Carolyn Henderson, et al. v. Henry County, Georgia, et al., No. 17-13344 (11th Cir. 2018)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Case: 17-13344 Date Filed: 05/01/2018 Page: 1 of 4 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 17-13344 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-03292-AT CAROLYN HENDERSON, ERNEST HENDERSON, JR., Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus HENRY COUNTY, GEORGIA, JUDGE KELLY S. POWELL, in her official capacity, MICHAEL A. O’QUINN, individually and in his official capacity as Henry County Administrator, O’QUINN & CRONIN, LLC, Defendants-Appellees. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________ (May 1, 2018) Case: 17-13344 Date Filed: 05/01/2018 Page: 2 of 4 Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Carolyn Henderson and Ernest Henderson Jr. appeal pro se the dismissal of their complaint of the violation of their civil rights by Henry County, Georgia; Probate Judge Kelly S. Powell; the executor for Carolyn’s mother’s estate, Michael A. O’Quinn; and the law firm O’Quinn & Cronin, LLC. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Hendersons complained about the violation of their rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, see U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, in relation to the annulment of a will executed by Carolyn’s mother. The district court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine to review the Hendersons’ claim about being denied due process during the probate proceeding. We affirm. The Hendersons alleged in their complaint that Carolyn’s mother, Annie Key, “specifically bequeathed her home . . . and two acres to . . . Carolyn . . . as a Life Estate” and that Carolyn’s brother, Larry Key, who was appointed executor of the estate, “assented to the Life Estate in favor of Carolyn.” According to the Hendersons, Larry’s assent “vested” Carolyn’s rights in the “life estate” and divested “the probate court . . . [of] jurisdiction and standing to the property matters,” which “should have ended the courts and administrator’s role” in the estate, but Judge Powell “removed [Carolyn’s brother] as the executor,” appointed 2 Case: 17-13344 Date Filed: 05/01/2018 Page: 3 of 4 O’Quinn in his stead, and “voided . . . Carolyn Henderson’s vested Life Estate interest in the property . . . .” In addition, the Hendersons alleged that O’Quinn petitioned the state court to consider the will without standing to do so and “used his position as Administrator, his law firm and the judicial process” to “void[]” and “to wrongly divest . . . Carolyn Henderson of her life estate” and to “wrongfully void[] [Ernest Henderson’s] 10-year Residential Lease Contract to the property[.]” We review the dismissal of the Hendersons’ complaint de novo. See SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010). The district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the Hendersons’ claim that they were denied due process by Henry County, Judge Powell, O’Quinn, and O’Quinn’s law firm. Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the final judgment of a state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476–82 (1983). And the doctrine applies to “federal claims . . . [that are] inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). The Hendersons’ claim that they were denied due process during the probate proceedings is “inextricably intertwined” with the judgment that annulled the will because success “would effectively nullify [that] state-court judgment” or reveal “that the state court wrongly decided the issues” related to the will. See id. That judgment became final 3 Case: 17-13344 Date Filed: 05/01/2018 Page: 4 of 4 after the Hendersons declined to appeal the order that annulled the will. See Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-34. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the district court from reviewing the final judgment of the state court. The Hendersons do not contest the decision by the district court not to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over their state claim of conversion after dismissing the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We deem abandoned any challenge that they could have made to the dismissal without prejudice of their state claim. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We AFFIRM the dismissal of the Hendersons’ complaint. 4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
