Unpublished Disposition, 925 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Clayton Myer appeals from the district court's denial of a motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in his Sec. 1983 class action to remedy overcrowding in the Orange County Courthouse holding cells. After a two year stay, the County moved to dismiss and Myer sought attorneys' fees on the ground that the action was a catalyst for change in the courthouse facilities. The court found that the overcrowding had been remedied, but it declined to exercise jurisdiction for reasons of comity and consequently did not rule on the merits of Myer's motion for attorneys' fees. We review de novo the district court's decision as to the exercise of jurisdiction, United States v. Moncini, 882 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1989), and reverse and remand.

* The County claims that Myer filed an untimely appeal. Final judgment was entered on March 9, 1990, and Myer filed a motion for post-judgment attorneys' fees twenty-nine days later on April 7, 1990. According to White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 102 S. Ct. 1162, 71 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1982), a post-judgment request for attorneys' fees under Sec. 1988 is not subject to the ten-day requirement of Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A notice of appeal was filed within eight days of Myer's motion thereby satisfying the 30-day requirement of Rule 4(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, the appeal was timely.

II

Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise their jurisdiction. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976). "This obligation is particularly weighty when those seeking a hearing in federal court are asserting ... their right to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979).

Moreover, where there is jurisdiction, a court is only justified in abstaining from exercising that jurisdiction in a few exceptional circumstances. " [T]he doctrine of abstention remains 'an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a controversy property before it.' " Miofsky v. Superior Court, 703 F.2d 332, 338 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188, 79 S. Ct. 1060, 1063, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1163 (1959)). Although the district court did not directly abstain in this case, it declined to exercise jurisdiction on account of "principles of comity."

No abstention doctrine applies in this case. Younger and Colorado River both require a concurrent state proceeding which is not a factor here. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976). Pullman abstention requires ambiguous state law, Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1941), and Burford abstention concerns cases in which a decision of a federal court would impair efforts to implement state policy. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1943). Burford abstention also applies to cases where the state has established a complicated regulatory scheme. Id. State law does not appear to be involved and a federal court decision would not impair any state policy or complicated regulatory scheme. Despite the fact that the overcrowding concerns a "local matter," the district court had jurisdiction over the action seeking relief for constitutional deprivations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Attorneys' fees are awarded to a "prevailing party" in a Sec. 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. "Plaintiffs prevailing in a civil rights action 'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.' " Mayer v. Wedgewood Neighborhood Coalition, 707 F.2d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978)).

A party who does not win on the merits is not necessarily precluded from attaining "prevailing party" status. A plaintiff may be a "prevailing party" if the lawsuit is causally linked to the relief obtained and the plaintiff's claims have a legal basis. Sablan v. Department of Finance, 856 F.2d 1317, 1325 (9th Cir. 1988). The application of this test involves a factual evaluation which is left to the district court. Without intimating any view on resolution of this question, we believe the district court should consider whether Myer was such a catalyst, without reference to the court's jurisdiction.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.