Taajwar Kafeel Rasheed-bey, Plaintiff/appellant, v. James E. Aikens, Jack R. Duckworth, and Donald R. Lawless,defendants/appellees, 25 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 1994)

ORDER

Taajwar Kafeel Rasheed-Bey, a state prisoner in Indiana, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was deprived of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and we affirm.

Rasheed-Bey was housed in segregation for approximately one month during his incarceration at the Indiana Reformatory. Before entering segregation, Rasheed-Bey's personal property was inventoried and stored by the institution's staff. When Rasheed-Bey was released from segregation his property could not be found. He filed a grievance with the prison officials who found a basis for the grievance but did not reimburse Rasheed-Bey for his loss. Rasheed-Bey then filed a state tort claim in Madison County, Indiana alleging loss of property and seeking reimbursement. The claim was dismissed as untimely and it appears from the record that he did not attempt to appeal this decision as a pauper. See Ind.R.App.P. 3; Campbell v. Criterion Group, 605 N.E.2d 150 (Ind.1992). He thereafter filed this action.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and will affirm if it appears from the record that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970); Lister v. Stark, 942 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1991). We conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. First, Rasheed-Bey does not prove that his property was intentionally misplaced or destroyed. Even if the actions of the prison staff were deemed intentional, an unauthorized intentional deprivation of an inmate's property does not amount to a constitutional violation where an adequate post-deprivation remedy is available. Zinerman v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Because Indiana provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, there is no denial of due process. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-44 (1981); see Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-16.5-1 (Indiana Tort Claims Act). Rasheed-Bey may not recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hossman v. Spradlin, 812 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1987); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435, 453, 460 (N.D. Ind. 1981), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984).

Second, the record does not support an Eighth Amendment violation. The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison conditions which cause "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). Conditions triggering Eighth Amendment scrutiny include deprivations of human necessities such as food, medical care, sanitation and physical safety. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989); James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 63 (1992). Although some of the items Rasheed-Bey lost were food stuffs, he does not allege that he was deprived of food nor does he specify any conditions that would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See also Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1986) (a prisoner's inconvenience falls outside the Eighth Amendment).

AFFIRMED.