Unpublished Disposition, 917 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Edmundo Campos appeals his sentence, following conviction on a guilty plea, for conspiracy to distribute and distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 846. Campos alleges that the district court erred by (1) imposing a term of supervised release, because the relevant statutes precluded any term of post-incarceration supervision;¹  (2) basing Campos' sentence in part on admissions he made to an undercover agent during the course of a sting operation; and (3) imposing a disproportionate sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

Campos was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (ii).²  Under section 1002 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Act),³  a district court, when sentencing a defendant under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B), must also "include a term of supervised release of at least four years." Unlike other provisions of the Act which took effect on November 1, 1987, section 1002 does not carry an express provision for its effect date. See United States v. Torres, 880 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 873 (1990). In the absence of an express effective date, section 1002 took effect on the date of the statute's enactment, October 27, 1986. Id.; United States v. Meyers, 847 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1988).

Campos committed his crimes between January 1987 and August 6, 1987, and entered his guilty plea on November 10, 1988. All of these events occurred after the Act's effective date of October 27, 1986.⁴  Therefore, the district court did not err by imposing the statutorily mandated term of supervised release. See Torres, 880 F.2d at 115.

Campos argues that his admissions to the undercover agent regarding his extensive past experience in drug trafficking were clearly untrue, and that the district court abused its discretion by relying on those statements when deciding Campos' sentence.

A district court may consider a wide range of information when determining a defendant's sentence, as long as it is reasonably reliable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986); United States v. Fernandez-Vidana, 857 F.2d 673, 675 (9th Cir. 1988).

Here, Campos bragged repeatedly to the undercover agent that he had been trafficking in drugs for several years and that he usually dealt in large amounts of drugs. The government introduced an exhaustive sentencing memorandum detailing Campos' involvement in drug trafficking since at least 1981, approximately six years before he committed the crimes for which he was sentenced. The district court did not clearly err by finding the testimony regarding Campos' statements to be reliable, and properly credited those statements when determining Campos' sentence. See Fernandez-Vidana, 857 F.2d at 674-675.

Finally, Campos argues that although his sentence was below the statutory maximum penalty, it was disproportionate because he was less culpable than his codefendants who received lesser sentences.

" ' [A] defendant cannot base a challenge to his sentence solely on the lesser sentence given ... to his codefendant.' " United States v. Carpenter, No. 89-30290, slip op. 9339, 9350 (9th Cir. August 23, 1990) (quoting United States v. Boyd, 885 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1989)). Here, Campos received two concurrent fifteen-year terms of imprisonment, well within the statutory maximum of sixty years' imprisonment for his offense. This sentence did not constitute an abuse of the district court's discretion even though some codefendants received lesser sentences. See Carpenter, slip op. at 9349-50.

AFFIRMED.