United States v. Navas, No. 09-1144 (2d Cir. 2010)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
09-1144-cr United States v. Navas 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 F OR THE S ECOND C IRCUIT 3 4 August Term, 2009 5 (Argued: January 27, 2010 Decided: March 8, 2010) 6 7 Docket No. 09-1144-cr 8 U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA, 9 Appellant, 10 - v.- 11 J OSE N AVAS, J OSE A LVAREZ, and A RTURO M OREL, 12 Defendants-Appellees, 13 14 F AUSTO V ELEZ, F ERNANDO D ELGADO, P EDRO V ENTURA, A NTONIO M OREL, and E URIS V ELEZ, 15 16 Defendants. * * The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption of this action to conform to the caption listed above. 1 Before: 2 L EVAL and W ESLEY, Circuit Judges, and G LEESON, District Judge. ** 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Interlocutory appeal from a March 19, 2009 order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.), which granted in part and denied in part motions to suppress evidence and post-arrest statements collected during the course of a narcotics investigation. The government seeks review of the portion of the district court s order that suppressed narcotics seized by law enforcement officers during a warrantless search of a trailer. We hold that the search was lawful under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment s warrant requirement. R EVERSED and R EMANDED. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 T ELEMACHUS P. K ASULIS, Assistant United States Attorney (Katherine Polk Failla, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York, for Appellant. 26 27 L AWRENCE D. G ERZOG, New York, New York, for Appellee Jose Alvarez. 28 29 30 S USAN G. K ELLMAN, Brooklyn, New York, for Appellee Arturo Morel. P ATRICK J. J OYCE, New York, New York, for Appellee Jose Navas. ** The Honorable John Gleeson, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 2 1 W ESLEY, Circuit Judge: 2 This appeal concerns a trailer, unhitched from its cab 3 and parked in a warehouse. The district court held that a 4 warrantless search of the trailer ran afoul of the Fourth 5 Amendment. 6 fixed structure, and argue that the district court properly 7 suppressed the fruits of the search. 8 that, whether or not attached to a cab, the trailer is 9 subject to a warrantless search pursuant to the automobile On appeal, defendants liken the trailer to a The government argues 10 exception to the Fourth Amendment s warrant requirement. 11 As the trailer was readily mobile and commanded only a 12 diminished expectation of privacy, we hold that the 13 automobile exception applies. I. 14 15 A. Therefore, we reverse. BACKGROUND Facts 16 The information leading to defendants arrests was 17 provided to the Drug Enforcement Administration ( DEA ) by a 18 cooperating witness who himself had been arrested for a 19 narcotics-related offense. 20 that he was a member of a narcotics distribution enterprise 21 that shuttled large quantities of narcotics and illicit 22 proceeds between California and New York City. The witness informed the DEA 3 The modus 1 operandi of the group, according to the cooperating witness, 2 was to transport the contraband in hidden traps located 3 within trailers that contained more mundane freight. 1 4 addition to providing information about the nature of the 5 narcotics trafficking scheme, the cooperating witness also 6 implicated defendant-appellee Jose Navas and provided the 7 number of a cellular telephone that was subsequently linked 8 to Navas following further investigation. 9 10 In On October 27 2008, the government obtained an order from a magistrate judge in the Southern District of New York 1 At the suppression hearing conducted by the district court, one of the agents who participated in the challenged search testified that he was not really a truck guy. Perhaps as a result, there is a dearth of evidence in the record regarding the nature of the vehicle at issue and some confusion in the district court s terminology. The district court used the word cab to describe what we understand to be [t]he noncargo carrying power unit that operates in combination with a semitrailer or trailer. 23 C.F.R. § 658.5 (Department of Transportation regulation defining the terms tractor and truck tractor ). In some parts of its decision, the court used the term tractor trailer to describe what we understand to be a nonautomotive highway . . . vehicle designed to be hauled by a cab. Webster s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 2424 (2002). At other times, the court referred to the object of the search simply as a trailer. The testimony from the hearing suggests that it was in fact only the trailer portion of a tractor trailer. Thus, for purposes of clarity, we adopt the district court s use of the term cab and refer to the vehicle searched as a trailer. We only use the phrase tractor trailer to denote times at which the cab and the trailer were connected. 