Bay Shore v. Kain, No. 06-0601 (2d Cir. 2007)

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06-0601 Bay Shore v. Kain 1 2 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2006 4 5 (Argued November 22, 2006 Decided May 10, 2007) Docket No. 06-0601-cv 6 7 --------------------------------------------BAY SHORE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 8 Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, 9 v. 10 THOMAS KAIN, on behalf of his son, RYAN KAIN, 11 12 Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellee. --------------------------------------------- 13 B e f o r e: MESKILL, WINTER and HALL, Circuit Judges. 14 Appeal from a final order and judgment of the United 15 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 16 Weinstein, J., filed on December 29, 2005, confirming the 17 decision of the State Review Officer that Plaintiff-Appellant Bay 18 Shore Union Free School District provide Ryan Kain, the son of 19 Defendant-Appellee Thomas Kain, a one-to-one teacher s aide at 20 his parochial school. 21 22 23 24 CHRISTOPHER VENATOR, Hauppauge, NY, (Ingerman Smith, L.L.P., Hauppauge, NY, of counsel), for Appellant. 25 26 27 28 ROBERT E. FEKETE, Mineola, NY, (Kenneth A. Gray, Bee Ready Fishbein Hatter & Donovan, L.L.P., Mineola, NY, of counsel), 1 2 for Appellee. MESKILL, Circuit Judge: 3 This appeal asks us to decide whether plaintiff- 4 appellant Bay Shore Union Free School District (the School 5 District) has a legal obligation to provide defendant-appellee s 6 son Ryan with a teacher s aide during his classes at St. Patrick 7 School,1 the parochial school the child now attends. 8 York Department of Education Review Officer determined that the 9 School District must provide Ryan a teacher s aide at St. Patrick 10 if his parents wish him to remain at that school for his regular 11 classes. 12 United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 13 York, and the court, Weinstein, J., confirmed the State Review 14 Officer s findings and recommendation. 15 agree that the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education 16 Act (IDEA) does not confer on Ryan a right to a teacher s aide at 17 a private school of his choosing, and therefore the obligations 18 of the School District turn on the New York Education Law. 19 conclude that the district court improperly assumed jurisdiction 20 over this case. 21 the district court vacated. The New The School District challenged the decision in the However, the parties We This appeal must be dismissed and the order of 1 Although the parties and the Impartial Hearing Officer refer to Ryan s school as St. Patrick s, correspondence on the school letterhead included in the record indicates that the institution is called St. Patrick School. -2- 1 2 I. At the time of his impartial hearing in September 2004, 3 Ryan was a seven-year old second-grader at St. Patrick School 4 (St. Patrick) in Bay Shore, New York. 5 of Ryan s teachers referred him to the District s Committee on 6 Special Education, observing that he has extreme difficulty 7 following and carrying out oral directions [and] has yet to 8 master daily classroom routines. 9 diagnosed Ryan as suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 10 11 On November 4, 2003, one A pediatric neurologist Disorder (ADHD). IDEA requires participating states such as New York to 12 ensure that once a school district has made such a disability 13 determination, the needs of the student are adequately 14 accommodated. 15 process that [IDEA] establishes between parents and schools. 16 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). 17 each disabled child a school district must create an 18 Individualized Education Program (IEP), which must include an 19 assessment of the child s current educational performance, must 20 articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the 21 nature of the special services that the school will provide. 22 Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A). 23 is not appropriate, they may seek an administrative impartial 24 due process hearing conducted by the state or local educational The core of the statute . . . is the cooperative For If parents believe that an IEP -3- 1 agency. 2 impartial due process hearing is conducted by a local educational 3 agency, as it was in the instant case, the decision may be 4 appealed to the state agency. 5 provides that any party aggrieved by the final state decision 6 shall have the right to bring a civil action challenging the 7 decision in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a 8 district court of the United States. 9 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Id. § 1415(g). If the IDEA expressly Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Pursuant to this elaborate process, the School District 10 developed an IEP designating Ryan to receive testing 11 accommodations, daily 40 minute sessions in a Resource Room, and 12 the services of a one-to-one teacher s aide for three hours per 13 day in the classroom. 