United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Michael D. Pirello, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Michael D. Pirello, Defendant-appellant, 5 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 1993)

MEMORANDUM^** 

In these consolidated appeals, Michael Pirello appeals his sentence imposed following guilty pleas to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). Pirello contends the district court erroneously calculated his base offense level under the Guidelines because neither his prior Idaho state conviction for first degree burglary of a commercial warehouse nor a church qualified as crimes of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the Guidelines. United States v. Blaize, 959 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2954 (1992).

U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1, applicable to violations of the current offenses, requires a base offense level of 20 if a defendant has at least one prior felony conviction for a crime of violence.¹  U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(a) (4) (A). The Guidelines define a crime of violence as an " 'offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that ... is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.' " United States v. Morrison, 972 F.2d 269, 270 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (quoting U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2(1) (ii)).

Pirello argues that neither one of the contested convictions qualifies as a crime of violence within the meaning of section 4B1.1 because the offenses involve buildings other than dwellings. We disagree. In Morrison, we held that "once a crime has been defined as burglary, it necessarily is a crime of violence [for purposes of section 4B1.1]." 972 F.2d at 270; see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 597 (1990) (" 'burglary' is commonly understood to include ... run-of-the-mill burglaries involving an unarmed offender, an unoccupied building, and no use of threat of force [against a person]"). Thus, because the Idaho state statute includes both a warehouse and other building within its definition of burglary, Pirello's contested convictions qualify as crimes of violence under section 4B1.2. See Morrison, 972 F.2d at 270.

Because we conclude that both of Pirello's state burglary convictions qualify as crimes of violence, we need not address his remaining contentions. Accordingly, the district court properly relied on either conviction as a crime of violence to calculate Pirello's base offense level.

AFFIRMED.