Unpublished Disposition, 912 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1986)

MEMORANDUM^* 

SUMMARY

Harutyun Krboyan appeals the district court's summary judgment affirming the denial of supplement security income by the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary"). We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Paulson v. Bowen, 836 F.2d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 1988).

In reviewing the ALJ's denial of disability benefits, we will affirm if substantial evidence supports the Secretary's findings and the Secretary applied the correct legal standards. Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing evidence that both supports and opposes the Secretary's findings. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986).

Because appellant successfully established a prima facie case of disability by showing that his impairments prevented him from performing his previous work, the Secretary bore the burden of showing that appellant could perform other work. Id. at 773.

DISCUSSION

1. Whether substantial evidence supports findings

Substantial evidence supports the overall finding that appellant can perform the full range of light work as reduced by inability to withstand excessive stress.¹ 

The objective medical evidence overwhelmingly establishes that appellant physically and psychologically is not disabled. Appellant's treating physician, Dr. Gromis, early in the relevant period stated that appellant "could be rehabilitated to some lighter type of work" (December 3, 1985) and soon thereafter (January 3, 1986) ceased treatment. His medical observations, detailed in about twenty-six reports in the record, amply supported his conclusions. Gromis ceased rating appellant as "temporarily totally disabled" (which in any event was for Workers' Compensation purposes and signified only that appellant could not resume his past job, as the ALJ found) once the relevant period began. Although consulting doctors concluded that appellant was disabled, " [t]he medical opinion of a treating physician is entitled to special weight." Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989).

Further, Sweel's unremarkable clinical neurological findings did not support his conclusion of disability. Yetenekian's conclusion that appellant was disabled until his medical condition was medically stabilized was irrelevant; as a psychologist, he was not qualified to evaluate appellant's medical condition. As noted, his conclusion was inconsistent with the treating physician's view that appellant's medical condition had stabilized. The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts and ambiguities in the medical testimony. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989).² 

Substantial record evidence supports the ALJ's finding discrediting appellant's claim of disabling discomfort. As discussed above, the objective medical evidence supports the view that appellant's complaints are not disabling. Indeed, appellant told Gromis on January 3, 1986, that he had learned to live with his discomfort. Further, appellant's testimony was inconsistent internally and with information he provided to physicians. He initially testified, and had told Gromis and Sweel, that he had been hospitalized for lengthy periods and had had back surgery (which had astounded Sweel, who could not find a surgical scar) when in fact he had been hospitalized for two days and had had a nonsurgical procedure.³  Appellant used a cane when he did not need one.

Credibility findings are the sphere of the ALJ. Russell v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ's assessment of the claimant's pain is entitled to great deference. Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985).

2. Whether ALJ adequately explained findings

An ALJ may disregard a claimant's subjective pain testimony unless accompanied by evidence of "a medical condition that could be reasonably expected to produce" the full level of pain claimed. 20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.1529 and 416.929 (1989); Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1072 (9th Cir. 1990) (Wright and Wallace, JJ., concurring). An ALJ must make specific findings to that effect. Id. In Bates, the majority in concurring held the ALJ's findings sufficient to discredit Bates's pain claim where the ALJ found Bates's testimony "not supported by medical evidence" and the ALJ referred to the testimony of the treating doctors that contradicted Bates's claim.

Here, as discussed, the objective medical evidence strongly indicates that Krboyan's discomfort is not disabling. The ALJ specifically found that " [t]he claimant's testimony regarding his subjective complaints, including pain, and their effect on his ability to perform basic work-related activities was not credible in light of the objective medical evidence...." The ALJ explained his findings with adequate specificity. After exhaustively discussing the medical evidence, the ALJ concluded that "the picture examining physicians presented was certainly not consistent with that of an individual undergoing the characteristically debilitating effects of incapacitatingly severe pain." We easily can infer any small gaps in the ALJ's presentation of his analysis. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 755 (reviewing court may draw specific and legitimate inferences from ALJ's opinion; although "the ALJ did not recite the magic words, 'I reject Dr. Fox's opinion ... because....,' our cases do not require such an incantation.")⁴ 

The ALJ otherwise adequately explained his reasoning.

Contrary to appellant's contention, the ALJ was allowed to use the grids as a framework for his decision making because he found that appellant's nonexertional limitations do not significantly affect his exertional capabilities. See Bates, 894 F.2d at 1063; Razey v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986), modified, 794 F.2d 1348 (1986); see also Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989); section 200.00(e) (2), Subpt. P, Appendix 2 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Further, contrary to appellant's claim, the ALJ did consider the effect of the combination of appellant's impairments.

The ALJ correctly disregarded the vocational expert's response to counsel's hypothetical incorporating appellant's discredited subjective claims because, as discussed earlier, substantial evidence supported disbelief of these claims. An ALJ may reject as untrue the assumptions in a hypothetical posed by a claimant's attorney so long as substantial evidence supports the ALJ's view. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 756-57. (citing Martinez, 807 F.2d at 773-74).

The Secretary correctly did not make findings as to whether 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.962 ("the arduous labor regulation") applies. The arduous labor regulation applies only to a claimant with, inter alia, at least 35 years experience of "arduous unskilled physical labor." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.962. Because appellant's work as a sheet metal worker and mechanic was semiskilled, the regulation obviously is inapplicable.

AFFIRMED.