Unpublished Disposition, 919 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1990)Annotate this Case
Jeffrey Alan HOLMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 27, 1990.* Decided Nov. 29, 1990.
Before WALLACE, DAVID R. THOMPSON and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey Alan Holman appeals pro se the district court's orders dismissing his civil rights action against the Board of Regents of the University of California ("Board of Regents") and its members, and granting summary judgment in favor of International House at U.C. Berkeley, its Board of Directors, and numerous unnamed defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Holman brought this action seeking damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Holman's complaints alleged that while he was a law student at Boalt Hall and living at International House, he was discriminated against and harassed because of his radical political beliefs. Holman alleged numerous violations of his constitutional rights by employees of U.C. Berkeley and International House, including not being allowed to play the piano at certain times, having to change rooms several times, being placed in a room where loud drilling occurred nearby on the day before a law school exam, being told that he "would make a good lawyer," having letters from prominent leftists disappear from his room, not receiving telephone messages, and being pressured to pay his bills promptly.
* The district court did not err in dismissing Holman's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims for damages and injunctive relief against the Board of Regents and its individual members. The eleventh amendment bars suits in federal court against an unconsenting state and its agencies regardless of the type of relief sought. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The Board of Regents constitutes an instrumentality of the state and therefore is immune from suit under the eleventh amendment. Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, Holman's section 1983 and 1985 claims against the Board of Regents were properly dismissed.
Moreover, the eleventh amendment bars suits for damages against state officials when the state is the real party in interest. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101. Although the eleventh amendment does not bar federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief for constitutional violations by state officials, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the district court correctly ruled that no prospective injunctive relief is available here for the alleged violations of Holman's constitutional rights. Accordingly, Holman's section 1983 and 1985 claims against individual members of the Board of Regents were properly dismissed.
The district court did not err in dismissing Holman's claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because (1) none of Holman's complaints specified a title or section of the Act under which he was entitled to relief, and (2) Holman's allegation that he was discriminated against because he is a radical is not sufficient to state a claim under either Title VI or Title VII, the only provisions of the Act that create a private cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
The district court did not err in dismissing Holman's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1986 claims against International House for failure to state a claim. A properly pleaded claim under section 1985(3) must contain an allegation of racial or class-based invidious discrimination. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Here, Holman alleged only that he was discriminated against because he was a radical. The district court correctly ruled that this allegation is not sufficient to state a claim under section 1985(3). See id.; DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, because Holman's complaint did not contain a valid section 1985 claim, the district court correctly dismissed his section 1986 claim. See Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).
Lastly, the district court correctly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Holman's section 1983 claims against International House, its Board of Directors, and numerous unnamed employees. To state section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege facts which show a deprivation of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Here, despite four opportunities to amend his original complaint, Holman failed to present facts to support his allegation that International House and the individual defendants act under color of state law. Moreover, none of the actions the defendants allegedly took against Holman rise to the level of a deprivation of a constitutional right. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted because Holman failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact and the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4. Accordingly, Holman's request for oral argument is denied. Holman's motion for judicial notice of documents relating to his previous appeal also is denied
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
Holman also contends that the assignment to his case of a district court judge appointed by former President Reagan violates his right to due process. This contention is patently frivolous