Unpublished Disposition, 917 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Richard Bacon appeals the district court's orders (1) quashing return of service of summons and dismissing his pleading against Municipal Court of California, Mount Diablo Judicial District and Contra Costa District Attorney ("Court and District Attorney") under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (5) and 8(a) and (e) (1), and (2) dismissing California Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") from this action with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). We dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

We raise sua sponte the issue of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Abernathy v. Southern California Edison, 885 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1989). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders of the district court. Ordinarily, an order dismissing a complaint rather than dismissing the action is not appealable under section 1291 unless it is clear that the court concluded the action could not be saved by amendment, or if it appears that the court intended the dismissal to dispose of the entire action. Gerritsen v. de la Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1514 (9th Cir. 1987); Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1171 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984). Here, the district court expressly dismissed Bacon's pleading, not his underlying action. The court gave no indication that it did not believe the pleading could be saved by amendment, or that it intended to dispose of the entire action. Therefore, the court's order dismissing Bacon's pleading pursuant to Rule 8(a) and (e) (1) is not a final order reviewable in this court. See Gerritsen, 819 F.2d at 1514.

Furthermore, an order quashing service of process is also not a final order in the sense of terminating the action below, and thus is not normally reviewable in this court. Stevens v. Security Pac. Nat'l. Bank, 538 F.2d 1387, 1388 (9th Cir. 1976). Because defendants were all still amenable to process, the order quashing return of service of summons did not terminate the action, and there was no final appealable order entered as to defendants Court and District Attorney.

Finally, the dismissal of one party where the action is not terminated as to other parties does not constitute a final appealable order. See Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1986); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1980).¹  In this case, the district court did not issue a final order as to defendants Court and District Attorney; thus, the action has not been terminated as to those parties. Accordingly, the order dismissing the DMV from the action with prejudice is not appealable. Therefore, the entire appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.²