Unpublished Disposition, 925 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1990)

Annotate this Case
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 925 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1990)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Wayne Patrick GEBRO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 90-50419.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 4, 1991.Decided Feb. 22, 1991.

Before BEEZER, KOZINSKI and RYMER, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM* 

The duress instruction correctly stated the three elements of the defense. However, the district court added a fourth element: "Even if these three elements are shown to exist the defendant, [sic] must further show that he submitted to the proper authorities after attaining a position of safety." R.T. 5/2/90, at 217-18. Adding surrender as a fourth element was improper and constitutes reversible error.

In crimes such as prison escape, where evasion of law enforcement authorities constitutes an element of the crime charged, surrender is properly a fourth element of the defense. United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1984). However, where the elements of the crime charged do not include continuing separation from authorities, surrender is merely a factor the jury may consider in determining whether the defendant ceased to commit the crime at the first reasonable opportunity. United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1214 (1989) (drug smuggling). This is the case where the crime is aiding and abetting a bank robbery.1 

Since we reverse the conviction because the duress instruction improperly made surrender an element of the defense, we need not address defendant's argument that the district court committed plain error by misstating the burden of proof. For the same reason, we need not reach defendant's argument that the trial court improperly provided the jury with extrinsic evidence after it began deliberating.

REVERSED.

 *

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

 1

The district court's error may have been caused by its misapprehension of the applicable principles. Assisting bank robbers in making their escape, including flight in hot pursuit, clearly constitutes the crime of aiding and abetting a bank robbery. See United States v. Lovato, 740 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1984). The district court so instructed the jury in this case, but added language which could be construed to mean that the defendant continued to commit the crime of aiding and abetting by evading arrest even after the bank robbers and money were no longer in his vehicle: " [I]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided the robbers by fleeing before the possibility of hot pursuit had ended, then you must find him guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery." R.T. 5/2/90, at 210-11 (emphasis added). There is no case law to support the notion that a getaway driver continues to commit the crime of aiding and abetting by fleeing after the principals and the fruits of their crime have left his vehicle

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.