14 have the services of the one-to-one aide only at a public school 15 within the School District. 16 impartial due process hearing to challenge the IEP s 17 determination that Ryan must travel to a public school every day 18 to receive this benefit. 19 The IEP also indicated that Ryan should Ryan s parents requested an The Impartial Hearing Officer ruled that providing Ryan 20 a one-to-one aide at St. Patrick was not only a reasonable 21 accommodation for the School District, but was necessary for 22 the boy to receive the Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) 23 guaranteed by IDEA and the New York Education Law. 24 § 1412(a)(1)(A); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402 (McKinney 2006). -4- See id. The 1 Hearing Officer concluded that requiring Ryan to travel from St. 2 Patrick to a public school every day to enjoy the services of a 3 one-to-one aide would cause too much disruption in the child s 4 school day and would take away from [his] academic experience. 5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Hearing Officer ordered the School District to provide the 7 child s [one-to-one] aide services indicated in his current IEP 8 at St. Patrick s [sic]. 9 Therefore, the The School District appealed to the New York Education 10 Department s State Review Officer (the Review Officer), 11 contending that it has no obligation under federal or state law 12 to provide a one-to-one aide to a student attending a private 13 school. 14 on Ryan the right to enjoy all of the special services he would 15 receive if he attended a public school. 16 Officer concluded, [i]n contrast to the IDEA, New York State law 17 does confer an individual entitlement to special education 18 services and programs to eligible students enrolled by their 19 parents in nonpublic schools. 20 a one-to-one aide offered at a location separate from Ryan s 21 academic classes would not meet the child s individual needs. 22 The School District s appeal was accordingly dismissed. 23 24 The Review Officer determined that IDEA did not confer However, the Review The Review Officer suggested that The School District filed the instant suit in the United States District Court for Eastern District of New York, -5- 1 challenging the Review Officer s determination that the School 2 District is obliged to provide Ryan a one-to-one aide during his 3 academic classes at St. Patrick. 4 jurisdiction was proper, stating that IDEA provides for 5 concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over claims arising 6 under its provisions. 7 rel. R., 405 F.Supp.2d 230, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 8 acknowledged that federal law did not compel the School District 9 to offer educational services to Ryan at St. Patrick, but 10 rejected the School District s argument that New York law 11 precludes it from doing so. 12 reasoned, it could not disturb the Review Officer s determination 13 that anything less than provision of a one-to-one aide at the 14 location of Ryan s academic classes at St. Patrick would fail to 15 meet the child s academic needs. 16 confirmed dubitante the Review Officer s decision and this appeal 17 followed. 18 The district court assumed Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. T. ex Id. at 249. The court Thus, the court Id. at 248. The court II. 19 The parties concede that IDEA does not require the 20 School District to provide Ryan with a one-to-one aide at St. 21 Patrick. 22 district court properly exercised jurisdiction. 23 supplemental briefing. 24 is properly before a federal court, but the parties consent Thus, at oral argument we questioned whether the We ordered Both parties now contend that this suit -6- 1 alone cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. 2 See Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 3 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2006). 4 argument that their dispute involves a federal question because 5 IDEA incorporates the New York Educational Law on which this case 6 turns. 7 We are not persuaded by their IDEA frequently has been described as a model of 8 cooperative federalism. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52. The 9 statute requires participating states to establish a basic floor 10 of meaningful, beneficial educational opportunity, but states 11 may exceed the federal floor and enact their own laws and 12 regulations to guarantee a higher level of entitlement to 13 disabled students. 14 Educ., 480 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2007), amending 465 F.3d 503, 15 514 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Burlington v. Dep t of Educ. 16 for Comm. of Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 792 (1st Cir. 1984)(holding 17 that a state is free to exceed, both substantively and 18 procedurally, the protection and services to be provided to its 19 disabled children under IDEA). 