Unpublished Disposition, 930 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Benjamin F. Steele appeals pro se the district court's entry of judgment in favor of Arizona state agencies on his employment discrimination claims. Steele contends that the district court erred by (1) granting summary judgment without ruling on his motion to compel discovery; (2) concluding that he failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1988) (Title VII); and (3) dismissing his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), the fourteenth amendment, and Arizona state regulations on eleventh amendment immunity grounds. We affirm.

* Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to state that further discovery is necessary. See Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must clearly state what information is sought and how that information will preclude summary judgment. Id. Failure to do so is grounds for denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment. Id.

Here, Steele's motion to compel discovery requested "all applications and certification lists, and names and addresses of the evaluators, for each year that the position of Laundry Manager in Phoenix or Coolidge, Arizona, were announced, for the years 1979-1986." Steele's request does not make clear how such information would preclude summary judgment. The district court did not err by proceeding to summary judgment.

II

Steele's Title VII action was brought under a theory of disparate treatment. As part of his prima facie case, Steele was required to show that he is qualified for the position sought. See Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, the newly-classified position of laundry manager required two years of managerial experience in a "large commercial or institutional laundry." Steele's prior experience did not include laundry management. Nor did Steele's participation in a cross-training program require him to write reports, hire and fire workers, or coordinate operations. Thus, Steele failed to show he was qualified for the position. Moreover, Steele did not show that the person evaluating his application was aware of his race. See Robinson v. Adams, 847 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987) ("An employer cannot intentionally discriminate against a job applicant based on race unless the employer knows the applicant's race."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989).

Steele also appears to allege a disparate impact claim, contending that the minimum qualifications for the position were raised as a pretext, and that such qualifications have a discriminatory impact on blacks in violation of Title VII. To prove a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must present statistical evidence that a business practice, neutral on its face, has a substantial adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII. Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, Steele did not offer affidavits or documentary evidence sufficient to support his claim. Summary judgment was thus proper. See Robinson, 847 F.2d at 1318.

III

Steele contends that the district court erred by dismissing his remaining claims on eleventh amendment immunity grounds. We reject that contention. The defendants in this action are Arizona state agencies, which are immune under the eleventh amendment from damage actions brought in federal court. See Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1081 (1989).

AFFIRMED.