Ernest G. Moore, Petitioner-appellant, v. Richard R. Thornburgh, J. Michael Quinlan, G.l. Henman, Neilgoldschmidt, Booth Gardner, Respondents-appellees, 944 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1991)

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir.R. 36.3

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument

The petitioner in Stevenson was transferred to USPL from Pennsylvania. Petitioner herein was transferred to USPL by the Oregon Department of Corrections from his then-current assignment to a Washington state prison on a prisoner exchange program between Washington and Oregon. See Dist.Ct.R. doc. 30 ex. A (contract between Washington and Oregon detailing terms of the prisoner exchange). Petitioner was transferred to USPL pursuant to a contract between Oregon and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, see Dist.Ct.R. doc. 27 attachm. 2 (agreement between the State of Oregon and the Federal Bureau of Prisons), under the authority of Or.Rev.Stat. § 421.205. Although petitioner asserts that the governors of the states of Oregon and Washington were appropriate respondents in this case, the district court was correct to dismiss these two named respondents. See Blango v. Thornburgh, --- F.2d ----, 1991 WL 154940, slip op. at 11-12 & n. 10 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1991)

Based on his claim that Oregon had lost jurisdiction over him upon transfer to USPL, petitioner objected to the Oregon Board of Parole's notice of parole hearing. In its order on the merits, the district court noted that because the court found that Oregon retained jurisdiction over petitioner while he was at USPL, it would "not address petitioner's claim that the Oregon Board of Parole is without authority to take any action regarding petitioner's state sentence." Dist.Ct.R. doc. 37 at 5. This disposition of petitioner's request is correct.

In addition to the compact clause claims raised in the Stevenson case, petitioner herein filed a motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, Dist.Ct.R. doc. 34. Petitioner claimed that his right of access to the courts was compromised by changes in USPL's administration of the prison's law library facilities. Petitioner alleged that these changes "obstruct [ed petitioner's] ability to render adequate MUTUAL ASSISTANCE to other prisoners [as a self-described 'jailhouse lawyer']." Id. at 1. This motion was identical to that submitted to the district court by a fellow inmate at USPL who was also pursuing a habeas corpus petition based on an alleged violation of the compact clause after transfer from a state prison. That motion was denied by the district court on the grounds that the allegation of impediment to right of access to the courts must be brought by or on behalf of one whose right has been affected, not on behalf of the party attempting to provide legal assistance to that person. See, Johnston v. Thornburgh, No. 90-3464-R, Order at 7, 1991 WL 49649 (unpubl.) (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 1991). The district court's analysis of the motion in Johnston was correct. The district court apparently neglected to include its analysis of the issue in its order dismissing the petition we consider here, but that omission is harmless because the claim is without merit.