Leftridge v. Connecticut State Trooper, No. 09-2922 (2d Cir. 2011)
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Plaintiff, an African-American, sued defendants pro se alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law where plaintiff was charged with a traffic violation by a state trooper and where plaintiff alleged that the charge was false and that the trooper's actions were motivated by plaintiff's race. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to reopen his case, which the district court had administratively closed, because of plaintiff's failure to obtain counsel. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion where the inability of an individual litigant to obtain counsel was not a basis for denying him his statutory right to pursue his case pro se.
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09-2922-cv Leftridge v. Connecticut State Trooper 09-2922-cv Leftridge v. Connecticut State Trooper 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2010 4 5 (Submitted: October 15, 2010 Decided: May 12, 2011) Docket No. 09-2922-cv 6 7 8 VERNON J. LEFTRIDGE, Jr., 9 Plaintiff-Appellant, 10 11 12 13 14 - v. - CONNECTICUT STATE TROOPER OFFICER #1283, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS UNIT, CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE, 15 Defendants-Appellees. 16 17 Before: 18 KEARSE, CALABRESI, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges. Appeal 19 for 20 refusing 21 the pro se plaintiff's failure to retain counsel. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 the from an order of the United States District Court District of Connecticut, Vanessa L. Bryant, Judge, to reopen an administratively closed action because of Vacated and remanded. VERNON J. LEFTRIDGE, Jr., Hartford, Connecticut, Plaintiff-Appellant pro se. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, Connecticut (Maura Murphy Osborne, Assistant Attorney General, Hartford, Connecticut, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees. 1 KEARSE, Circuit Judge: 2 Plaintiff pro se Vernon J. Leftridge, Jr., who commenced 3 the present 4 against defendants Connecticut State Trooper #1283 ("Trooper 1283" 5 or "the Trooper") and various agencies of the State of Connecticut 6 (the 7 States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Vanessa L . 8 Bryant, 9 which action pursuant "State"), appeals Judge, the Leftridge's had failure U. S. C. from a July 2, denying court to 42 § obtain and state law 2009 order of the United motion to administratively to 1983 closed, case, because court, which of Leftridge's 11 February 2009 had imposed a June 29, 12 to hire counsel, 13 and refused to reopen the case, 14 retain counselor to establish that the retaining of counsel was 15 imminent. On 16 district court's 17 prosecute his case pro se. 18 and we 19 fUrther proceedings. ~n 2009 deadline for Leftridge refused to grant an extension of that deadline appeal, orders 20 contends improperly principally denied him the that the right to For the reasons that follow, we agree, the July 2, I . an stating that Leftridge failed to Leftridge therefore vacate Leftridge, The his 10 21 counsel . reopen 2009 order and remand for BACKGROUND African - American, alleging that, commenced the present 22 action in July 2007, while driving in Connecticut 23 in October 2005, he had been stopped by Trooper 1283 and charged 24 with a traffic violation. The complaint alleged that that charge - 2 - 1 was false and that 2 Leftridge's 3 Amendment to the United States Constitution. race, In August 4 the in Trooper's violat ion 2007, of, Leftridge inter moved were al ia, for motivated the the by Fourteenth appointment of 5 counsel 6 concluding that "the plaintiff's position does not seem likely to 7 be of substance" 8 the plaintiff has demonstrated in his filings that he is able to 9 investigate the facts of the case and present them to the Court." 10 to represent him. actions The district court denied the motion, and that "the legal issues are not complex and Order dated October 1, 2007. Defendants moved to dismiss Leftridge's complaint on the 11 12 grounds, inter alia, that they were entitled to Eleventh Amendment 13 sovereign 14 claim upon which relief could be granted. 15 the motion, Leftridge moved in May 2008 for reconsideration of the 16 district 17 counsel. 18 experienced in or competent to understand the litigation process, 19 and was stressed and frustrated with the case. 20 reconsideration. 