Mark Larue, Plaintiff-appellant, v. James Blodgett, Associate Director; Tana Wood,superintendent; John Lambert, Associatesuperintendent; Gary Edwards, Hearingofficer; R. Inman, Officer,defendants-appellees, 85 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 1996)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Washington state prisoner Mark Larue appeals pro se the district court Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) dismissal of his civil rights action for failure to state a claim. Larue contends that prison officials denied him due process protection by providing insufficient notice of his rules violation. He also contends that he was denied access to the courts because prison officials prohibited him from communicating with other inmates regarding his legal matters. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo. See Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1995). We affirm.

Larue received five days in isolation for speaking with another inmate in the yard of the Intensive Management Unit ("IMU") in violation of IMU rules. Larue alleged that his due process rights were violated because the prison officials provided him with inadequate notice of the possible effect of such a violation.¹  He further alleged that the prison officials failed to substantiate a finding of guilt on all the charges.

Prison inmates have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in freedom from restraint only when the restraint "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300-01 (1995) (holding that 30-day segregated confinement in Hawaii penitentiary did not present such atypical hardship so as to create liberty interest); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (applying Sandin) .

Here, Larue was already housed in the Intensive Management Unit.²  Larue's five-day isolation, the denial of one shower, and his temporary loss of certain privileges, such as telephone calls, possession of a radio, and visitation, did not "present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions" of Larue's prison life. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2301; Mujahid, 59 F.3d at 932.³  Accordingly, Larue did not have a liberty interest that would have entitled him to due process protection when being disciplined. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300-01.

Larue also contends that he was denied access to the courts when prison officials prohibited him from communicating with other inmates regarding his legal matters. This contention lacks merit. Since Larue does not challenge the adequacy of the prison law library or the provision of trained legal assistance, he must show "actual injury" to sustain a constitutional claim. See Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989). Larue has failed to do so. Although Larue claimed that the prohibition interfered with his preparation of his pending cases, he did not point to any specific instance in which he was actually denied access to the courts. See id.

Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing Larue's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim. See Stone, 58 F.3d at 436-37.

AFFIRMED.