Unpublished Disposition, 930 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services adopted as final the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") for the Social Security Administration, denying Bernice Emerson's application for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. Upon Emerson's petition for judicial review and cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary. We affirm.

Emerson contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding that Emerson's psychological impairments do not disable her from all work. We disagree.

Only one of several medical reports, that of Dr. Cohen, a psychiatrist, supports a finding that Emerson's psychological impairments do disable her from all work. The other reports indicate psychological problems, but do not conclude that the problems disable Emerson from all work. Emerson argues that the ALJ erred by failing to give Dr. Cohen's report, the most recent, greater weight than the others. The most recent report commands greater credibility where a condition is progressive. Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986). There is no evidence Emerson's condition is progressive, however. Instead, Emerson claims she has been totally disabled since her lay-off in 1985. Therefore, the ALJ need not have specially credited Dr. Cohen's report.

Emerson also argues that Dr. Cohen's is more comprehensive and so commands greater credibility than the other reports. See, e.g., Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1987) (cursory examination and report by consulting physician do not constitute substantial evidence). While Dr. Cohen reviewed Emerson's records and interviewed her for one hour, Dr. Cohen did not, herself, test Emerson. Dr. Cohen was hired at the behest of Emerson's attorney. She was not a treating doctor, but served rather as an evaluator or consulting physician. In comparison to other reports in the record, Dr. Cohen's report, although possibly more comprehensive than some, is not the most comprehensive one in the record.

The ALJ found that Dr. Cohen's report contained "numerous inconsistencies" and concluded " [f]rankly, this report is not at all credible." E.R. at 9. He was explicit in his reasons for reaching this conclusion. There is substantial evidence in the record to support his view. Since all of the other doctors, including her treating physician found her capable of performing at least light work and not limited in any significant manner by any mental or other impairments, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Emerson is not disabled from performing light work.

Emerson argues that substantial evidence fails to support a finding that Emerson's testimony of "excess pain" is incredible. See Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986). Emerson's argument is misdirected. The ALJ specifically supported his finding with citation to Emerson's own reports to physicians as well as to her testimony concerning her daily activities and her symptoms. He also evaluated this evidence in light of the objective clinical findings made by the doctors. Cf. id. (specific findings must justify an ALJ's decision to disbelieve testimony about subjective pain). On this record, we find the ALJ's conclusion supported by substantial evidence.

Finally, Emerson argues that the Secretary failed to carry the government's burden of proof to show what specific, gainful employment Emerson could perform despite her impairments once it was conceded that she could no longer perform her old job. Emerson asserts that the vocational expert's answer to the hypothetical question posed to him by the ALJ "had no evidentiary value," Bl.Br. at 26, because it did not contain "all of Plaintiff's subjective limitations", id. We assume he is referring to her claims of constant pain and mental disability. In light of the ALJ's findings that Emerson did not suffer disabling non-exertional limitations, the hypothetical did not need to take into account such limitations.

Emerson's further allegation that the expert confused "acquired skills" with "worker traits" is unfounded. The vocational expert explained the difference and made it clear that Emerson in her previous job as an electronics coating operator had learned to follow instructions and to operate production-type machinery, adjust machine controls, manipulate hand tools and to reassemble objects following prescribed standards and guidelines. He testified that these skills were transferable and that they would enable her to perform available jobs in the economy. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusions that Emerson is able to perform semi-skilled, sedentary work, and that such work is available in the economy.

CONCLUSION

Substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusions about Emerson's psychological impairments, her credibility, and her ability to perform semi-skilled, sedentary work. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED and the Petition for Review is Denied.