Unpublished Disposition, 922 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1991)

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US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 922 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1991)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Charles Edward WIGGINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89-50604.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 6, 1990.Decided Jan. 7, 1991.

Before WALLACE, O'SCANNLAIN and RYMER, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM* 

Charles Wiggins appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress after entering a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(g). We affirm.

* Wiggins contends that officers of the Los Angeles Police Department unreasonably executed a search warrant at his residence. When the officers arrived, the front door was open but it was surrounded by a porch area which was barred and locked. Wiggins came onto the porch, but told the officers that he would have to get the key inside. They restrained him and forcibly entered the residence through another door. The officers knew that Wiggins had carried a gun, been convicted for possession of firearms, often did business with narcotics customers in the house, did not live alone and could use the opportunity to arm himself or destroy evidence. The district court correctly found under the totality of circumstances that the officers' forcible entry was reasonable. United States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 909 (9th Cir. 1980) ("refusal of admittance" unnecessary where officers believed that defendant inside house was dangerous, possessed a handgun, and might also attempt to destroy evidence unless they acted quickly), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1004, 101 S. Ct. 1717, 68 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1981).

II

After releasing Wiggins and searching the residence, the officers asked to search a car they saw in the garage. Wiggins agreed and gave them the keys. Wiggins contends that the presence of officers who had been armed when they arrived, and had handcuffed him to the porch while breaking into his house, vitiates his consent. However in light of evidence that on another occasion Wiggins had refused permission to officers to search his house, he had previous experience with law enforcement and knew he had the right to object, and understood what he was doing, the district court did not clearly err in finding the consent voluntary. See United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1985).1 

III

Wiggins also contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress illegal firearms seized during a protective sweep of his residence after he was arrested outside of the house. Because this evidence pertains only to a count that was dismissed, it is unnecessary to reach this issue.

AFFIRMED.

 *

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

 1

Wiggins suggests that the existence of the search warrant renders his consent ineffectual under Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S. Ct. 2319, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920 (1979). In Lo-Ji Sales the defendant simply did what he was told as officers made a sweeping search pursuant to a general warrant. The Court observed that his compliance with official requests could not, on the record in that case, amount to freely and voluntarily given "consent" such that otherwise illegal acts would be validated. The circumstances in this case are not similar and the fact that the officers had a search warrant for Wiggins' address does not render the consent he actually gave involuntary

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