Unpublished Disposition, 931 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1990)

Annotate this Case
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 931 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1990)

David SUDDUTH, Petitioner-Appellant,v.William GASPAR, Deputy Warden, Arizona Attorney General,Respondents-Appellees.

No. 90-15926.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 15, 1991.* Decided April 23, 1991.

Before D.W. NELSON, KOZINSKI and THOMAS G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

David Sudduth, now a Colorado state prisoner, appeals pro se the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for emergency temporary restraining order. Sudduth requested the district court bar his extradition to Colorado, based upon an alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The district court denied Sudduth's motion for a temporary restraining order and later dismissed his action, finding that Sudduth had in fact not filed a habeas petition, but simply a motion for a temporary restraining order. We affirm the decision of the district court.

Sudduth filed his petition and motion on March 13, 1990, while in prison in Arizona. Sudduth sought his future release from custody after he satisfied his Arizona sentence, in essence asking the court to rule that Colorado had "lost any interest" over him. On March 20, 1990, the district court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. On May 9, 1990, the district court received notice of Sudduth's change of address from the state prison at Tucson, Arizona, to the state prison at Buena Vista, Colorado. On May 11, 1990, the district court dismissed Sudduth's action with prejudice. The court explained that " [i]t is clear from reviewing this document [Sudduth's petition and motion] that it is a motion for a temporary restraining order and not an actual habeas petition." As the court further noted, once Sudduth had been turned over to the authorities in Colorado, his case in Arizona was moot, even if it were to be construed as a habeas petition.

Sudduth's basic argument on appeal is that the district court should have granted his motion for a temporary restraining order. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of the motion. See Religious Technology Center, Church of Scientology Int'l, Inc. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1989).

The district court correctly reasoned that once the motion for a temporary restraining order was disposed of there were no additional claims pending in the action. The court properly dismissed the action. The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

 *

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4