4 1 that authorized law enforcement officers to track the 2 location of the phone. 2 3 assigned to the Drug Enforcement Task Force observed that 4 the phone was approaching the Bronx. 5 observation, agents were dispatched to the Hunts Point 6 Terminal Market to conduct surveillance. 3 7 afternoon, one of the agents identified Navas at the Market. 8 He was seen unloading a tractor trailer with out-of-state 9 license plates, aided by an individual later identified as 10 On November 4, 2008, agents defendant-appellee Jose Alvarez. Based on that During the Later that night, Navas 2 The order was issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-26, 2703(d), which were enacted in Titles II and III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). See United States v. Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The surveillance authorized by the order allowed the agents to approximate the phone s geographic position by monitoring the cell site information transmitted between the phone and the antenna towers in its vicinity. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing the mechanics and investigative uses of cell site information). The district court denied defendants motions to suppress evidence collected pursuant to this order, and those holdings are not at issue in this appeal. See Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d. at 262-63. 3 The Hunts Point Terminal Market is located on Halleck and Spofford Streets in the Bronx. It is one of the largest wholesale produce and meat processing centers in the world. See United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2002). Products are shipped there via air, rail, and road. 5 1 and Alvarez drove the tractor trailer to a private warehouse 2 on Drake Street in the Bronx, approximately one half mile 3 from the Hunts Point Market. 4 watched Navas open the garage door, park the tractor trailer 5 in the warehouse, unhitch the cab, and lower the legs in the 6 front of the trailer to stabilize it. 7 then drove the cab out of the warehouse, closed its garage 8 door, and drove away. 9 pursued Navas and Alvarez, and others remained at the 10 11 At the warehouse, the agents Navas and Alvarez Some of the surveilling agents warehouse. Navas and Alvarez proceeded to a nearby McDonald s 12 restaurant, where they parked the cab on the street. 13 later identified as defendant Fernando Delgado approached 14 the cab and engaged in a discussion with Navas and Alvarez. 15 After the conversation, Delgado entered a black Lincoln Town 16 Car with Ohio license plates, which then parked in the 17 McDonald s parking lot. 18 again with Navas and Alvarez, and then entered a silver 19 Honda Odyssey parked adjacent to the Lincoln. 20 approximately five individuals exited the Honda with black 21 duffel bags. 22 23 A male Delgado exited that vehicle, spoke Thereafter, The agents at the scene then arrested Navas, Alvarez, Delgado, and the remaining occupants of the Lincoln and the 6 1 Honda. Searches incident to those arrests revealed that the 2 duffel bags removed from the Honda were empty, but that 3 additional bags within that vehicle contained gloves, 4 drills, and drill bits. 5 arrestees and transported them back to the warehouse, where 6 they were issued Miranda warnings in Spanish and patted down 7 a second time. 8 admitted that he was a driver for drug traffickers, that 9 the trailer was being delivered to a member of the The agents patted down the After receiving Miranda warnings, Navas 10 trafficking organization, and that narcotics were stowed in 11 a secret rooftop compartment of the trailer. 12 Supp. 2d at 261. 13 Navas, 640 F. During the pat-down of an arrestee later identified as 14 defendant-appellee Arturo Morel, an agent noticed a large 15 box-like object in Morel s right front pants pocket. 16 agent testified at the suppression hearing that Morel stated 17 that the object was the garage door opener to [his] house, 18 but the garage door of the warehouse opened when the agent 19 inadvertently touch[ed] it. 4 20 discussion, Morel verbally consented to a search inside 4 Id. at 261. The After further The district court specifically credited this aspect of the agent s testimony, and its credibility determination is unchallenged. See Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 261 & n.2. 7 1 [the warehouse at] 528 Drake Street and anything that was in 2 there. 3 but neither the agents nor Morel completed the portion of 4 the form calling for a description of the area to be 5 searched. Id. Morel also executed a written Consent Form, 6 Following Morel s consent, the agents entered the 7 warehouse and conducted the search at issue in this appeal. 8 Acting on information from Navas s post-arrest statement and 9 the cooperating witness, they examined the top of the 10 trailer and observed physical indicia of a secret 11 compartment. 12 roof of the trailer, discovered 230 kilograms of cocaine, 13 and promptly seized the contraband. 