Barry Smyth, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Jon Thomas Sandridge, Colorado State Trooper; Ronald Eugeneballas, Colorado State Trooper; Logan County Court; Kurtpenney, Jr., Presiding Judge, Official Capacity Only;audrey E. Brekel, Logan County Court Clerk; Unknowncolorado State Patrol Trainers A-z, One Unknowninvestigator, Defendants-appellees, 53 F.3d 343 (10th Cir. 1995)Annotate this Case
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MCKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. ORDER AND JUDGMENT1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Barry Smyth appeals the district court's denial of his Motion for Preliminary Injunction and its dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.1983 complaint. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
We have jurisdiction over appeals only from final orders and judgements. 28 U.S.C. 1291. A district court order that does not adjudicate all claims against all served defendants is not deemed a final, appealable order. Bristol v. Fireboard Corp., 789 F.2d 846, 847-48 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). On August 9, 1994, Mr. Smyth amended his complaint to include Geraldine Rose, Logan County Clerk; Roy Cullip, a tow truck driver; Donald Bollish, Logan County Sheriff; Claudia Goldin, a public defender; the County of Logan; and the State of Colorado. The district court did not dispose of claims regarding any of these defendants, and it is clear from the docket that at least four of these defendants were served and made parties to the suit. The district court's order is therefore not a final, appealable order.
We DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470