Ronald C. Taylor, Plaintiff-appellant, Cross-appellee, v. Coors Biotech Products Company, Defendant-appellee, Cross-appellant, 951 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1991)

Defendant-appellee Coors Biotech Products Company terminated plaintiff-appellant Ronald C. Taylor, a black male, from its employ in August 1987. Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, claiming disparate treatment and retaliatory discharge. The district court dismissed the § 1981 claim and, after a bench trial, entered judgment in favor of Defendant on the Title VII claims. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to the facts under the Title VII claims and that its findings were clearly erroneous.¹  Defendant cross-appeals, contending that the district court erred in failing to award it attorney fees. We affirm the judgment in favor of Defendant and remand for a determination of whether attorney's fees should be awarded.

Plaintiff worked as a lab technician for defendant. Shortly before he was discharged, he filed an EEOC complaint, charging that (1) he was the only technician required to keep a daily log of his activities, (2) he was paid a lower wage than similarly situated employees and (3) he had been subjected to a pattern of racial harassment. After the discharge, he filed another EEOC complaint, charging that he was discharged in retaliation for the filing of the prior EEOC complaint. Plaintiff brought all of these claims before the district court.

In addressing Plaintiff's claims, the district court found no racial animus or discriminatory motive in the challenged activities of Plaintiff's supervisors. Discriminatory motive is, of course, the critical element of any disparate treatment claim brought under Title VII. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir. 1981). Regarding the retaliatory discharge claim, the district court found no causal connection between the protected activity, the EEOC filing, and the discharge. This is the correct analysis. See Burrus v. United Telephone Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982). Plaintiff has not directed us to error in the district court's legal analysis, and we find none.

Turning to the findings, we note that the district court simply did not believe Plaintiff's testimony. In fact, the district court specifically found that a substantial portion of Plaintiff's testimony was fabricated. VI R. 25. In reviewing the findings, it is not our function to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Thompson v. Rockwell International Corp., 811 F.2d 1345, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 575-76 (1985)). Instead, we review only for clear error. Id. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Upon examining the entire record, we find no clear error in the district court's findings.

Given the district court's finding that much of Plaintiff's testimony was fabricated, Defendant cross-appeals, arguing that the district court should have awarded it reasonable attorney's fees. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k),²  a district court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant if it finds that the plaintiff's "claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978). In this case, it is clear that the district court thought that the action was frivolous. Nevertheless, the court denied attorney's fees.

We review the district court's attorney's fees determination for an abuse of discretion, but we review de novo the legal standard which informed the court's discretion. See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing 5A J. Moore and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice § 52.03 (1985)). Exercising de novo review, we find error in the district court's legal analysis, for the court misapprehended its authority to award attorney's fees based on a credibility determination.³  District courts are to "resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22. However, this admonition is merely cautionary and in no way precludes a district court from concluding that an action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless" after hearing the merits of the case. Many courts have granted attorney's fees to prevailing defendants after hearing the merits of the plaintiffs' cases. See Blue v. United States Department of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 535 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 711 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1983); Coleman v. General Motors Corp., 667 F.2d 704 (8th Cir. 1981); Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). See also Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965, 967 (4th Cir. 1988) (In the § 1988 context, " [a]lthough in some instances a frivolous case will be quickly revealed as such, it may sometimes be necessary for defendants to 'blow away the smoke screens the plaintiffs had thrown up' before the defendants may prevail.") (quoting Hicks v. Southern Maryland Health Systems Agency, 805 F.2d 1165, 1167-68 (4th Cir. 1986)).

The district court seemed to base its determination on the possible "chilling effect on future plaintiffs," see supra note 3, but the very purpose of awarding prevailing defendants attorney's fees is to deter or chill frivolous litigation. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420 (" [W]hile Congress wanted to clear the way for suits to be brought under the Act, it also wanted to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis."). In this case, the court specifically found that much of plaintiff's testimony was fabricated. This, to us, is close to a finding that the action was brought in bad faith, and bad faith provides "an even stronger basis for charging [plaintiff] with the attorney's fees incurred by the defense." Id. at 422. Even so, the ultimate determination of whether to grant attorney's fees rests in the discretion of the district court. We remand for a determination of whether to grant attorney's fees in accordance with the proper legal standard as set forth in Christiansburg.⁴ 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.