21 the 22 complaint 23 claims 24 dismiss insofar as the complaint asserted claims against Trooper 25 1283 in his individual capacity. immunity and/or court's denial that of the his complaint motion failed to state a Before responding to for the appointment He stated that he lacked knowledge of the law, district See Order dated June 10, court granted defendants' on Eleventh Amendment against the State grounds agencies, - but of was not The court denied 2008. In July 2008, motion to dismiss insofar as it denied the the asserted motion See Order dated July 30, 2008. 3 - to 1 Leftridge immediately renewed his motion for appointment 2 of counsel. 3 was not competent to proceed because of his lack of experience and 4 legal 5 Leftridge 6 should 7 2008. 8 1 i tigate his claims wi thout the assis tance of counsel, 9 with He stated that he was undergoing stress and that he knowledge. "ha [d] The not reconsider Leftridge, the case pro court denied provided its any the basis previous orders." despite se, having motion, upon stating which the that Court order da ted Augus t indicated that he could inter alia, 11 not proceeded making numerous motions with respect 10 8, to, and a potential default judgment against the Trooper. 12 In discovery matters, his desire to amend the complaint, February 2009, Leftridge again moved for the 13 appointment of counsel, 14 disorder and that 15 representing himself. 16 motion, 17 effect," and directing Leftridge to follow instructions previously 18 given by the court as to the time by which and the manner in which 19 pretrial 20 summary judgment could be filed. 21 Leftridge then submitted a February 11, 22 from his psychologist, who stated in pertinent part as follows: 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 his stating that he had an anxiety and stress doctor had advised that he should not be The district court promptly stating that "the Court's earlier ruling. discovery was to be completed, so that denied remains in motions Order dated February 10, 4 - for 2009. 2009 letter to the court I have been treating [Vernon Leftridge] since October 2006. I have advised Mr. Leftridge on multiple occasions that his serving as his own attorney has been causing him inordinate anxiety and stress. Consequently, I have recommended to him that he pursue hiring an at torney. He has informed me that you need my verification of such, in order to - the 1 2 appoint him counselor to grant him the time to seek legal counsel. 3 Following its receipt of this letter, 4 further order stating as follows: 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 the district court entered a The plaintiff filed an exhibit in which his psychologist confirms that the plaintiff lS experiencing anxiety and stress as a result of representing himself in this case. The Court has previously declined to appoint counsel for the plaintiff because his position does not seem likely to be of substance. That rul inq remains in ef fect, but it does not prevent the plaintiff from hiring counsel on his own. If the plaintiff wishes to pursue thls case. he may at tempt to hire counsel by 6/29/09, and that attorney may then pursue the plaintiff's claims. Given the present circumstances, the case should be administratively closed without prejudice to reopening by an attorney for the plaintiff. The Clerk is directed to administratively CLOSE this file. 21 Order dated February 13,2009 22 added) 23 ("February Leftridge that had been pending. 13 Order") (emphases The February 13 Order also "terminated" other motions by On June 24 22, 2009, as Id. the June 29 court-imposed deadline 25 for him to retain counsel approached, Leftridge moved for, inter 26 alia, 27 to be able to retain a 28 the] 29 establish that an attorney is on the verge of filing an appearance 30 for him." an extension of time in order to enable him to raise funds (specified) attorney. The court "den lied Motion for Extension of Time, as the plaintiff has failed to Order dated June 29, 2009 ("June 29 Order"). In the meantime, on June 25, 31 2009, Leftridge also filed a 32 motion to reopen the case notwithstanding his not having retained 33 counsel. He also indicated that he would continue to attempt to 34 raise money the needed to retain - 5 - counsel. The district court 1 denied the motion to reopen, stating that "the Court already ruled 2 on the issue in [the June 29 Order denying an extension of time to 3 obtain counsel}." 4 Leftridge Order dated July 2, 2009 ("July 2 Order"). filed a notice of appeal, contending that the 5 "judgment entered on July 2, 2009 den[ied him} 6 his case as a pro se/plaintiff." 7 motions in the district court, again asking the district court to 8 reopen his case or extend his time to retain an attorney. 