14 B. 15 The agents then ripped off the sheet metal Id. at 262. Procedural History Following the November 4, 2008 arrests, eight 16 defendants were indicted on November 19, 2008. The 17 indictment charges a single count of conspiracy to possess 18 and distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in 19 violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 20 appelees Navas, Alvarez, and Morel filed separate motions to 21 suppress. 22 related to the government s cell site surveillance, the In early 2009, defendants- The central issues raised by their motions 8 1 searches incident to the arrests, and the search of the 2 trailer. 3 on February 24, 2009, at which the government offered 4 testimony from three of the agents who participated in the 5 investigation. 6 affidavit form. 7 The district court conducted a suppression hearing Navas and Alvarez also submitted evidence in On March 19, 2009, the district court issued a decision 8 granting in part and denying in part the motions. The 9 district court rejected the challenges to the cell site 10 surveillance. 11 also held that defendants arrests were supported by 12 probable cause, and that the searches of their persons, the 13 Honda, the Lincoln, and the cab were all lawful searches 14 incident to those arrests. 15 See Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 263-64. It See id. at 265-66. Finally, the district court held that the search of the 16 trailer in the warehouse violated the Fourth Amendment. 17 began by rejecting the government s argument that Morel s 18 consent was sufficient to permit the search. 19 court found it undisputed that Morel verbally consented to 20 a general search of the warehouse, but concluded that his 21 consent did not extend to a physically invasive search of 9 It The district Id. at 267. 5 1 the trailer. 2 warrantless search of the trailer was not justified by the 3 consent doctrine. 4 Therefore, the court held, the Id. Turning to the application of the automobile exception, 5 the district court took the view that the doctrine 6 generally relates to some type of vehicle that is capable 7 of moving on its own. 8 court held that the exception was inapplicable because [a] 9 stationary trailer, detached from a tractor cab with its Id. at 267. Framed as such, the 10 legs dropped, and stored inside a warehouse, is not a 11 vehicle that is readily mobile or in use for 12 transportation. 13 consent did not extend to a search of the trailer and that 14 the automobile exception was inapplicable, the district 15 court ordered that the narcotics evidence be suppressed. 16 Id. at 268. Id. Based on its holdings that Morel s II. 17 18 DISCUSSION We review de novo the district court s legal conclusion 5 In addition to defendants-appellees arguments relating to the automobile exception, Alvarez separately argues that we may affirm the district court based on the alternative ground that the search of the warehouse was performed . . . without consent. Because this assertion ignores the district court s ruling that Morel consented to a general search of the warehouse, we reject it. 10 1 regarding the constitutionality of the search. E.g., United 2 States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 140 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009). 3 district court s findings of fact, as well as its probable 4 cause determination, are undisputed. 5 of the district court s finding that Morel verbally 6 consented to a general search of the warehouse, the agents 7 were lawfully within that structure. 8 at 267. 9 government relies exclusively on the automobile exception. The Furthermore, in light Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d To justify the search of the trailer, the 10 Consequently, we are left with a straightforward legal 11 question: 12 unhitched from its cab permissible under the automobile 13 exception to the Fourth Amendment s warrant requirement? 14 hold that the exception applies. 15 A. 16 Is the warrantless search of a trailer that is We The Automobile Exception We begin our inquiry on well-tread ground. [S]earches 17 conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 18 approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 19 under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few 20 specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 21 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote 22 omitted). One such exception is the automobile exception. 11 1 It permits law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search 2 of a readily mobile vehicle where there is probable cause to 3 believe that the vehicle contains contraband. 4 Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per 5 curiam). 