proposed by the Rustons, see id. at 159-60 5 (projects involving different types of housing and density 6 levels were not similarly situated as a matter of law). 7 As the Rustons fail to allege that properties 8 sufficiently similar to theirs were treated more favorably 9 by either the Village or the Town, they have failed to state 10 a class of one equal protection claim. 11 * * * 12 13 We have considered the Rustons other arguments and 14 find them unavailing. For the foregoing reasons, the 15 judgment of the district court is affirmed. 12

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