United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Dallas E. Scott, Defendant-appellant, 947 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Dallas E. Scott appeals pro se the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his the sentence imposed upon his 1976 conviction for armed bank robbery. We review de novo, Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1986), and affirm.

Scott contends that the district court improperly utilized cases decided subsequent to his conviction in ruling on the issues raised in his section 2255 motion. Scott argues that the cases used by the district court should only be given prospective effect and may not be used in analyzing "previous or pending cases."¹  This contention lacks merit.

As a general rule, judicial decisions apply retroactively. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973). "Indeed, a legal system based on precedent has a built-in presumption of retroactivity." Solem v. Stumes 465 U.S. 638, 642 (1984).

Here, the district court properly relied upon post-1976 case-law in ruling on Scott's section 2255 motion. The cases the district court relied on did nothing more than explain the legal standard to be used in analyzing the claims raised in Scott's section 2255 motion. Furthermore, Scott does not specify how the outcome would be different if pre-1976 case-law were applied. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Scott's section 2255 motion.

AFFIRMED.