6 based extends to the entire vehicle, the permissible scope 7 of a search pursuant to this exception includes every part 8 of the vehicle and its contents [including all containers 9 and packages] that may conceal the object of the search. E.g., Where the probable cause upon which the search is 10 United States v. Harwood, 998 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1993) 11 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 12 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 13 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). 14 The Supreme Court has relied on two rationales to 15 explain the reasonableness of a warrantless search pursuant 16 to the automobile exception: 17 and citizens reduced expectations of privacy in their 18 contents. 19 391 (1985); see also United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 20 492 (2d Cir. 2007). 21 exception, Carroll v. United States, emphasized vehicles 22 mobility: vehicles inherent mobility See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, One of the seminal cases defining the 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 [T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 14 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); see also Carney, 471 U.S. at 390 15 (characterizing Carroll as being based on a long-recognized 16 distinction between stationary structures and vehicles ). 17 Based on this reasoning, courts have held that vehicular 18 mobility is a sufficient exigency to permit law enforcement 19 to invoke the doctrine. 20 465, 466-67 (1999). 21 E.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. In addition to the mobility rationale, other authority 22 emphasizes that warrantless searches pursuant to the 23 automobile exception are also reasonable because citizens 24 possess a reduced expectation of privacy in their vehicles. 25 See Carney, 471 U.S. at 393. 26 27 28 29 30 31 Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have 13 1 2 3 4 expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order. 5 Id. at 392 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 6 368 (1976)). 7 privacy in their vehicles are reduced by the far-reaching 8 web of state and federal regulations that covers not only 9 vehicles but also our nation s roadways. Thus, citizens reasonable expectations of As a result, 10 warrantless searches of readily mobile vehicles, when based 11 on probable cause, are reasonable under the Fourth 12 Amendment. 13 Although we have characterized the mobility and 14 reduced-privacy rationales as distinct, they are related. 15 Howard, 489 F.3d at 492. 16 rise to a range of . . . regulation[s] inapplicable to a 17 fixed dwelling, which has in turn reduced citizens 18 reasonable expectations of privacy in their vehicles. 19 Carney, 471 U.S. at 393. 20 both inherently mobile and subject to a reduced expectation 21 of privacy as we conclude is true of the trailer in this 22 case a warrantless search supported by probable cause is 23 permissible under the automobile exception. 24 B. A vehicle s mobility has given Consequently, when a vehicle is Mobility 14 1 The phrase readily mobile is frequently used as a 2 term of art to describe the mobility rationale. 3 Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467; Howard, 489 F.3d at 492-93; United 4 States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 456 (2d Cir. 2004). 5 recently made clear, a vehicle s inherent mobility not the 6 probability that it might actually be set in motion is the 7 foundation of the mobility rationale. 8 at 493. 9 application of the automobile exception to the warrantless 10 11 See, e.g., As we See Howard, 489 F.3d In our view, this rationale supports the search of the trailer. As we have already indicated, the mobility rationale 12 originates from the Prohibition Era case of Carroll v. 13 United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 14 Court upheld a warrantless search of a car stopped on a 15 highway where the officers had probable cause to believe 16 that the vehicle s occupants, two bootleggers, were 17 transporting intoxicating spirituous liquor in violation 18 of the National Prohibition Act. 19 Court conducted a historical inquiry and found a distinction 20 between the Fourth Amendment s application to a search of a 21 store, dwelling house, or other structure, for which a 22 warrant was required, and a search of a movable vessel 15 There, the Supreme Id. at 134. The Carroll 1 such as a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile, where 2 it is not practicable to secure a warrant. 3 153. 4 vessel of the latter type could be quickly moved and 5 readily . . . put out of reach of a search warrant. 6 at 151, 153. 7 Id. at 151, To explain the distinction, the Court reasoned that a Id. Under our case law, the mobility rationale articulated 8 in Carroll does not turn on case-by-case determinations by 9 agents in the field regarding either the probability that a 10 vehicle could be mobilized or the speed with which movement 11 could be achieved. 12 mobile within the meaning of the automobile exception has 13 more to do with the inherent mobility of the vehicle than 14 with the potential for the vehicle to be moved from the 15 jurisdiction, thereby precluding a search. 