9 mot ions were denied on the the right to reopen He thereafter filed additional ground tha t provided no new 10 information. 11 2009 12 Leftridge had "already filed a notice of appeal as to the Court's 13 decision not to reopen the case." ("July See Order dated July 9, they Those 15 Order"). II. 14 15 On appeal, The 2009; Order dated July 15, latter order also noted that July 15 Order. DISCUSSION Leftridge argues principally that the district 16 court abused its discretion by denying his motion to reopen his 17 case to allow him to proceed pro se when he could not afford to 18 retain an attorney. 19 discretion in denying several of his other motions. 20 while noting that the district court did not enter a judgment in 21 this 22 ground that it was properly dismissed for lack of prosecution or 23 for failure to comply with court orders. case, urge us He also contends that to aff irm the - 6 - closure the court abused its of the Defendants, case on the 1 For the reasons that follow, of a "judgment," 2 lack 3 appeal 4 district court's refusal to reopen the case because of Leftridge's 5 failure to retain an attorney const ituted an abuse o f discretion. 6 A. pursuant to we have we conclude that despite the 28 U . S.C. § jurisdiction 1291; and to we entertain conclude this that the Appellate Jurisdiction 7 Section 1291 of Title 28 provides, 8 the federal 9 from all in pertinent part, that courts of appeals "shall have jurisdiction of appeals final decisions 28 U.S.C. of § 1291. the district courts 10 States." 11 does not pertain to an interlocutory inj unction, 12 or a case 13 that the district court 14 appeal 15 jurisdiction 16 of the United within the meaning of § 1291 . in admiralty, pursuant to see to 28 hear the appeal 'final 18 litigation on the 19 but execute the judgment." 20 233 21 Livesay, 22 decision is 23 that 24 Cohen 25 (1949) § for and a 1292 (b) , unless the generally is and a ours); 467 see, ~, (1978) Industrial decision is not an order immediate Court decision is one which lacks "final" ends the court the t o do Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S . 229, Coopers In "practical rather than a Beneficial receivership, this merits and leaves nothing for 463, a potential Loan "by which a - 7 - & Lybrand determining "final" within the meaning of § 1291, section a v. decision' (emphasis U.S. 1292 (a), § U.S.C. "A 437 id. has certified 17 ( 1945) When a decision of th e district court v. whether a we are to give technical construction," Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 district court disassociates 1 i tsel f from 2 County Commission, 3 Trust 4 appeals must 5 the judgment to represent the final decision in the case") . Co. v. In 6 a case" deemed lS 514 Mallis, U.S. 435 35, U.S. be 42 381, final, Swint (1995); 385 Chambers ~, see, n.6 v. (1978) Bankers ("courts determine whether the district court the present case, 7 intended its July 2 Order, 8 the 9 Leftridge's case to or any issue case. appears that intended the district court although not addressing the merits of in it, to be its described As in Part I that order closed the case only conditionally, 12 entered "without 13 [Leftridge]" 14 February 15 refused 16 court 17 closure of 18 became 19 referred 20 reopen 21 in in intended its July 2 Order to be its final action in the case. if 22 Leftridge Order. extend to In that the the 29 the by in case. an counsel Order, and "administratively "by July the The 2 July district for 6/29/09." the 2 court Order the administrative Order 15 as "the Order, which court, Court's therefore 23 plainly Leftridge's case 24 practical matter. 25 Leftridge 26 him from having an attorney come in the thereafter deci sion appears Even if that were not the court's intent, ended attorney however, its Thus, as it was conditional when first ordered in February, July case," June deadline, unconditional. to obtained its reopen the case, reopening be court closed"; to case the 11 prejudice the above, 2009 refused that decision February to ordered final 10 13 had it of not to to have the July 2 Order district court as a The court's June 29 Order had refused to give additional time to retain - 8 counsel, thereby precluding in to represent him. - When the 1 court also refused, in its July 2 Order, to reopen the case to 2 allow Leftridge to pursue his case without an attorney, 3 his ability to pursue his case by any means. it ended Accordingly, we view the July 2 Order as a final decision 4 5 within the meaning of 6 jurisprudence, 7 appellate review of a district court order that "administratively" 8 unconditionally ends the case. 9 We cannot, as a matter of sound conclude that an aggrieved party has no right to turn, We 1291. § therefore, to the question of whether the 10 district court's July 2 Order, refusing to reopen the case because 11 Leftridge 12 discretion . 