Alex Paz Rodriguez, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 91 F.3d 154 (9th Cir. 1996)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Alex Paz Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA) summarily affirming an immigration judge's ("IJ") decision denying his request for suspension of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), and we deny the petition.

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1), the Attorney General may suspend deportation if the applicant can demonstrate: (1) continuous physical presence in the United States for at least seven years; (2) good moral character; and (3) that deportation would result in extreme hardship to himself or herself, or to a spouse, parent, or child who is a United States citizen or has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1).

It is undisputed that Rodriguez has demonstrated both continuous physical presence and good moral character. The only issue before us is whether he has demonstrated extreme hardship. We review the IJ's determination that Rodriguez would not suffer extreme hardship for abuse of discretion. Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 498 (9th Cir. 1986).

Rodriguez contends that the IJ abused its discretion by failing to consider "all the factors bearing on extreme hardship in the aggregate in petitioner's case." This contention lacks merit.

The IJ expressly stated in his oral decision that he considered all factors for their individual and cumulative effect. See Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1995). The IJ considered Rodriguez's age (29 years old), the length of time Rodriguez spent in the United States (8 years), and the fact that Rodriguez had no relatives who statutorily qualified for consideration under suspension of deportation.¹  The IJ also noted that other than his membership in a church, Rodriguez's community ties were not sufficient to establish extreme hardship. See Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 1980).

The IJ also considered the prospect of economic hardship to Rodriguez. " [E]conomic detriment, without more, does not amount to extreme hardship." Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1981). It is true that a "complete inability to find work" may be sufficient to establish extreme hardship, id. at 1357, but here the IJ properly concluded not only that Rodriguez is young, in good health, and able to work, but also that Rodriguez failed to show that he would be unable to obtain employment in Honduras because he possessed skills that "are usable anywhere in commercial enterprise."² 

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by holding that Rodriguez is statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation. See Ramirez-Durazo, 794 F.2d at 498.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.