Notice: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 Provides That Dispositions Other Than Opinions or Orders Designated for Publication Are Not Precedential and Should Not Be Cited Except when Relevant Under the Doctrines of Law of the Case, Res Judicata, or Collateral Estoppel, 94 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 1996)Annotate this Case
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.ONE 1956 MERCEDES BENZ GULL WING AUTOMOBILE, VIN 5500632 itstools and appurtenances, Defendant,andDavid Chow, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Aug. 12, 1996.* Decided Aug. 22, 1996.
Before: BROWNING, SCHROEDER and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
David Chow, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's denial of his motion for return of a 1956 Mercedes Benz Gull Wing. We affirm.
Chow contends that the civil forfeiture of the Gull Wing violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had already been punished for the same conduct through his prior criminal conviction. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
We decline to consider Chow's contention that the forfeiture proceeding was instituted after the expiration of the statute of limitations because he did not raise this issue in his motion for return of property and the district court did not address it