Kenneth Goodman v. Commr. of Social Security, No. 10-11595 (11th Cir. 2011)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
[DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 10-11595 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JANUARY 6, 2011 JOHN LEY CLERK D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-00180-MP-AK KENNETH G. GOODMAN, lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant, versus COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Michael J. Astrue, lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________ (January 6, 2011) Before BARKETT, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Kenneth Goodman appeals from the district court s order affirming the Social Security Commissioner s denial of his application for disability benefits.1 Goodman argues that the Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) erred by finding that his intellectual functioning and mood disorder were not severe impairments.2 Goodman relies on a psychological evaluation finding that he had borderline intellectual functioning and a poor ability to function in several areas. However, the ALJ afforded those findings little weight because they contradicted the record on the whole, which demonstrated that Goodman s mental condition had no more than a minimal effect on his ability to do basic work activities. See Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984). The ALJ provided specific and detailed reasons for this finding, which Goodman does not challenge on appeal and which we conclude are supported by substantial evidence. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). We further find no reversible error in the ALJ s use of the Medical Vocational Guidelines instead of a vocational expert when determining Goodman s ability to perform jobs in the 1 [W]e review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner s decision is based. However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 2 Goodman also argues that chronic pain and neuropathy were severe impairments, but we do not address these arguments because he failed to raise them in the district court. See Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). 2 national economy. See Passopulos v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 642, 648 (11th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