20 standard for a FAPE incorporates by reference all state 21 standards, even if the state regulations exceed the minimum floor 22 established by federal law. 23 Kain contends that New York law requires his son to receive a 24 one-to-one aide at St. Patrick, the parties argue this is a See D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. New York City Bd. of The parties contend that IDEA s See id. at 789. -7- Thus, even though 1 civil action[] arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United 2 States such that federal question jurisdiction is appropriate. 3 28 § U.S.C. 1331. 4 We disagree. IDEA incorporates some but not all state law concerning 5 special education. See Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 73 (2d 6 Cir. 1990). 7 relevant New York Education Law, this does not provide an 8 independent federal question that would sustain the court s 9 jurisdiction. However, assuming that IDEA incorporates the A federal statute is not a sufficient basis for 10 federal question jurisdiction simply because it incorporates 11 state law. City Nat l Bank v. Edmisten, 681 F.2d 942, 945 (4th 12 Cir. 1982). Edmisten was an action for a declaratory judgment 13 brought by seven banks seeking to challenge North Carolina s 14 application of its usury law to a credit card service fee the 15 banks wished to introduce. 16 that the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85, expressly 17 incorporated North Carolina s usury laws by allowing banks to 18 charge rates up to the maximum permitted under state law. 19 944-45. 20 interpreted, the challenged practice would have remained legal 21 under federal law, and thus the resolution of the dispute did not 22 turn on a question of federal law. 23 Court concluded that the banks action did not raise a federal 24 question. Id. at 943. The court acknowledged Id. at Nonetheless, regardless of how North Carolina law was Id. at 945. The Edmisten Id. at 946; see also Standage Ventures v. Arizona, 499 -8- 1 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (deeming no federal question to 2 exist where the real substance of the controversy . . . turns 3 entirely upon disputed questions of law and fact relating to 4 compliance with state law, and not at all upon the meaning or 5 effect of the federal statute itself ). 6 A similar dynamic prevails in this action. The School 7 District s suit does not turn on the interpretation of federal 8 law. 9 Education Law permits the School District or Ryan s parents to The parties agree that regardless of whether New York s 10 dictate where the child will receive the services of a one-to-one 11 aide, the IEP as drafted should afford Ryan the FAPE IDEA 12 demands. 13 such it cannot form the basis of federal question jurisdiction. This case turns entirely on a state-law issue, and as 14 III. 15 Nor does the IDEA s explicit authorization of a cause 16 of action to be brought by any party aggrieved by the findings 17 and decision of the state educational agency ipso facto raise a 18 federal question that would confer jurisdiction in this case on a 19 federal court. 20 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The Supreme Court generally has followed Justice 21 Holmes classic formulation that, A suit arises under the law 22 that creates the cause of action. 23 Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 24 recently explained that, A case arises under federal law within -9- American Well Works Co. v. The Court has more 1 the meaning of § 1331 . . . if a well-pleaded complaint 2 establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action 3 or that the plaintiff s right to relief necessarily depends on 4 resolution of a substantial question of federal law. 5 Healthchoice Assur. v. McVeigh, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 2131 (2006) 6 (alterations, internal quotations, and citation omitted); 7 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for 8 Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). 9 Empire However, the Supreme Court has recognized a narrow 10 exception to Justice Holmes formulation where a formally federal 11 cause of action does not create ipso facto a federal question 12 because of the overwhelming predominance of state-law issues. 13 Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986); 14 see also Int l Sci. & Tech. Inst. v. Inacom Commuc ns, 106 F.3d 15 1146, 1154 (4th Cir. 1997). 16 v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900), the Court considered a federal 17 statute that expressly authorized adverse suits to determine 18 title to land. 19 were to be determined by local customs or rules of miners in the 20 several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and 21 not inconsistent with the laws of the United States; or by the 22 statute of limitations for mining claims of the State or 23 Territory where the same may be situated. 24 quotation marks omitted). Id. at 506. For example, in Shoshone Mining Co. The statute provided that claims Id. at 508 (internal The Court observed that the mere fact -10- 1 that a suit takes its origin in the laws of the United States 2 does not necessarily make it one arising under the Constitution 3 or laws of the United States, lest virtually every dispute over 4 title to land in the newer States raise a federal question. 