16 F.3d at 493 (emphasis added). Rather, [w]hether a vehicle is readily Howard, 489 17 In Howard, we sustained two roadside vehicular searches 18 that were conducted while the vehicles occupants were being 19 questioned at New York State Troopers barracks. 20 492-96. 21 court s decision to regard the actual ability of a driver 22 or passenger to flee immediately in the car, or the Id. at In doing so, we attributed error to the district 16 1 likelihood of him or her doing so, as a requirement for the 2 application of the automobile exception. 3 also pointed out that the district court s inquiry into . . 4 . the proximity of the drivers and passenger to the vehicles 5 . . . [was] misplaced. 6 inherent mobility of [a] vehicle is sufficient to constitute 7 the ready mobility the automobile exception cognizes. 8 Id. Id. at 494. Id. at 493. We Instead, [t]he mere 9 In light of Howard s emphasis on inherent mobility and 10 the practical concerns that animate the mobility rationale, 11 the district court erred in its assessment of the trailer 12 sans cab. 13 automobile exception as generally relat[ing] to some type 14 of vehicle that is capable of moving on its own. 15 640 F. Supp. 2d at 267. 16 introduced the mobility rationale in Carroll, it referenced 17 wagon[s], which, like trailers, require an additional 18 source of propulsion before they can be set in motion. 19 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153; see also Ross, 456 U.S. at 820 20 n.26 (referring to contraband . . . transported in a horse- 21 drawn carriage ). 22 own, but the Carroll Court considered it to present It started by wrongly characterizing the Navas, However, when the Supreme Court A wagon is not capable of moving on its 17 1 mobility concerns similar to those presented by the car 2 searched in that case. 3 Fourth Amendment, a trailer unhitched from a cab is no less 4 inherently mobile than a wagon without a horse. 5 And, at least for purposes of the The district court s adoption of a false premise 6 i.e., that the automobile exception centers on a vehicle s 7 ability to mov[e] on its own led it to place undue 8 emphasis on the fact that the trailer was disconnected from 9 a cab at the time of the search. However, the trailer 10 remained inherently mobile as a result of its own wheels and 11 the fact that it could have been connected to any cab and 12 driven away. 13 district court s reference to the position of the trailer s 14 legs. 15 mechanism. 16 attached to the trailer. 17 was detached from a . . . cab with its legs dropped, 18 Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 267, did not eliminate its 19 inherent mobility. 20 For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by the These legs served only as a temporary stabilization They could be retracted and a cab could be As such, the fact that the trailer Moreover, contrary to defendant Morel s assertion, a 21 trailer with its legs dropped, id., is quite unlike a 22 motor home with its wheels elevated on blocks, Carney, 471 18 1 U.S. at 394 n.3. 2 dropped, with the expectation of promptly returning them to 3 the road as soon as they have been loaded or a cab becomes 4 available to haul them. 5 suggests that the trailer will not promptly return to 6 service on the highways. 7 motor home onto blocks is a more elaborate process, less 8 easily undone, which might objectively indicate[] that [the 9 motor home] is being used as a residence rather than a The dropping of the legs in no way In contrast, the raising of a 10 vehicle. 11 such impression. 12 this case was being used as a vehicle and not a residence. 13 Id. Trailers are routinely parked, legs The position of a trailer s legs conveys no There is no question that the trailer in Finally, the district court also erred by relying on 14 the location of the defendants and the agents at the time of 15 the search. 16 likelihood that the vehicle will be driven away, the 17 [automobile] exception applies . . . when that possibility 18 exists because of the vehicle s inherent mobility. 19 489 F.3d at 493. 20 standard was not satisfied, reasoning that it was hard to 21 imagine a scenario where the [trailer] could have been 22 hooked up to a cab because [d]efendants were under arrest, Even where there is little practical Howard, The district court concluded that this 19 1 and more than a dozen government agents surrounded the 2 warehouse. 3 the district court appears to have erroneously regarded the 4 actual ability of a driver or passenger to flee immediately 5 in the [vehicle], or the likelihood of him . . . doing so, 6 as a requirement for the application of the automobile 7 exception. 8 detained and the warehouse was secured by the agents, these 9 facts had no bearing on the inherent mobility of the trailer 10 11 Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 489 F.3d at 493. As in Howard, Although the arrestees were itself. In reasoning otherwise, the district court suggested 12 that, instead of performing the search, the agents were 13 required to halt an ongoing investigation in order to wait 14 at the scene and ensure that the trailer remained secure 15 while a search warrant was obtained. 