Unpublished Disposition, 930 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1989)Annotate this Case
Brian REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.HYATT REGENCY SCOTTSDALE HOTEL, Karl Eller, Harry Merlo, Wm.G. McGowan, Harland Adams, Edward L. Gaylord,Harold Holder, Paul B. Smucker andThomas A. Klein, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 4, 1991.* Decided March 21, 1991.
Before HUG, ALARCON and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.
Brian Reynolds appeals pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. This court has jurisdiction of Reynolds' timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and reviews grants of summary judgement de novo. Kruso v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the "absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In the instant case, the defendants met this burden. Their motions for summary judgment are adequately supported with sworn declarations setting forth factual assertions.
As the party opposing motions for summary judgment, Reynolds cannot rest upon the mere allegations of his pleadings. Instead, he must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). In this regard, Reynolds has the burden of presenting "affirmative evidence". Id. at 257. Reynolds failed to meet this burden. He failed to come forward with evidence contradicting the factual assertions presented by the defendants in their motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that there was no issue of material fact for trial.
Additionally, we find that the district court correctly concluded that the applicable law dictates that summary judgment for the defendants is appropriate. In this regard, we adopt the reasoning set forth by the district court in its order dated December 19, 1989.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.