Unpublished Disposition, 921 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1990)Annotate this Case
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Joaquin TORRES-HUERTA, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 6, 1990.* Decided Dec. 5, 1990.
Before SCHROEDER, WIGGINS and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Joaquin Torres-Huerta pled guilty to one count of making a false statement to obtain student aid, and one count of illegal use of an alien registration receipt card. He served 90 days in prison and five years' probation, and has made full restitution in the amount of $4,239. Torres filed a motion to expunge his conviction in federal district court. He contends that expungement is warranted in his case because his conviction was an "aberration" in an otherwise law-abiding life, and because it is the only impediment to his receiving amnesty from the INS. The district court denied Torres' motion, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to expunge the conviction. We affirm.
Torres correctly asserts that there is some authority suggesting that a federal district court has the power to expunge criminal records. See, e.g., Geary v. United States, 901 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1990); Diamond v. United States, 649 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit has stated that a district court may order expungement in cases where there has been official misconduct or denial of a substantial constitutional right. See, e.g., Maurer v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., 691 F.2d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1982) (authorizing expungement where defendant claimed his arrest was unconstitutional); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1978) (recognizing power to expunge where individual challenged constitutionality of conviction); Wilson v. Webster, 467 F.2d 1282, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1972) (recognizing power to expunge arrest record where individuals acquitted or charges dismissed and arrest due to police misconduct); see also United States v. G, 774 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1985) (insufficient factual record to determine if expungement appropriate, but suggesting expungement permitted in some circumstances). However, there is no suggestion that Torres' conviction was invalid or unlawfully obtained; indeed, he concedes the validity of the underlying convictions.
The factors which Torres claims entitle him to relief are merely the intended collateral consequences of his conviction. They do not create the "extreme circumstances" or infringement of a "substantial right" necessary to warrant expungement, even assuming such power exists. United States v. Sweeney, No. 89-10418, slip op. at 11357 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1990); see United States v. Stromick, 710 F. Supp. 613 (D. Md. 1989) (convicted individual's subsequent law-abiding life does not warrant expungement); Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981) (expungement of conviction does not negate conviction for purposes of deportation statutes). Therefore, we affirm.