Unpublished Disposition, 925 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991)

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US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 925 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991)

Maria PORZYCKA, Petitioner,v.U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 90-70352.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 4, 1991.* Decided Feb. 6, 1991.

Before TANG, SCHROEDER and CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Maria Porzycka, a native and citizen of Poland, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") decision upholding the immigration judge's ("IJ") denial of her applications for asylum and withholding of deportation. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) & 1253(h). The BIA held that Porzycka had failed to establish her eligibility for asylum on the basis of either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a and deny Porzycka's petition for review.

We review factual findings underlying the BIA's denial of applications for asylum and withholding of deportation under the substantial evidence standard. Alonzo v. INS, 915 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1990). We review de novo the BIA's determinations involving questions of law. Id.

An alien who demonstrates "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" is eligible for the discretionary relief of asylum. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A)), aff'd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).1 

An alien may establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988) ("past persecution, without more, satisfies the [statutory requirement for asylum eligibility] ... even independent of establishing a well founded fear of future persecution"); accord Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Chen, Int.Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989). Although there is no precise definition of persecution, we have held "that persecution involves the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive." Desir, 840 F.2d at 727 (quotation omitted). The dangers faced by the alien, however, must differ appreciably from the dangers faced by his fellow citizens. Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d, 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1987).

The well-founded fear standard contains "both a subjective and [an] objective component." Desir, 840 F.2d at 726. The subjective component requires a showing that the alien's fear is genuine. Id. The objective component requires the alien to show credible, direct, and specific evidence of facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution. See id.

Here, the IJ found Porzycka to be credible and sincere in her testimony regarding her fear of persecution. The BIA did not challenge this finding. Accordingly, Porzycka's statements satisfy the subjective component. See Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1985) (if the BIA is silent on the issue of credibility, the petitioner's testimony is presumed credible). Both the IJ and the BIA, however, found that Porzycka had failed to satisfy the objective component based on past persecution or on a reasonable fear of future persecution. We agree.

First, substantial evidence supports the BIA's finding that the Polish government's past treatment of Porzycka does not rise to the level of persecution. See Desir, 840 F.2d at 727. Although Porzycka's passport was cancelled when she returned to Poland in 1982, she subsequently was able to obtain permission to return abroad to complete her studies. Porzycka contends that in her effort to obtain a new passport, Polish authorities persecuted her by requiring her to wait five hours and then questioning her for another three hours about her activities at home and abroad, her prior refusal to join the communist party, and her personal life. This detention does not demonstrate persecution given the following: (1) Porzycka was detained for only three hours; (2) Poland, at the time, was under a state of martial law; (3) Porzycka was not mistreated, threatened, or arrested during the incident; and (4) the authorities, at the conclusion of the questioning, granted her permission to leave the country, and later granted her a five-year renewal of her passport. Cf. Mendez-Efrain v. INS, 813 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1987) (the fact that alien was detained by the military for four days and was released without being tortured or threatened constituted substantial evidence that alien would not be subject to persecution). Under these circumstances, the BIA did not err in finding that Porzycka was ineligible for asylum based on past persecution.

Second, substantial evidence supports the BIA's finding that Porzycka did not established a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her refusal to join the Polish communist party and on her brief encounter with Polish authorities regarding her passport. See Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (" [t]here must be a valid reason for the fear"); Vides-Vides, 783 F.2d at 1469 (alien must present facts that would support a "reasonable" fear that the alien faces persecution). Porzycka was not politically active nor did she present evidence that she or her family had ever been threatened, mistreated or arrested on account of their political opinions, race, nationality, religion or membership in a social organization. Moreover, Porzycka failed to present evidence that her experience created the reasonable possibility that, upon her return to Poland, she would be persecuted on account one of these protected categories. As the BIA observed, Porzycka offered no evidence that the temporary cancellation of her passport and subsequent questioning were anything more than "an example of a totalitarian regime's means of internal security during a period of martial law." Administrative Record at 5.

In addition, the BIA took administrative notice of the recent and dramatic change in the government of Poland and found that, based on these developments, Porzycka had failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of future persecution.

Accordingly, we hold that the BIA did not err in affirming the IJ's denial of Porzycka's applications for asylum and withholding of deportation.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

 *

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

 1

Section 1158(a) provides that the applicant for asylum must qualify as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A). 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). The specified grounds are actually listed in section 1101(a) (42) (A)

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