16 does not necessitate such a course of action. 17 had probable cause to conduct the search, and an automobile 18 search is not unreasonable if based upon facts that would 19 justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has 20 not been actually obtained. 21 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467). 22 The justification to conduct such a warrantless search does The Fourth Amendment The agents Howard, 489 F.3d at 495 20 1 not vanish once the car has been immobilized. 2 Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982). 3 Michigan v. If the agents had left the area around the warehouse, 4 the inherent mobility of the trailer would provide ample 5 cause for concern that it could be removed from the 6 jurisdiction. 7 confederates in another car, of whom the police were 8 unaware, might have observed the police intervention and 9 might drive the [trailer] away. For example, as we observed in Howard, 489 F.3d at 493-94. The 10 district court referenced this hypothetical, but apparently 11 found it inapposite because the warehouse was surrounded 12 by more than a dozen government agents. 13 Supp. 2d at 268. 14 automobile exception is to ensure that law enforcement 15 officials need not expend resources to secure a readily 16 mobile automobile during the period of time required to 17 obtain a search warrant. 18 Navas, 640 F. However, the very function of the In sum, the trailer in this case was: (1) affixed with 19 at least one axle and a set of wheels; and (2) capable of 20 being attached to a cab and driven away. 21 conclude that the trailer was inherently mobile at the time 22 of the search, notwithstanding the fact that it was 21 Therefore, we 1 unhitched from the cab that initially transported it to the 2 warehouse. 3 militates in favor of the conclusion that the search of the 4 trailer was lawful under the automobile exception. 5 C. 6 Accordingly, we hold that the mobility rationale Reduced Expectation of Privacy The district court also failed to properly consider the 7 reduced-privacy rationale underlying the automobile 8 exception. 9 expectation of privacy enjoyed by the drivers and Although it acknowledged the diminished 10 passengers, the court discarded this proposition and 11 repeated its mobility-based holding that the unhitched 12 trailer in the warehouse [did] not constitute a vehicle in 13 use for transportation. 14 (quoting Howard, 489 F.3d at 494). 15 for defendants reduced expectation of privacy in the 16 trailer was also error. 17 Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 268 This failure to account Indeed, the reduced-privacy rationale applies 18 forcefully here. Agents had observed the trailer being used 19 for transportation. 20 trailer bore no objective indicia of residential use that 21 might give rise to elevated privacy expectations in its 22 contents. Unlike the motor home in Carney, the Moreover, any expectation of privacy that 22 1 defendants may have harbored in the trailer was 2 significantly diminished by the pervasive schemes of state 3 and federal regulation to which it was subject. 4 U.S. at 392; cf. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 5 (1987) (reasoning that expectations of privacy are 6 particularly attenuated in commercial property employed in 7 closely regulated industries ). 8 circuits have held that the interstate commercial trucking 9 industry is pervasively regulated to an extent that Carney, 471 Several of our sister 10 justifies a warrantless administrative search of a tractor 11 trailer. 12 1195, 1201-02 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2008). 13 foundation for the administrative search exception to the 14 warrant requirement is entirely distinct from the rationales 15 underlying the automobile exception, the discussion of the 16 applicable regulatory structures in this authority is 17 instructive. 18 regulations relating to the commercial trucking industry, we 19 are persuaded that defendants reasonable expectations of 20 privacy in the trailer were minimal. 21 reduced-privacy rationale provides further support for our 22 conclusion that the warrantless search of this inherently See, e.g., United States v. Delgado, 545 F.3d Although the Based on the nature and scope of the 23 Therefore, the 1 2 3 mobile trailer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the automobile 4 exception applies because the trailer was inherently mobile, 5 and defendants possessed a significantly reduced expectation 6 of privacy in the trailer. 7 court s order is REVERSED insofar as it granted the motion 8 to suppress, and the matter is REMANDED for further 9 proceedings consistent with this opinion. Accordingly, the district 10 24
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
