Unpublished Disposition, 927 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1995)
Annotate this CaseClarence E. BLAIR, Petitioner-Appellant,v.Michael QUINLAN, Respondent-Appellee,Richard H. Rison, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 89-55994.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 13, 1990.* Decided Feb. 27, 1991.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, No. CV-88-1992-SVW; Steven V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding.
C.D. Cal.
AFFIRMED.
MEMORANDUM**
Before BRUNETTI, FERNANDEZ and THOMAS G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Clarence Blair appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on jurisdictional grounds. He asserts that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the merits of his petition. We affirm.
FACTS
Petitioner Blair was convicted of second degree murder in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and sentenced to prison for ten years to life. Subsequently, he was convicted of second degree murder in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and sentenced to a consecutive life prison term.
Blair was placed in the custody of the Attorney General and confined at the Lorton Correctional Complex in Virginia, which is maintained by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. Parole decisions at Lorton are made by the District of Columbia Parole Board pursuant to the D.C. Code. While at Lorton, Blair successfully challenged his parole eligibility computation. As a result, he became eligible for parole consideration ten years earlier than originally calculated, that is February 14, 1985 rather than February 13, 1995.
However, within a few days of this finding, Blair was transferred to the federal penitentiary in Lompoc, California, which is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Parole decisions at Lompoc are made by the United States Parole Commission pursuant to Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a), Blair remained eligible for immediate parole consideration, but he claims it is "harder" for him to make parole before the U.S. Parole Commission than it is before the D.C. Parole Board. For this reason, Blair contends that the transfer was retaliatory and in violation of his due process rights.
Blair filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court on April 12, 1988. The court denied the petition on July 7, 1989, and Blair now appeals.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
We review de novo the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 1987).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner Blair does not challenge the legality of his confinement, nor the length of his sentence. He challenges his transfer to another prison. That is merely a condition of his confinement.1 Under Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1979), a habeas corpus petition is an inappropriate remedy for challenges to conditions of confinement rather than legality or duration of confinement. See also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-86, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1833-34, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973).
The fact that Blair's transfer to Lompoc may affect the duration of his confinement does not make his petition a challenge to duration. To the extent any "harder" parole suitability standards have been triggered, duration is merely incidental to the allegedly unconstitutional transfer condition. Therefore, the district court was correct in determining that it had no jurisdiction over Blair's habeas petition.2
AFFIRMED.
The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without oral argument pursuant to 9th Cir.R. 34-4 and Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
Moreover, Blair's transfer from a D.C. facility to a federal facility may not have triggered a different set of parole guidelines at all. See Brewer v. Swinson, 837 F.2d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 1988); Walker v. Luther, 830 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Williford, 821 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1987)
We note that if this were indeed a U.S. Parole Commission matter, an issue we need not decide, Blair would not be entitled to relief at this time because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1983)
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