Urall O. Edwards, Plaintiff-appellant v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner, Social Securityadministration,1 Defendant-appellee.no. 95-5075, 78 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 1996)

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Claimant Urall O. Edwards appeals from the district court's judgment affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health & Human Services to deny him disability benefits under the Social Security Act. Claimant filed two applications for disability benefits--one in 1989 and one in 1990--which were denied administratively, both initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), the ALJ issued a decision to deny benefits. The Appeals Council denied review, and Claimant filed this action in federal district court. The district court's order was filed on February 15, 1995, and this appeal followed.

Our jurisdiction arises from 42 U.S.C. 405(g). "We review the Secretary's decision to determine whether her factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole and whether she applied the correct legal standards." Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). If the Secretary has not applied the correct legal standards or has failed to provide an adequate basis for review of the application of these standards, grounds exist to reverse the Secretary's determination. See Nielson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1119-20 (10th Cir. 1993). In light of these standards, and after a thorough review of the record, we reverse.

The Secretary applies a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520; Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). Here, the ALJ reached step five of the analysis. "At step five, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that a claimant can perform work that exists in the national economy. The Secretary must consider a claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience." Nielson, 992 F.2d at 1120 (citations omitted). Finding that Claimant retained the capacity to perform a significant number of jobs involving light and sedentary work, the ALJ concluded at step five that Claimant was not disabled and therefore not entitled to an award of benefits.

We reverse because it is not apparent from the record that the agency applied its regulations in reaching this conclusion. At the time of the ALJ's decision Claimant was 53 years old and, therefore, a "person approaching advanced age" according to agency regulations. 20 C.F.R. 404.1563(c). This classification requires the ALJ to give special consideration to the difficulties an older claimant might face in adjusting to a new job situation. While the ALJ acknowledged Claimant's age and even cited the pertinent regulation, Appellant's App. Vol. II at 18, his opinion does not demonstrate that he engaged in the analysis required by that regulation. The ALJ's passing references to Claimant's age are not sufficient to demonstrate that he applied the regulation.

Because the ALJ's opinion lacks any meaningful discussion of how Claimant's age might affect Claimant's ability to return to the work force, we conclude that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards or, at best, failed to provide an adequate basis for us to review his application of these standards. Under Nielson, either shortcoming is grounds for reversal.

Claimant is now over the age of 55, a "person of advanced age" pursuant to agency regulation. 20 C.F.R. 404.1563(d). Moreover, the ALJ necessarily determined at step two that Claimant was "severely impaired." Where, as here, a claimant is severely impaired, section 404.1563(d) requires the Secretary to consider whether a claimant over the age of 55 has skills which are transferable to less demanding work. Nielson, 992 F.2d at 1120. Based on VE testimony elicited at Claimant's hearing, the ALJ has already found that Claimant has no transferable skills. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 18. Thus, if we were to remand this case for further administrative proceedings, the Secretary would be obliged to return a finding that Claimant is now disabled. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 202.00(c).

In light of Claimant's current status as a person of advanced age and the ALJ's findings that Claimant is severely impaired and has no transferable skills, we decline to remand for further administrative proceedings. "In reversing the Secretary's determination, it is within our discretion to remand to the Secretary for a further hearing or direct the district court to award benefits." Nielson, 992 F.2d at 1122 (quotations omitted). The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED and REMANDED, and the district court is directed to award benefits.