Unpublished Disposition, 937 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1991)Annotate this Case
Norman E. TEDDER, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Neil GOLDSCHMIDT, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 27, 1991.* Decided July 1, 1991.
Before SCHROEDER, FLETCHER and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Norman E. Tedder, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We review de novo, Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1989), and we affirm.
Tedder brought this action seeking damages against former Governor Neil Goldschmidt, Oregon Board of Parole members Vernon Faatz, Douglas Dinsmore, Richard Groener, Arlene Samuelson, and Roosevelt Robertson, the Parole Board's legal counsel, Assistant Attorney General James S. McAlister, and the "enterprise and eneties" of the state of Oregon. Tedder's complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to extend his original parole date in retaliation for his litigation activities, and that they committed an "ex post facto law violation" by requiring him to undergo a psychological evaluation before he could be considered for parole.
The district court correctly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants are immune from liability for damages, and therefore are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. First, the eleventh amendment bars Tedder's action for damages against the state of Oregon and state officials acting in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Moreover, Tedder's claim against former Governor Goldschmidt is based solely on the theory of respondeat superior, which is not a basis for liability under section 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978).
Tedder's claims against Faatz, Dinsmore, Groener, Samuelson, and Robertson are also barred. Members of the Oregon Board of Parole are entitled to absolute immunity from damages, based on their quasi-judicial status, for their decision to postpone Tedder's parole date. See Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1983) (parole board members are absolutely immune when they act to grant, deny, or revoke parole). Similarly, Tedder's claim against McAlister is barred by absolute immunity. See Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985) (absolute prosecutorial immunity applies in state administrative proceedings).