Unpublished Disposition, 925 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Roger Knight appeals from the district court's ruling on his section 1983 claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. He alleges first, that the district court erred in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent state authorities from seizing his wages and second, that the procedure whereby his wages were seized is unconstitutional. We affirm with respect to the first challenge and decline to address the second.

* A

The denial of a preliminary injunction is interlocutorily appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1988).

B

This court has previously held that

[t]he grant or denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction lies within the discretion of the district court. Its order granting or denying the injunction will be reversed only if the district court relied on an erroneous legal premise or abused its discretion. A district court's order is reversible for legal error if the court does not employ the appropriate legal standards which govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction, or if, in applying the appropriate standards, the court misapprehends the law with respect to the underlying issues in litigation.

Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Under this extremely deferential standard, we must affirm. Knight has revealed no "erroneous legal premise" to support his appeal, and it is apparent from the face of the district court's order that the court applied the appropriate legal standard by which to assess the propriety of injunctive relief. See Knight v. Bell, No. 90-535 at 2-3 (W.D. Wash. June 5, 1990) (citing and applying Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 1985)).

Moreover, in Duranceau v. Wallace, 743 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1984), this court explicitly rejected a claim that Washington's procedures for the collection of child support violate due process by failing to provide prompt postgarnishment hearings to delinquent parents. In light of that decision, we can hardly say that the district court abused its discretion when it found an insufficient possibility of irreparable harm to Knight and an improbability of his success on the merits. Similarly, there is no abuse in holding that the balance of hardships favors ensuring support for a dependent child while a parent's litigation proceeds.

II

We lack jurisdiction to address Knight's underlying constitutional challenge because the district court has not yet finally ruled on the matter. Despite Knight's obvious desire to have us reach the merits and appellee's willingness to proceed in the interests of "judicial economy," the record remains incomplete, and the parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement.

AFFIRMED.