Unpublished Disposition, 927 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Kukes, a state prisoner, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, Kukes alleges that court personnel fraudulently altered or forged some documents relating to his appeal of a conviction for the killing of his wife. He requested monetary relief in the amount of $400,000 in damages from each of the named defendants. The district judge referred the matter to the magistrate who entered findings and recommendations which stated that the complaint should be considered as one for habeas corpus. Since the magistrate read it as challenging the validity of Kukes' conviction, he recommended the complaint or application for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.

Kukes complains that while a particular preliminary hearing was held on June 25, the transcript and certificate of record showed the date to be July 25. This clerical error was apparently corrected during his appeal. Kukes alleges that the July 25 date was fraudulently entered, or forged, and therefore these court personnel are liable to him for damages under Sec. 1983. The district court determined that even if the action were to proceed under Sec. 1983, Kukes had stated no claim for relief because the court personnel named were protected by "absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil violations when they performed tasks that are an integral part of a judicial process."

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review.

This court reviews de novo a petition for habeas corpus. U.S. v. Popoola, 881 F.2d 811, 812 (9th Cir. 1989). If the district court had treated Kukes' complaint as a proper Sec. 1983 action, the standard of review would be the same. A dismissal under rule 12(b) (6) is also subject to de novo review. Woodrum v. Woodward County Okla., 866 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989).

B. Analysis.

The district court determined that even if the action were to proceed as a Sec. 1983 action, Kukes has stated no claim for relief because the court personnel named were protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. We agree. The court personnel have absolute immunity for damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process. Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988).

The relevant focus is on the specific actions of the court officer. If the challenged conduct was within the scope of his or her duties, the court officer enjoys absolute immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). It is only when court personnel are acting outside their authority that their conduct can be attacked.

Here, the court clerk, recorder and reporter were all acting as court employees. They were responsible for the filing and preservation of court records which were integral to the judicial process. Consequently, even if Kukes' allegations were true, these court personnel would be immune from liability. The complaint has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Whether this case is treated as a habeas petition or a civil rights action, it has no merit.

AFFIRMED.