5 Id. at 507. 6 action created by the mining statute did not confer federal 7 question jurisdiction over claims that turned entirely on state 8 law. 9 Thus, the Court held that the federal cause of Id. at 513. We conclude that the Shoshone exception is appropriate 10 in this case. We cannot discern a strong federal interest in 11 adjudicating whether the School District must provide Ryan a one- 12 to-one aide in the school of his choosing. 13 Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 315 (2005) 14 (noting strong federal interest in prompt collection of 15 delinquent taxes). 16 certain educational benefits, but the statute allows 17 participating states to impose additional requirements on their 18 schools if they so choose. 19 clearly did not intend to require a uniform level of special 20 education entitlements across the states. 21 whether New York law compels the School District to provide the 22 one-to-one aide at a parochial school is a question best left to 23 New York courts. Cf. Grable & Sons IDEA provides a floor of entitlement to See D.D., 480 F.3d at 139. -11- Congress The determination 1 IV. 2 We further conclude that IDEA s jurisdictional 3 provision cannot save the parties inability to establish federal 4 question jurisdiction. 5 differs from IDEA in one important respect. 6 statute provided that the adverse claimant should commence 7 proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction[,] [i]t did 8 not in express language prescribe either a Federal or a state 9 court, and did not provide for exclusive or concurrent The mining statute at issue in Shoshone 10 jurisdiction. 11 Court could discern no basis for jurisdiction absent a federal 12 question. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 506. While the mining Thus, the Shoshone IDEA, however, expressly provides that any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy. 20 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 21 provision refers lays out in broad terms the procedures for 22 challenging an impartial due process hearing. 23 jurisdictional language thus suggests that IDEA might provide an 24 independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction of the federal 25 courts whereby any issue raised in the hearing may be reviewed, 26 even if it concerns exclusively a matter of state law. 27 The subsection to which this This We decline, however, to construe 20 U.S.C. -12- 1 § 1415(i)(2)(A) to permit an issue of state law to be challenged 2 in federal court independent of a federal question. 3 reading of § 1415(i)(2)(A) might raise grave constitutional 4 concerns about IDEA s jurisdictional provisions. 5 Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the judicial power 6 shall extend to nine different types of Cases, in Law and 7 Equity. 8 York, and the judicial power does not extend to suits between 9 citizens of the same state unless the case aris[es] under this Such a broad Article III, Kain and the School District are both citizens of New 10 Constitution [or] the Laws of the United States, or involves 11 several other now obscure scenarios, such as the adjudication of 12 Lands under Grants of different States, which are not 13 implicated by the instant dispute. 14 cl. 1. 15 advocate raises the question whether Congress has conferred or 16 can confer jurisdiction on the federal courts beyond the judicial 17 power described in Article III of the Constitution, and, if 18 accepted, brings § 1415(i)(2)(A) into conflict with Article III, 19 § 2. 20 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, The broad reading of § 1415(i)(2)(A) that the parties The jurisdictional language of IDEA must be construed, 21 if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that 22 it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score. 23 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (quoting United States 24 v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916)); see also Merrell Dow, -13- 1 478 U.S. at 814 (recognizing the need for careful judgments 2 about the exercise of federal judicial power in an area of 3 uncertain jurisdiction ). 4 more narrowly than has been urged by the parties. 5 federal court may not exercise jurisdiction over a civil action 6 brought under § 1415(i)(2)(A) if the claims asserted turn 7 exclusively on matters of state law and diversity of citizenship 8 is absent. 9 question in this suit, jurisdiction under § 1415(i)(2)(A) cannot 10 We hold that a Because the School District has raised no federal be sustained. 11 12 Therefore, we construe § 1415(i)(2)(A) V. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 13 district court did not properly exercise jurisdiction over this 14 action, and thus the appeal is dismissed and the decision below 15 is vacated. -14-

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