13 14 B. failed to retain counsel, constituted an abuse of The Propriety of the Administrative Closure and Refusal To Reopen nA 15 district court necessarily abusers) its 16 discretion if it base [5] 17 law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence," Cooter 18 & 19 decision--though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a 20 clearly erroneous 21 range of 22 Insurance Co., 23 Verizon New York, Gell v. As 24 Hartmarx Corp., its ruling on an erroneous view of the 496 U.S. factual a 47 (1990), 405 finding--cannot permissible decisions,'" 554 F.3d 38, 384, or if n'its be located within the Slupinski v. (2d Cir. 2009) First Unum Life (quoting Zervos v. Inc., 252 F.3d 163,169 (2d Cir. 2001)). general matter of federal law, an individual 25 proceeding in federal court has the right to present his case pro 26 se: lOIn all courts of the United States the parties may plead and - 9 1 conduct thei r own 2 general l y 3 1308- 1 0 4 representat i on 5 art i f i c i al 6 h i s case pro se, an order requiring him i nstead to reta i n counsel 7 to represent h i m v i olates § 1654. 8 of 9 legal error and cannot be located within the range of permi ss i ble Eagle (2d such cases Assoc i ates Ci r. to v. 19 91) U . S.C. grants the 1654. See 926 F . 2d 1305, r i ght Montre al, § of self - persons, not an adult If i nd i v i dual wishes pro se pla i nt i ff for to corporat i ons or other to conduct An order dism i ss i ng the act i on fa i lure to retain i n the present case, counsel is a 10 dec i s i ons. 11 July 2 Order refus i ng to reopen the case solely because Leftr i dge 12 had not ob t a i ned couns e l, 13 case pro s e , const i tuted an abuse of d i scret i on. 14 Accord i ngly, 28 Bank of (§ 1654 natural ent i t i es). a p e rsona ll y." th e d i str i ct court's thereby preclud i ng h im from pursu i ng h i s Defendants argue that the Ju l y 2 Order was e ssent i ally a 15 d i sm i ssa l 16 prosecute o r to comply wi th the[ Federa l Rules of Ci v i l 17 or 18 (quot i ng Fed. R. Ci v. 19 Order 20 (Defendants' 21 Leftr i dge 22 for d i scovery 23 at 6-7) and that 24 request that he 25 legal 26 arguments any of Leftr i dge's case" order "be of court. ,,, did and br i ef on not beg i n (2006» the not appeal at 5 this at 8), case stating remain closed" pr i ncipally that d i scovery during the court-ordered t i me court be on Procedure] . ) They urge that the July 2 [that] appeal br i ef "from Ju l y 2008 to March 2009 " "s i mply requ i red to compl i ed l i t i gate at 7) We characteri zations. The representa ti on" and (Defendan t s ' P. 41 (b) affirmed [f]or fa i lur e of the pla i nt i ff to I (i d. - 10 - are (id . at 6; wi th th i s ~ pla i nt i ff's case wi thout unpe rsuaded by r e cord does i d. not these i nd icate 1 that defendants ever moved pursuant to Rule 41{b) for an order of 2 dismissal 3 conducted 4 defendants made such a motion, 5 273 F . 3d 159, 6 upon such an analysis, the record would have warranted dismissa l . 7 It does not appear that there was a failure to prosecute; indeed, 8 defendants 9 required for failure the to prosecute, analysis 180 that would (2d Cir. 2001). in their respond to motion (Defendants' the district court have been required had see generally Martens v. Thomann, compl ain to or that Nor is it at all clear that, brief on appeal practice Leftridge that was 11 district court docket entries support defendants' suggestion that 12 Leftridge was derelict for fai l ing to make any attempt to conduct 13 discovery 14 entries indicate, 15 period 16 videotapes 17 court had ordered but that was delayed by several defense motions 18 for 19 December 20 deposition 21 Order administratively closed the case nearly a month before the 22 discovery period was scheduled to end. extensions 2008 of July inter alia, Leftridge of period was his of time Leftridge to March to have do 2009. defendants arrest--production that Leftridge moved 1283. Nor the Those that during the early part o f that attempting traffic Trooper 2008 at 7) were "voluminous" the on appeal they 10 during brief by that for And, of that the district opposed--and permission course, the produce to that in take the February 13 23 Final l y, we are not persuaded by defendants' argument that 24 the court simply granted Leftridge's own wish to proceed only with 25 the assistance of counsel. 26 of counsel did not necessarily mean that Leftridge would choose His repeated requests for appointment - 11 - 1 not to proceed pro se if that choice would result in dismissal. 2 He had in fact proceeded pro se for some 18 months despite the 3 denial of counsel and his complaints that he was not well equipped 4 to 5 inclined to view the district court's February 13 Order itself, 6 which 7 reopening if Leftridge obtained counsel by June 29, as an abuse of 8 discretion. 9 Leftridge, proceed on his conditionally That only own. That closed order after the was note without entered, Leftridge the we are prejudice without submitted to objection letter by from his his own 12 abuse its discretion by giving Leftridge time to retain counsel, 13 although it would have been preferable for the court to have said 14 that 15 should have specified that if Leftridge did not retain counsel (by 16 such deadline as the court imposed) he nonetheless had the option 17 of proceeding pro se. 18 counsel 19 reopened in order to allow him to proceed pro se, 20 been allowed to proceed pro se. 21 litigant 22 statutory right to pursue his case pro se. 23 C. before as its attorney was detrimental to his health. rather serving not 11 stayed, Leftridge's that psychologist action was that case we 10 the indicating said, Clearly the court did not than closed; and the court And once Leftridge was unable to retain the June 29 deadline and asked that the case be to obtain counsel he should have The inability of an individual is not a basis for denying him his Leftridge's Other Contentions 24 Leftridge also contends, with little specificity, that the 25 district court "abuse[d] its discretion when it denied several ll of - 12 - 1 his other motions. 2 extent that 3 orders denying 4 co unsel, 5 party has 6 of counsel 7 662 8 (1982) . 9 to represent" he F.2d (Leftridge Leftridge his means brief to on motions no for basis at 4.) the district challenge repeated provides appeal for the overturning in a civil case. 162, 176 (2d ~, See, Cir. 1981), court's of orders. A to the assistance United States v. cert. the appointment those no constitutionally guaranteed right To denied, 456 Coven, U.S. 916 A district court's decision not to "request an attorney an indigent civil plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. discretion. See, 10 § 11 ~, 12 Police 13 Pleasure, 14 U.S. 15 for counsel if it concludes that his chances of success are highly 16 dubious. 17 Pleasure, 1915 (e) (1) is Pena v. reviewable Choo, Officers, 802 (1962). See, for 58, 284-85 abuse 168 F.2d 168, F.2d 296 F.2d 283, 964 18 826 only (2d (2d 60 of Cir. 1987); Cir. 1961), (2d Cir. 1986); cert. Hodge v. Miller denied, v. 370 The court prop erly denies the plaintiff's motion ~, Pena v. Choo, 826 F.2d at 169; Miller v. 296 F.2d at 285. Here , of In 19 appointment 20 case 21 Lef tridge's 22 that 23 Leftridge 24 court's 25 record before us, appeared denying counsel, the to substance. lack renewed Leftridge's had Leftridge's initial requests case not court for appeared provided initial inter stated, In cou nsel, to be motion alia, addressing and/or new informati on In the circumstances, we see no abuse of discretion - 13 - his several of noted stated any assessment. that the court again weak for to alter and on that the the in the district 1 court's 2 denial of Leftridge's counsel. To the extent of 3 that the district requests Leftridge for seeks the to appointment challenge of other 4 rulings 5 amend 6 decline 7 dealt 8 some manner resolves Leftridge's case on substantive or procedural 9 grounds, his court on complaint to or address those his with on an appeal, such matters as his desire requests matters, if relating to discovery, will more from a any, which final judgment to we properly that be in rather than closing it administratively. 10 CONCLUSION We have considered all of defendants' arguments in support 11 12 of the district 13 have 14 above, 15 remanded 16 Leftridge must be allowed, 17 se. found the court's refusal to reopen for 2, 2009 proceedings order not is case and For the reasons discussed them to be without merit. July Leftridge's vacated, inconsistent if he wishes, and with the matter this is opinion. to pursue his action pro We of course express no view as to the merits of his claims. No 18 costs are awarded at this time. In the event that 19 Leftridge ultimately prevails on the merits of any of his claims, 20 the 21 appeal. district court should award - 14 - him the costs of the present
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